The REVIEW *of* RELIGION

Volume IV MAY, 1940 Number 4

EDITOR
Raymond C. Knox

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

SECRETARY
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

William Adams Brown
Eugene H. Byrne
Louis H. Gray
Arthur Jeffery
Eugene W. Lyman
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
Cyril C. Richardson
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1940 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

The Attitude of the Ancient World Toward Judaism. By ISAAK HEINEMANN 385
The Demands of the Religious Consciousness. By BENJAMIN MILLER 401
On Typical Misinterpretations of the Religious and Moral Experience. By MAXIMILIAN BECK 416

COMMUNICATIONS

A Survey of Studies in Cornish Hagiography and Church History. By LOUIS H. GRAY 431
A Rejoinder to Professor Niebuhr's Reply. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH 434

(Continued on next page)

BOOK REVIEWS

Elsie Clews Parsons: *Pueblo Indian Religion.* (Ruth Benedict) .. 438

Mirza Ahmad Sohrab, Editor: *The Bible of Mankind.* (Robert E. Hume) 440

Robert O. Ballou, Editor: *The Bible of the World.* (Teresina Rowell) 444

Rudolf Otto: *The Original Gītā.* (Franklin Edgerton) 447

George Weston Briggs: *Gorakhnāth and the Kānphaṭa Yogīs.* (W. Norman Brown) 450

Adolphe Lods: *La Religion d'Israël.* (Samuel L. Terrien) 452

Joshua Trachtenberg: *Jewish Magic and Superstition.* (Joseph L. Blau) 456

Martin Dibelius: *The Message of Jesus Christ.* (Burton Scott Easton) 460

William Warren Sweet: *Religion on the American Frontier, 1783-1850.* Vol. III: *The Congregationalists.* (Maurice C. Latta) .. 463

Vida Dutton Scudder: *The Privilege of Age.* (Hoxie N. Fairchild) 466

Nicolas Berdyaev: *Spirit and Reality.* (Clarence A. Manning) 469

R. H. L. Slater: *God of the Living.* (Marion J. Bradshaw) 473

G. N. M. Tyrrell: *Science and Psychical Phenomena.* (Gardner Murphy and Ernest Taves) 476

Book Notes. P. Carleton: *Buried Empires.* G. Dumézil: *Mythes et dieux des Germains.* P. Brunton: *Indian Philosophy and Modern Culture.* M. Sadr-ud-Din: *Einleitung in den Heiligen Koran.* L. Jung, Ed.: *Judaism in a Changing World.* C. A. Glover: *With the Twelve.* S. Kristofersson: *Psalmboksförslagen av år 1765-67 och 1793.* R. C. Strickland: *Religion and the State in Georgia in the Eighteenth Century.* C. E. Schneider: *The German Church on the American Frontier.* C. S. Macfarland: *The Christian Faith in a Day of Crisis; "I Was in Prison."* C. H. Moehlman: *Protestantism's Challenge.* B. Rosenmöller: *Religionsphilosophie.* K. L. Schmidt: *Die Polis in Kirche und Welt.* Charles Williams: *The Descent of the Dove* 484

Among the Periodicals 498

Index 503

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD TOWARD JUDAISM

By Isaak Heinemann
Formerly Director of the Breslau Rabbinerseminar

The attitude of the outside world toward Judaism shows peculiar characteristics in the Hellenistic-Roman period. Neither in the Biblical period, nor in the Middle Ages, nor in modern times, has Judaism possessed such a power of attraction and drawn proselytes in such numbers. Accordingly, one might expect to find in Hellenistic literature also traces of a favorable estimate of Judaism. One finds, indeed, appreciative statements about Moses in the writings of many of the more serious investigators, but these are mingled with more or less sharp criticism of contemporary Judaism. And not only in the greatest Roman historians, but especially in writers of second rank and the poets who reflect popular feeling, do we find anti-Semitic expressions which do not fall short of those of the Middle Ages and modern times in severity, although later antiquity was inclined neither to religious intolerance nor to racial hatred. In strangely sharp contrast to the sympathy of large sections of the people for Judaism, is the almost uniform tone of the literature.

The peculiar problem which results from this ambiguous attitude of the ancient world toward Judaism (as well as toward Christianity) has not yet been clearly posed. Scholars have only inquired into the motives for sympathy or antipathy singly. And these investigations are incomplete for the reason that they make hardly any use of Jewish literature,[1] although it contains important evidence of the elements, both friendly and hostile to the Jews, not reflected in the Gentile literature. In what follows we may, therefore, assume that the very frequently presented *facts* of the sympathy and antipathy incurred by ancient Judaism are already known, referring particularly to our own earlier account[2] of the testimonia of Greco-Roman anti-Semitism. We

1. An exception is Johannes Leipoldt, *Antisemitismus in der Antiken Welt* (1933). However, he is acquainted with only a few Talmudic tractates in German translation, and not with the Aggadic Midrashim.

2. "Antisemitismus" in Kroll's *Realencyclopädie der Altertumswissenschaft* (RE), Supp. v, A (cited as "Antis."). A discussion of the attitude of the ancient world toward Judaism has appeared in the Hebrew periodical, *Zion* (Jerusalem, 1939) IV, pp. 269 ff., in which the Rabbinic citations are given more fully.

shall, therefore, only pose the question of the motives for both these tendencies on the basis of all groups of sources, in order to understand the reaction of paganism to Judaism, which, at first sight, appears so contradictory.

I

THE MOTIVES OF THE PROSELYTES

According to Eduard Meyer, "the more ideal, really religious elements of Judaism hardly had a very considerable effect on large numbers,"[3] whereas superstition did, as in all religions of the Orient. He, therefore, simply entitles his discussion, "The Proselytes and Jewish Superstition." There were two groups among those who were influenced by Judaism. In the one, Jewish rites were practiced together with pagan rites; in the other, Judaism replaced paganism, and participation in the state cult was rejected as idolatry. This distinction, although it does not appear in Hellenistic Judaism, is emphasized with the greatest clarity in Rabbinic Judaism.[4] Only the first group is directly mentioned in Greco-Roman literature, and in the papyri concerned with magic. It does not, however, follow from this that it was the larger group. On the contrary, Tacitus (*Hist.* v, 5) is fundamentally right when he asserts that one of the primary things impressed upon converts is "contempt of the gods." Only thus can we explain the fact that an emperor like Domitian, who was not at all unfavorable to Oriental religions, sought with all his power to prevent conversions to Judaism. The motives of the first group have been correctly explained by Meyer. But what caused pagans to renounce not only the state cult with all its festivals, but also the mystery

3. *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* (Stuttgart, 1921-23) II, pp. 353 ff.

4. Josephus, *Ant.* XX. 195, refers to the Empress Poppaea Sabina with the expression, *Theosebes,* usually applied to proselytes, although this lady who had ordered her embalming (according to non-Jewish Oriental rites), was as little affected by the monotheism of Judaism as by its ethic. He expresses jubilation at the spread of the Sabbath ceremonies, *Ap.* II. 282; similarly, Philo. *Vita Mos.* II. 21. In contrast to this is *Sanhedrin* 58 a, "The pagan who observes the Sabbath is liable to death." On the other hand, *Sifre Šelaḥ* 111, "He who abandons idolatry, acts as if he observed the whole Torah." The literary form of both statements is conditioned by the Rabbis' tendency to use hyperbolic forms of expression. If, however, one reflects that Horace, *Sat.* I. 9, 70, uses the *tricesima sabbata* of the *curti Iudaei* (a mocking allusion to circumcision) as a profane expression, and that Ovid, *Ars Amatoria,* I. 75, recommends to an adventure-seeking youth not to overlook the "Syrian Sabbath rites," one can understand why Jews placed this sort of participation of confessed pagans in the sanctification of the Sabbath on the same level as the violation of the Sabbath by Jews, considering both as deserving of death.

religions, the impressive rites of which must have had a much greater effect upon persons inclined toward superstition than did Judaism, which, even before the destruction of its only place of sacrifice, offered most of its followers nothing more than prayer services and domestic observances?

Evidence for the motives of these people is preserved only in Rabbinic literature. In *Exodus Rabba* 30, 12 we find the following:

> Aquila said to the Emperor: "I wish to become a convert to Judaism." Hadrian: "Is it this people which attracts you? How much have I humiliated it! How cruelly have I chastised it! You want to associate yourself with the lowest of the nations? What draws you to them and makes you want to become a convert?" Aquila: "Even their children know how God created the world; what was created on the first and on the second day, and how much time has since elapsed, and on what the world is founded. And their Torah is true." Hadrian: "Well then, learn their Torah. But do not become circumcised." Aquila: "Even the wisest and oldest in your empire cannot learn their Torah if he is not circumcised, for it is written (Psalm 147:19), 'He sheweth his word unto Jacob, his statutes and his judgments unto Israel.' He has not done so for any pagan."[5]

These data respecting the outspoken and unspoken motives of those who were faced by the choice of conversion need to be supplemented, especially where the reading of Scripture did not lead to conversion immediately, or without conflict. We have numerous proofs that persons who inclined toward conversion busied themselves earnestly with the Bible[6] (that is, generally, with the Septuagint), which was almost unknown to Greek and Roman writers down to the second century, when Christianity began to be a serious danger.[7] They expressed their doubts about certain passages to their Jewish friends, upon whose answers the final decision largely depended.[8]

A second motivation appears in certain passages which we shall quote in condensed form. According to *Aboda Zara* 11 a, Onkelos (i.e., Aquila) becomes converted to Judaism. The Emperor sends groups of messengers after him, but he converts them by means of Bible verses. The last relay is forbidden by the Emperor to speak with Aquila. But the latter addressed him thus: "In general, the inferior carries a torch

5. So one should translate in accordance with the change of meaning of *goy*.
6. Samuel Klein, in *Zion* (1926) 1, pp. 7 f.
7. "Antis." pp. 23 f.
8. *Pes. Rabbati*, par. 23, p. 117 a; *Gen. Rabba*, 70, 5; *Koh. Rabba*, 7, 8. See also, *Zion*, IV, p. 272; cf. also Josephus, *Ap.* II. 123, on the backsliding of proselytes.

before his superior; God, however, went before Israel (Exodus 13:21) to give him light." Accordingly, Aquila, in self-justification, appeals to the Emperor's suggestion to him to buy wares which would rise in price; for though no people has fallen so low as Israel now, none will be exalted so high in time to come (*Tanchuma,* Buber, *Mishpaṭim* 3). Thus, attachment to the people for whom future glory has been prophesied was felt to be an honor and hope of reward.

This evidence is in agreement with the writings of many of the Church Fathers, which were evidently in the mind of Eduard Meyer, for example, Tatian, on whom the Old Testament made a convincing impression "through its lucid expression, its easily comprehensible account of the creation of the world, its foreknowledge of the future, the excellence of its laws, and its teaching of the sole rule of God" (*Or.* 29). This stylistic argument reveals a man with a literary education, and is, therefore, purely individual. The prophesies were probably more important to Christians than to the converts to Judaism, but the ethical teaching, and the belief in monotheism, together with the story of the creation, probably determined the latter also.

It is certain, therefore, that proselytes were won less through dogmas and rites than through Scripture, to which the other religions of antiquity, both official and mystery religions, had nothing comparable to oppose. But the problem still remains, what won over the masses to monotheism, upon which, after all, Scripture was based? The well-known criticism of Homer in the philosophy of the schools, at least since Xenophanes, can have reached the masses only indirectly, and even its exponents can never have taught the rejection of what the whole of antiquity felt to be a ritual duty for all citizens. The Cynic-Stoic Diatribe, however, probably prepared the way for Judaism. That it also reached those circles in the East with which Jews associated, is proved by Rabbinic literature, which mentions no philosopher of the schools by name, but has learned of the Diatribe.[9] The revolutionary character of this "transvaluation of all values" might have set the stage for so radical an innovation as the rejection of polytheism; and its depreciation of Hellenism, in comparison with barbarian peoples nearer to nature, facilitated the proselyting activity of Judaism.

9. I. Heinemann, *Die griechische Weltanschauungslehre bei Juden und Römern* (1932), p. 8. Concerning the Diatribe, see P. Wendland, *Die Hellenistische-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum* (Tübingen, 1912), pp. 75 ff.

The severe criticism of immorality, such as pederasty and the exposure of infants, espoused by Plato, fully agreed with Jewish values. And with reference to the criticism of religion, it suffices to select a few sentences from a document which, in form and content, belongs to the sphere of the Diatribe.[10] "Where is God? Is He perhaps confined within the halls of the temples? Ignorant men, do you not know that God cannot be the work of man's hand, and that there is no enclosure for Him, but that the whole universe serves Him as a temple?" Such statements are so close to the Jewish point of view, and even to Biblical phrases, that the author was considered to be a Jew by some, until it was clearly recognized how well they fit into the Cynic criticism of culture. On this basis can be understood the confession of Tatian that the Bible "brings us only what we received but lost through our error." By this is meant the primitive religion of mankind, which, according to the Cynics, is the foundation of all religions, and which contained the doctrine of one God discovered in nature and in natural moral law.

How close a companion Judaism felt the Cynic-Stoic reform to be, a glance at Philo's writings will reveal.[11] Though belonging to the upper classes and certainly participating in their forms of life, Philo attempted to accommodate Judaism, as far as possible, to the ideal of a life close to nature, maintaining that the law of Moses is identical with the law of nature, rejecting every luxury, if not every great possession. And he refers to predecessors who went even further, according to whom every law of the state is a human addition to the divine law of nature (*De Jos.* 28; an etymological interpretation of Joseph, the "statesman"!). So, too, Jewish ritual law is not meant literally; the prohibition of kindling a fire on the Sabbath, or of eating leavened bread during Passover, does not hold merely for specific periods of time, but means that we should abstain throughout the entire year from the gift of Prometheus and the culture based upon it. The tendency of this re-interpretation undoubtedly took account of those movements which were spreading throughout the circles of Judaeophile pagans. But it goes beyond the necessities of propaganda (we have seen how greatly the pagans inclined toward a literal observance of the Sabbath) and, therefore, cannot be explained on the basis of rationaliz-

10. According to J. Bernays, *Die heraklitischen Briefe* (London, 1869), p. 23. Against the theory of Jewish origin, cf. Heinemann, RE. Supp. v, 231.

11. On the following, cf. Heinemann, *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung* (Breslau, 1932), especially pp. 432 ff. and 142 ff., with bibliography.

ing, but, rather, from the fact that many Jews, also, believed that in the demands of the moral reformers they recognized those of the Torah.

On the other hand, many Jews, as Philo's writings again show, sought to represent their religion as the true mystery religion.[12] The doctrine of the ascent of the soul to God, of the mediating powers, above all, of the esoteric meaning of the enigmatic names of Biblical persons and the allegorical interpretation of rites strange to the Greeks, may have met the needs of many pagan circles, even though evidence for this has not come down to us.

That there were Jews who won proselytes in accordance with carefully made plans, we learn from their success, even more clearly than from the censorious allusions in Matthew 23:15, and Horace *Sat.* 1, 4.142. But it is worth while to make plain the point of view from which Judaism regarded the problem of propaganda.[13] The purely religious question whether Judaism might or should win converts among aliens has never been answered negatively at any time, but neither has it been answered so decidedly in the affirmative as it was for Christianity in Matthew 28:19. Therefore, there were no official representatives of Judaism commissioned to be missionaries.[14] But how meritorious private proselytizing efforts were considered, is shown in the Aggadic portrait of Abraham, who was regarded by all rabbis without distinction of period as the soul-winning champion of the true faith, and the model of genuine piety. This conception, which has no basis in the Bible, is certainly connected with the fact that it was to Abraham that the law of circumcision was given, and that the prose-

12. On the following, cf. E. Goodenough, *By Light, Light* (New Haven, 1935), and his essay, "Literal Mystery in Hellenistic Judaism" in *Quantulacumque* (1937), pp. 227 ff.

13. Rabbinic material in I. *Levi, Revue des études juives,* L, pp. 1 ff.; LI, pp. 1 ff.; Strack-Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament,* I, pp. 924 ff.; Michael Guttmann, *Das Judentum und seine Umwelt* (Berlin, 1927), pp. 75 ff.; V. Aptowitzer, in *Jewish Studies in Memory of G. A. Kohut* (New York, 1935), p. 6. Especially in Guttmann will the non-specialist find proof-texts for the following arguments.

14. Rengstorff, in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* (Stuttgart, 1932-) I, pp. 418 f. That the activity of the private missionaries, whose great number Rengstorff also admits, was based on the "idea of merit" can be asserted only if one judges from a single isolated *dictum probans,* in the unfortunately prevalent fashion, instead of from the involuntary testimony of the Aggadic portrait of Abraham. It is none other than he who is the well-known exemplar of pure love for God (R. Sander, *Furcht und Liebe im palestinischen Judentum* (Stuttgart, 1935); and it is precisely in his capacity of missionary that he is compared to a hero who defends and, in a certain sense, "saves" his king (*Sifre,* par. 313, on Deut. 32:10).

lytes received Abraham's name as that of their father (that is, *full* proselytes, not those who observed only the "Noachic commandments").

Was the winning of converts advantageous for the people of Israel? The question may be asked in a religious as well as in a political sense. That proselytes could attain the highest degrees of piety, was the unanimous opinion of the ancient Jews;[15] indeed, the religious consecration of those who came to Judaism of their own volition was often especially praised, though it is also stressed that backsliding must be expected "down to twenty-four generations." In any case, in the third Christian century one finds only one isolated statement to the effect that proselytes are as *qāšêh* to Israel as leprosy. The adjective *qāšêh* (literally "heavy") may mean anything disagreeable or painful; and since this statement rests on a play on words, we cannot say whether the author feared harmful religious influences and conflicts with backsliders, or repressive measures by a Roman government angered over proselytizing. It is certain, however, that this particular rabbi was an isolated instance among the theologians, and that historians should not judge the attitude of the Jews merely on the basis of theological testimony. The political leaders were definitely in favor of gaining converts, merely from the point of view of expediency. The Maccabees led their subjugated neighbors into the Jewish cult without bothering very much about religious theories, for otherwise these people (the Edomites, for example) would not have felt themselves to be true Jews so completely as they showed themselves later on, in the war against the Romans. The Jews of the Diaspora did everything in their power to increase the attraction of the Synagogue for the heathen, a motive to be recognized in a Talmudic passage concerning the heathen of Meḥasya, who remained faithful to their beliefs out of stubbornness, although "they witnessed the gloriousness of the Torah" twice a year.[16]

Even for the religious leaders, considerations of expediency had some weight in regard to the winning of converts. The ancient principle that people who became converts on secondary grounds (such as for the sake of marriage) were not to be considered proselytes was regarded only as an exhortation, at least in Babylonia after about A.D.

15. Another view is found in Jehuda Hallevi, under the influence of Greek anthropology and the Arabic doctrine of *nūr muḥammadī*.

16. Josephus, *Jewish War*, VII, 45; and Talm. *Berakot*, 17 b.

200; the admission of the non-Jewish partner in a marriage was not refused, chiefly to prevent the apostasy of the Jewish partner.[17] The story of Timna, the mother of Amalek, is interpreted (etymologically) as follows, in *Sanhedrin* 99 b: Timna means the "rejected one"; she came to the patriarchs in order to be converted, but she was rejected, and so, out of a scorned love, became the mother of the arch-enemy of Israel. The same thing happened, according to the Book of Ruth (*Rabba* 2:20), when the Moabitess, Orpah, was sent back to her people by her mother-in-law, Naomi; Orpah became the mother of another enemy of Israel, Goliath, whereas, the proselyte, Ruth, was held in high honor as the ancestress of David. In agreement with these antitheses is the Rabbinic conception that the nations of the world form a solid front against Judaism,[18] while the Judaeophile heathen of the Bible are transformed into proselytes. Jewish literature, therefore, throughout confirms the impression received from Greco-Roman literature, namely, that the ancient world was divided essentially into enemies of the Jews and proselytes (including the half-proselytes). For this reason alone, the large majority of the Jews could not have been opposed to the winning of converts, even after the destruction of the Temple; otherwise it would be impossible to explain the great numbers which appeared in the second century in connection with the uprisings in Cyrene and Cyprus. To be sure, the impression made by the fall of the Temple, and the competition of Christianity, must have limited this activity to a considerable extent, and so, indirectly, have lessened their joy in it.

II

THE MOTIVES OF THE ANTI-SEMITES

The success of Jewish missionary activity in the cities of Asia Minor and North Africa aroused anxiety concerning predominance of the

17. Aptowitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 14. He concludes, *ex silentio*, that they held stricter views in Palestine, even in the Amorite period; but when Yose ben Halafta, for example, asserts that Solomon married foreign wives only to convert them (*Cant. Rabba* 1, 10), it appears that we must infer this to be an approval of such conversions.

18. N. Glatzer, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichtslehre der Tannaiten* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 30 f. Friendships between Jews and pagans, such as that between a Rabbi and one of the Antonines, were regarded as rare exceptions. On the following, cf. *Exodus Rabba*, 1, 23; *Sanhedrin*, 94 a; *Mekilta, Jethro* 1 (on the daughter of Pharaoh, Jethro, Rahab).

Jews over the Greeks, and led to bloody conflicts.[19] The Romans, too, observed with concern the increase of this tenaciously cohering people, whose battle for liberation in Palestine was accompanied by outbreaks in Asia Minor. These phenomena, of course, have nothing to do with anti-Semitism as hatred for the peculiarities of Judaism. But the conflict here, as frequently elsewhere, was certainly accompanied and supported by a struggle against the spirit of the adversary. Even earlier, the Seleucides had spread distortions and transparent lies about the Jewish cult to justify the anti-Jewish policy of Epiphanes; upon these, Apion, leader of the Alexandrian Greeks in their action against the Jews under Emperor Gaius, drew in part; and his data, with those of others of like mind, were used by Tacitus, who, as a member of the commission to supervise foreign cults (*Quindecimviri sacris faciundis*), must have felt a special obligation to take defense measures against Jewish propaganda.

This struggle against the influence of Judaism was just as little an isolated phenomenon as was the success of Jewish missionary activities. Other religions, also, were for a time forbidden to Roman citizens.[20] Juvenal, who is able to endure the Egyptians even less than the Jews, bemoans the fact that "the (Syrian) Orontes empties into the Tiber"; while Lucian, in his far-reaching criticism of religion, spares Judaism, although he knew Jews. It is certain, therefore, that "in general, the dislike of barbarianism, and the inclination toward ancestral cults"[21] furthered anti-Semitism—or rather, anti-Semitism is to be regarded as a special form of this dislike. For to be sure, just as Judaism had special points of attraction, as described above, so it also had special features that repel.

It is easy to make Jewish ritual law primarily responsible for anti-Semitism. Even Poseidonius, who recognizes Moses and his followers as "true worshippers of God,"[22] in curious anticipation of modern theories of Biblical criticism, finds fault with circumcision and the

19. As we are concerned here only with the *motives* of ancient anti-Semitism, I may refer to my article, "Antis" (pp. 16 f., 30 f., 36), for the evidence for the facts mentioned in the two following sections.

20. Leipoldt, *op. cit.*, 3; T. Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin, 1905-7), III, pp. 401, 2; 403.

21. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Berlin, 1932), II, p. 422; cf. also R. Reitzenstein, *Die Hellenistische Mysterienreligionen*, 3rd ed., p. 101.

22. Texts in "Antis." pp. 19 ff.

dietary laws as innovations of later priests. The rigor of the laws of observance of the Sabbath also evoked serious criticism, and even ridicule. In a certain mime of the period, a camel is brought on the stage wearing mourning, because it is the sabbatical year, and the Jews, who do not cultivate their fields during this period, have cleared them of the thorn bushes upon which it grazes. A bald-headed man complains that, since the Jews do not work on the Sabbath, they have to use their beds for firewood, for which reason he has lost his hair from sleeping on the ground![23] In a Midrash, Abraham is made to say: "So long as I was uncircumcised, nomads would lodge with me; now that I am circumcised, they no longer come, and they no longer do so." Moses declares: "If we were uncircumcised and practiced heathen cults, and denied the Commandments, they would not persecute us."[24] Somewhat less decided are the following statements: "Their laws are different from those of other peoples" (Esther 3:8); "All peoples will take offence at thy laws" (*Sibylline Or.* III. 272); "The Jewish people finds no support among the nations, because it has special laws" (Philo *Spec. Leg.* IV. 179).

In spite of this, the statement that it was this ritual difference which gave anti-Semitism its special stamp needs a good deal of qualification. Every people has its special laws: this was a fact not only known to the ancients, but respected by them. Moreover, the Greeks and the Romans also rejected *proskynesis* (prostration), although for different motives than those of Mordecai; circumcision and dietary laws were not peculiar to Judaism alone, nor were they considered so in antiquity; even Sabbath commandments and laws of purity have their parallels among the Greeks and Romans.[25] To be sure, his laws presumably meant more to the devout Jew who believed in their divine origin than did those of the Syrians or Phoenicians to them. It is possible, therefore, that, in the Diaspora, the Jews clung to their observances more tenaciously than other peoples; but this difference was scarcely felt very clearly by the ancient critics. Rather was the criticism

23. The tradition is given in *Echa Rabb.*, Introd. 17 (therefore not noticed by historians); discussed by Joseph Horowitz, *Spuren grieschischer Mimen im Orient* (Berlin, 1905), pp. 91 f.

24. *Tanhuma, Mattot* 3 (ed. Buber); *Gen. Rabba*, 48, 1; on the parallels, compare the Hebrew essay. The attacks on circumcision are, of course, partly of Christian origin (Aptowitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 11).

25. Cf. especially H. Dessau, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Berlin, 1930), II, p. 717.

of Jewish rites altogether embedded in the general criticism of religion. Poseidonius and Seneca express similar objections to degenerate traits, and superfluous commands in other religions as well. And the comic poets found objects for their wit on every hand; Juvenal's ridicule of the Jews who worship "the Clouds" obviously reflects Aristophanes' ridicule of the supposed god of Socrates. It is not from Jewish ritualism, therefore, that anti-Semitism took its peculiar coloring.

There was, however, a peculiarity of Judiasm which set it apart from all other religions. This was the exclusiveness of its monotheism. Every other deity, not excepting those of the philosophers, was satisfied to be identified with one or another of the Olympians, so that, in spite of a variety of interpretations, *one* religion, in a certain sense, bound the Oecumene (civilized world) together. But the Jew denied the existence of the gods of these religions,[26] and though he did not refuse to accept for his god the sacrifices of others, he himself sacrificed neither to Zeus nor to Caesar. Certain of the philosophically trained historians, to be sure, approved of Moses' rejection of the theriomorphic gods of the Egyptians, and Tacitus echoes this praise of Moses in his account of the Jewish god.[27] But the majority of critics confined themselves to the negative side of the Jewish conception of God, construing their rejection of the syncretistic world religion as *atheotes* (the word has the connotation of "atheist" and even "profligate"),[28] and as contempt for other religions.

From this religious separatism followed social separatism as well. A Jew could never drink wine of which some had been poured out as a libation to the gods in accordance with the usual custom. He demanded conversion to his religion of the non-Jew, whether man or woman, who wished to enter his family by marriage; but he permitted no conversions to paganism. That this aversion to those of other faiths produced a regrettable separatism, was felt by even so friendly a critic as Hecataeus, who attributed it to a misanthropy which had its origin in the unfortunate experiences of the Jews with their Egyptian hosts. Those

26. The Midianite women in Josephus (*Ant.* IV. 138) expect of the Jews, "since they have come to a foreign country," that they will participate in their cult, "especially as our gods are universal, but yours are honored by no one else."

27. *Hist.* V. 5. "summum illud et aeternum neque imitabile neque interiturum."

28. Harnack, *Der Vorwurf des Atheismus in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (Leipzig, 1905); "Antis." 20.

who were less kindly disposed saw in this attitude a bottomless hate (*hostile odium*, Tacitus), or at least, a criminal arrogance.

It is instructive to observe how the Romans were affected by the Jew's rejection of extra-marital relations, which, of course, applied to Jewish and pagan women alike, but was remarked by pagans only as an aversion to pagan women.[29] We read in the Haggadah of two cases[30] in which Jewish men refused women slaves whom their Roman hosts had put at their disposal, according to the custom of the times.[31] In the first case, the rabbi justifies himself by saying that he does not wish to beget any illegitimate children, an argument understood by the Roman; in the second case, the Roman host asks: "Art not these maids people like you? Has not the same God created them?" The reproach here implies the charge of *apanthropia*, the denial of *humanitas* as the doctrine of the equality of all men, and although the rabbi excuses himself by saying that from the girls proceeds "an odor like that of swine's flesh and other forbidden foods" (meaning that contact with them was forbidden to him, not because of their inferiority, but merely on religious grounds), it does not appear that his excuse made any impression upon the Roman.

In fact, both these reproaches of contempt, for the gods and for men, have a special sense in the mouth of a Roman. The people from whose language, strangely enough, modern words for religion have been derived, although they described themselves as *religiosissimi mortales*, had very little idea of religious inwardness, and judged religious doctrines and institutions only by their practical effects, and their relation to their own genuine ideals. These ideals were, first, faith in the family, which was the basis of the strict discipline of the *pater familias*, and second, faith in the *res publica* as the concern of the community to which all individual desires must be subordinated.[32] And so, in so far as the Jew demanded of his proselytes that they renounce the Roman gods and oppose the authority of the *pater familias*, and that they refuse the imperial cult as a religious recognition of the unity of the Empire, he contradicted the norms upon which, in truth, genuine Romanness rested. Exasperation at this is given expression, in frantic exaggeration, to be sure, by Tacitus, in *Hist.* v. 4: "Profana

29. Tactitus, *Hist.* v. 5, "alienarum concubitu abstinent: inter se nihil illicitum."
30. *Abot de R. Natan*, Text A, par. 16; cf. also *Zion*, IV, pp. 283 f.
31. W. Kroll, in *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft* (1930), p. 147.
32. R. Heinze, *Von den Ursachen der Grösse Roms* (Leipzig, 1925), p. 12.

illic omnia quae apud nos sacra, rursum concessa apud illos quae nobis incesta." The proselytes learn "contemnere deos, exuere patriam, parentes liberos fratres vilia habere." In the complaint, "victi victoribus leges dederunt," the wounded vanity of the rulers of the world at the, to them, incomprehensible success of this conquered people finds a natural expression.[33]

And just as certainly as it was not ritual law but monotheism which caused the peculiar hatred of the Jews, so certainly did anti-Semitism at its height interpret even those laws which were not peculiar to Judaism on the basis of its own conception of the Jews' enmity toward gods and men. Although the Jews might justify circumcision on religious, hygienic, or magical grounds, for Tacitus it was only a "mark of distinction."[34] And however widespread in antiquity were the sacrifices of cattle and sheep, those of the Jews were, according to him, introduced only to show contempt for Apis and Ammon. This same fundamental point of view naturally created a readiness to believe in the cannibalism of the Jews, who yearly devoured a Greek to the accompaniment of oaths of vengeance against everything Greek.

III

THE ROOTS OF SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY

To our inquiry concerning the explanation of the co-existence of strong sympathy for, and passionate antipathy to, Judaism, there is now provided a double answer. First of all, we have seen that the results which sympathy for Judaism produced also aroused anxiety and uneasiness, and so prepared the ground for antipathy. But an investigation of the motives of both proselytes and anti-Semites enables us to recognize a much closer connection between the two. It was the exclusiveness of Jewish monotheism which attracted the first group, and repelled the second. In so far as Judaism denied the religious foundations of ancient culture, it placed an alternative before the ancient world. If its fundamental premise was false, then there was contained in it a ridiculous pride, especially over against peoples like the Greeks and Romans, who were infinitely superior in culture, or reputation for culture. If, however, it was true, if this little people—and it alone—had preserved in purity the religious tradition of the primeval

33. Seneca, *ap.* Augustine, *Civ. Dei,* VI. 10.

34. Similarly Josephus, *Ant.* I. 192. But Schorr, in his note on the Hebrew translation, rightly notes that this motivation was, otherwise, foreign to ancient Judaism.

Golden Age, then, indeed, nothing remained for thousands who (like Poseidonius) were not satisfied with a philosophical religiosity, but who sought for a living religion, but to attach themselves to it and share its beliefs, its sufferings, its pride, and its hope. Thus, in the last analysis, the roots of hate and love were the same, and herein lies the tragic element in the fate of ancient Judaism, namely, that precisely its very greatness was the ground of its suffering.

This tragic element is not adequately realized in the Jewish literature written in Greek, which feels itself distinguished from the Greek world "more in space than by its way of life,"[35] since the very things which apparently distinctly characterized Judaism, namely, its rejection of the Homeric pantheon, and the *Politeia* of Moses, are in reality, anything but un-Greek; they are only the complete realization, unlimited by any regard for the masses, of Greek religious criticism and humanism.[36] But it is different with Rabbinic Judaism. This could not find a place in its philosophy for the culture of the outer world; it knew too little of philosophy for that—and knew life too well! That there was an essential opposition between Judaism and non-Judaism, the Rabbis fully granted to Tacitus; but whereas he found that the Jews considered as profane what was sacred to the Romans, the Midrash writes even more sweepingly of Jacob and Esau (the ancestor of Rome): "the one permits what the other forbids."[37] Rabbinic literature, of course, was fully cognizant of the distortions and misunderstandings which intensified hatred. "The most contemptible of peoples raises itself above us; it wishes for our undoing, and blasphemes our ruler (through the words, God is King forever)"—this is what the anti-Semites say. A son of Trajan was born on the ninth of Ab, and died on Hanukkah; hence the "slanderous" charge that the Jews

35. In refuting the charge that Jews hate the Greeks, Josephus writes (*Op.* II. 123): τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον τοῖς τόποις ἢ τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἀφεστήκομεν. But the thought also had significance outside of this context, and for Philo in even higher degree than for Josephus.

36. Again (*Op.* II. 169), Josephus formulates, more clearly than Philo, the idea that the philosophers did not dare tell the whole truth to the masses, and that only Moses drew the practical consequences from this generally accepted theory. Philo has in mind similar charges (*De Spec. Leg.* II. 165 f.); and he (like Josephus and IV Maccabees) explains not only that the Jewish Law leads to all the virtues, but also (*ibid.*, III. 110 f.) that other peoples practice *apanthropia* by approving of the exposure of infants. On the view of Jewish Hellenes that they were consistently Hellenistic, cf. Heinemann, *Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung*, p. 560.

37. On the following, cf. *Gen. Rabba*, 63. 6; *Esther Rabba*, Introd. 3, 7. 12 f.; Leipoldt, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 24. Much more detail is given in *Zion*, IV, 291 ff.

"mourn over our joy and light joyful candles to celebrate our mourning." We have here the same malicious misinterpretation of Jewish motives as that of Tacitus regarding Jewish sacrifices. And yet the Midrash is aware that such manifest distortions are the fruits, rather than the seeds, of anti-Semitism, and that the latter is the result of the Jews' adherence to their religious uniqueness. "Lord of the Universe, Thy sons are persecuted not because of idolatry, uncleanliness and homicide, but because they keep Thy laws," says Israel's guardian angel to God.

The view that the exclusiveness of Jewish monotheism explains, at the same time, both the success of Judaism and the enmity toward it, can easily be substantiated by even a superficial glance at the reception of Christianity, which took over this exclusiveness. In fact, the same phenomena appear here, but in an intensified form. Here, too, we find hatred and love coexisting with almost no intermediate states. Christian exclusiveness was less pronounced than that of Judaism, in so far as Christianity, to a far greater extent, had adopted Hellenistic elements of dogma and ritual; but it was more pronounced in so far as Christianity held that "the way to the Father is only through the Son," whereas Judaism, on the basis of the unmistakeable meaning of Old Testament texts, granted the existence of pious pagans. Therefore, while the success of Christianity is only partly based on Old Testament foundations, including monotheism, the hatred which it inspired shows the same characteristics, and in greater intensity. The same reproaches concerning its enmity toward gods and men reveal, in its case also, the same source of hatred; again, added thereto are distortions and lies, partly spread abroad through governmental agencies.[38]

But whereas the Jew was generally left in peace, even though he refused to participate in the imperial cult, and his faith accepted as a *religio licita*, against the Christians, on the other hand, were instigated horrible persecutions, even by Marcus Aurelius, "one of the purest and noblest men that ever lived." The fact that he believed he was only fulfilling "his duty as Emperor and citizen," and that the greatest authority on antiquity of the last generation[39] justifies him in this

38. On Maximinus Daia, cf. O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergang der antiken Welt* (Berlin, 1897), I, 1. 142. The mime ridiculed the sacraments as well as the Sabbath laws.

39. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Kaiser Marcus* (Berlin, 1931), pp. 3, 6. A similar judgment is given by Meyer on the persecution of the Christians.

belief, throws the clearest light upon that chasm between the Biblical and Roman conceptions felt by Tacitus and the Midrash. And when Mommsen asserts that these persecutions were in harmony with the feeling of the people[40] (in so far, of course, as it was not affected by missionary activity), a glance at the literature of the time proves that he is right. The writers of the imperial period either show themselves hostile to Judaism and Christianity with the same degree of severity, or direct their attacks against the Bible as the common foundation of both religions; but, at the same time, they expressly defend Judaism against the attacks of the Christians, for example, on the dietary laws, among them, Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian. This hatred persisted until the overthrow of paganism, when the persecution of Christians by the emperors was replaced by the persecution of pagans by the Church. Thus it was not the racial origin of the Jews, nor their economic activity,[41] nor yet circumcision, nor dietary law, which was the basis of ancient anti-Semitism, but the mutual aversion of the two scriptural religions to paganism and everything connected with it, which put before the pagan world the choice between accepting, or passionately rejecting them.

40. *Op. cit.*, III, pp. 410, 414.

41. "Antis." p. 41. To the proofs for covetousness as a cause of persecution of the Jews, may be added Josephus, *Ant.* II, 201 f. On the other hand, we must refer, especially in opposition to Sombart, who does not know classical antiquity sufficiently well, to Sigwart, RE, X, 1905, who writes: "The tendency toward exploitation of one's fellow man was, without doubt, present in the highest degree among the Greeks and Romans."

THE DEMANDS OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

By Benjamin Miller
Assistant in Religion, Pomona College

Religion is fundamentally concerned about three facts of human experience. The first is the nature of man himself; second, the nature of God and the universe; and third, the fact and possibilities of fact in man's relation to his environing world, both in its immediate and in its vaster reaches. These constitute the questions to which the religious mind attempts to give an answer. All religious beliefs and practices are varying modes of expression and experience which involve the recognition of man's earth-predicament, with a wide variation of emphases, and claim to have one or another solution to the problem.

1. *Man.* Any attempt to understand the nature of man must begin with the recognition of his creatureliness. He is a creature of earth (this is a familiar theme of the poets), and his roots are deep within the natural order of things. Professor Meland has made this point in a chapter called "Man, an Earth Creature." He writes:

> He who takes up the religion of adjustment has certain rigorous facts to face up to. He must acknowledge first of all that man is an earth creature. Creatureship implies possibilities of fulfilment, but it carries with it, too, definite limitations. Before one can clearly conceive the greater human possibilities in the life of earth, before he can achieve the mood and perspective for fruitfully pursuing valid human ends, he must become reconciled to the rôle of creature. This is the starting-point, and until he returns to that religious basis the meaning and purpose of life are bound to seem ambiguous to him, and his relation with the natural order will be fraught with perplexities resulting from maladjustment.[1]

The worthy religious adjustment must start from this point. But there is more that we must say about man's creatureliness. He is a conscious creature, unique in the midst of creation by reason of his rational powers of consciousness. We note two singular characteristics of the human nature: (a) Man is self-conscious and knows that he must die, and (b) because he is self-conscious he is able to dream, to

1. Bernard Eugene Meland, *Modern Man's Worship* (New York, 1934), pp. 165-66.

make choices between possible courses of action in the light of projected ends and purposes—he is an aspirational creature.

These characteristics are both strength and weakness. The creature can envision possibilities of behavior which may better and more completely serve his desires and interests; he is aware of his capacity to adjust himself to his world-environment on a plane above mere impulse and pre-potent reflex; as an earth-creature he breathes, eats, and drinks, but he also thinks, hopes, and is aware of the cosmic dimension of the world he immediately senses. There is great strength in man's power to dream and imagine; without it the most congenial adjustment on the level of material and physical relations is yet humanly unsatisfying.

But this rooted strength is of its very nature inevitable weakness. Man is conscious of his own self-distinctness, and while he is aware of his related dependence upon the basic processes of earth, this self-distinctness is at once his alienation from the rest of men and things. He must face the knowledge of his sure end, never wholly free from that haunting sense of being alone in the world. Men try desperately to overcome this fear and sense of loneliness in the human experience of love, mutuality, and communion with other persons. This may readily pass into the extreme activism of a service-morality, such as we have seen, in one form, in much of the social idealism of liberal Christianity—"lose the self in the service of others."

But one of the supreme difficulties is that the individual cannot lose himself. It is psychologically impossible to identify oneself with other selves. Considered from the point of view of the self, relations between us are always varying degrees of external relations. I am always I; you are always you. That is the simple fact from which we begin life, and in which we must find the transient, rich meanings of our brief existence as persons. We cannot deny, in the name of however noble sentiments and high ideals, the primary fact of our existence—self-identity.

But, short of this extreme, the possibility of mutuality and interpersonal communion is maintained by many current thinkers. There are two different emphases implied in this view. One looks to cooperative activity and community of interest among individuals and groups of individuals. But this would seem to be an immersion of the self in larger and more comprehensive loyalties and activities, and

tends to confuse the essential self-identity of the individual. This self-identity cannot be diffused within such abstractions as social interest or the general welfare; yet anything less than some such diffusion of self-identity could not claim to have solved the basic problem of the sense of loneliness, for the self would still be aware of its real distinctness and isolation.

The other emphasis points to the possibility of a real communion between persons, a mutuality that is essentially independent of interests and activities. Professor John Macmurray speaks of this association or relation of persons

> purely for the purpose of expressing our whole selves to one another in mutuality and fellowship . . . a relationship which has no purpose beyond itself; in which we associate because it is natural for human beings to share their experience, to understand one another, to find joy and satisfaction in living together; in expressing and revealing themselves to one another.[2]

We are reminded of the realism—and bitter cynicism, perhaps—in those lines from Conrad Aiken's poem, *Annihilation:*

> These are the secret; and I could hate you
> When, as I lean for another kiss,
> I see in your eyes that I do not meet you
>
> Rock meeting rock can know love better
> Than eyes that stare or lips that touch.
> All that we know in love is bitter,
> And it is not much.

Mr. Aiken has denied the rich meanings of love that every man surely feels at some time, but he has stated a penetrating observation of love's final difficulty—"I see in your eyes that I do not meet you." We may define love negatively as the real impossibility of a complete identity of lover and beloved. The romanticist feels in the delights of love a consciousness of identity and sings its praises, but he mistakes illusion for reality. Consciousness overdreams the sense-experience of relation between lover and beloved, and fancies the illusion of identity. Without the tension between these positive and negative aspects of love the experience is static, conventional, uninspiring, dreadful. Our point is that the fundamental problem of man's loneliness admits of no final solution in the highest and most worthy of human relationships—love. Thus, we must look elsewhere to overcome or to mitigate

2. John Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion* (New York, 1936), p. 98.

man's tragic awareness that, at the last, he stands alone, suckled at the breast of isolation and rooted beyond love. And "at the last" means not only death, but the extremity of any moment of life as well.[3]

But we draw one further conclusion from our summary analysis of the nature of man. The creature's conscious self-distinctness is the clue to the demonic element that persists through all our study of religion and ethics—human self-centeredness. This is probably the one persistent and indisputable fact of the human nature, and constitutes the religious problem of sin. We might define sin as the essential creaturecussedness, or the circumscription of the ego by its own inherent self-centeredness. It is the egocentric predicament and the net within which all that is human is caught. It is the corollary of man's state of self-conscious uniqueness.

It would seem, then, that the problem of religion is to solve the problem of sin, to establish a dominant center of reference and motivation outside of the self, and to secure a motivation of desire and behavior that is rooted in the not-self. But this is to state the problem of religion as fundamentally a moral problem, seeking a compelling moral imperative that is rooted beyond the human self, and thus counteracting the natural creature's self-centeredness. As we are unable to discover such a character of the not-self by empirical means, the only alternative in this statement of the religious problem is revelation.

2. *God.* The concept of revelation, in its full sense, is incompatible with a thoroughgoing naturalism. Within naturalism the use of the term can mean little more than insight into some higher level of the natural order; it is not properly called revelation, for the latter involves an evident self-disclosure of the nature of being that transcends the order of nature. It introduces a new element into nature which cannot proceed out of nature itself. And we do not see how such a self-revealing supernatural order of being can be other than *personal* and have any meaning at all. To conceive revelation in naturalistic terms is to deny any distinction to the term and to abandon any hope of solving the egocentric predicament (as we have defined it). The very need for redemption is a recognition of the failure of natural resources, and the necessary dependence upon some manner of supernatural initiative. In the last analysis man stands as a sinner, helpless

3. This paragraph is adapted from a section of my article in *The Personalist*, "Toward a Religious Philosophy of the Theatre" (Autumn, 1939).

before God, and impotent to effect his own salvation. However much we may stress man's own capacities and responsibilities in the redemptive process, the creature is finally unredeemed save by the gift of God's grace, freely given. We believe this to be the genius of Christianity and a suggestion of the serious difficulty confronting any attempt to identify Christianity and naturalism.

Within a naturalistic concept of God as "the community of processes sustaining all of reality," we cannot accept the revelational approach to the basic religious problem of human sin. We are unable to affirm the hope of salvation which has marked, in wide variation of degree and manifestation, all of the great world-religions. We must look elsewhere for the religious resource of strength and courage. Our idea of God and our empirical concept of the religious-mystical experience, however, affirm the possibility of man's having what we may call religious relations with reality. There is possible to man, as a conscious creature of earth, a real sensuous intimacy with the natural world, an intimacy which does not support our highest dreams and aspirations in the traditional sense, nor guarantee our human demand for salvation; but it does offer a considerable mitigation of man's loneliness in the world and a basis for probing the rich, temporal meanings of this life.

3. *Man's relation to his environing world.* In his poem, "Hope Is Not for the Wise," Mr. Robinson Jeffers has expressed much of the temper of our "aesthetic naturalism":

> Hope is not for the wise, fear is for fools;
> Change and the world, we think, are racing to a fall,
> Open-eyed and helpless, in every news-cast that is the news:
> The time's events would seem mere chaos but all
> Drift the one deadly direction. But this is only
> The August thunder of the age, not the November.
> Wise men hope nothing, the wise are naturally lonely
> And think November as good as April, the wise remember
> That Caesar and even final Augustulus had heirs,
> And men lived on; rich unplanned life on earth
> After the foreign wars and the civil wars, the border wars
> And the barbarians: music and religion, honor and mirth
> Renewed life's lost enchantments. But if life even
> Had perished utterly, Oh perfect loveliness of earth and heaven.[4]

4. In *Such Counsels You Gave To Me* (New York, 1937).

This is a harsh and severe view of life and could never become a popular religious interpretation. Yet its pessimistic realism does not present an unexciting prospect to the religious consciousness. This is not an easy way for the indolent soul, looking for a simple solution to the immeasurable complexities of this life. We are reminded of Lawrence Clark Powell's remark about *The Women at Point Sur:* "Certainly it demands careful reading and study. Like Browning, Jeffers does not intend his poetry as a substitute for an after-dinner cigar or a game of checkers."

Religious experience begins with a thorough acceptance of the natural world. "I do not ask so unanswerable a question as 'Why am I here?' I accept the fact that I *am* here under certain inevitable conditions. I cease batting my wings against dazzling dilemmas and begin focusing my powers for the flight."[5] This acceptance of the natural world avoids the imaginative speculation that presumes to dream a congenial cosmic nature into being. It strives to base its few positive affirmations upon the broad grounds of empirical realism, and to satisfy the demands of the religious consciousness to such extent as those demands are also consonant with the real character and performance of man's non-human environment. Its conclusions necessarily must be tentative, but in some measure productive of more genuine religious living.

Our presuppositions, however, are not ultimately empirical, *in the sense* that our sensuous experience discovers them by the logic of its own necessity. We fall back—as any religious faith must—upon that assurance which Mr. Jeffers has called "mystical certainty." Our final crossing into the religious life is a leap of faith, and the most that we can do in this crossing is to guard against humanistic presumption and conceit, and a too-ambitious overdreaming of reality. From this level man reaches out in appreciative expansion to relate himself to the vast world that environs him. He turns from dogma and rational speculation to the full experience of aesthetic response and poetic apprehension. But the religious experience avoids the aridity of merely intellectual contemplation. It is a feeling-quality of experience and a mystical recognition, which attends the immediate sense-awareness of things. In the religious life man returns to earth.

5. Meland, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300.

A little too abstract, a little too wise,
It is time for us to kiss the earth again,
It is time to let the leaves rain from the skies,
Let the rich life run to the roots again.
I will go down to the lovely Sur rivers
And dip my arms in them up to the shoulders.
I will find my accounting where the alder leaf quivers
In the ocean wind over the river boulders.
I will touch things and things and no more thoughts.[6]

In these lines Mr. Jeffers transposes the feeling of the religious life. The poet is the spokesman of religion, for the deep roots of religious experience are akin to the creative apprehensions of the poet and the artist. Mr. Meland writes that the religious man responds

> praisingly, gratefully, fearfully, yet devotedly to the great sources of life that promote his being. And in responding emotionally to reality in these ways, man, the prosaic workman, scientist, or scholar, becomes man, the artist, the poet, and the singer. For the man at worship feels the emotions of the artist, speaks the language of the poet, and lifts his voice with the song of the Psalmist.[7]

Thus man, as a creature of earth, reaches out to relations with God and the universe, and fulfils the circle that is possible to him, "beginning with existence, reaching toward appreciative fulfilment or enjoyment, and returning, as a stream from a mountain, to refresh and invigorate the will to live." This is the direction in which the religious man seeks an answer to the third of the questions which we asked at the beginning of this paper.

HUMANISTIC ETHICS AND RELIGION

But to such a view as we have suggested, the question is unfailingly put, What becomes of ethics? How are we to conceive the relation between the moral demands and what we have outlined as the demands of the religious consciousness? Is religion at all related to life as we live it in an inevitable social context?

It is the intention of these remarks to affirm the essentially humanistic and non-religious character of ethics.[8] Morality is concerned with

6. From "Return," in *Solstice and Other Poems* (New York, 1935).
7. Meland, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.
8. By humanism we mean simply man-centered philosophy which finds motivation, direction, and resource from within the nature of man and of social human experience, rather than from any non-human nature or transcendental source.

human value-motivation and behavior, individual and social, and does not depend upon the authority or sanction of a more-than-human imperative. Moral values are of man, by man, and for man, while at the same time we must recognize the objective conditioning factors involved in the total subject-object relation. These conditioning factors are valueless in themselves and are the object, rather than the source, of conscious valuation. Morality and ethics are the conscious means by which man seeks to relate himself to his fellows and by which he determines, above the level of mere impulse and unenlightened desire, the plan of action most conducive to his own self-realization in the midst of life's practical necessities and its inevitable social demands. Some such definition takes cognizance of the complexities and limitations, as well as the broad possibilities, of a strictly humanistic ethics.

The moral imperative is grounded in the vital nature of man—at the earliest stage of development, in the primitive impulse to self-preservation, and later, in the more consciously mature desire for self-realization. The presence of the individual in a society of other persons and in the midst of humanly uncontrolled natural forces (e.g., the weather, seasonal climatic changes, the "laws" of physics and chemistry, and the principles of physiological and psychological well-being) sets the ethical problem of how to relate himself to this complex so as to effect the fullest self-realization of his own person and that of his fellows. This involves a certain altruism growing out of that warmth of heart and human sympathy that mark every man in greater or lesser degree. An example of this inescapable creature-sympathy is suggested in Mr. Powell's reference to Jeffers as the poet who

> has faced with frankness and honesty the problem which confronts the man whose vision leads him beyond humanity, but who is drawn back by a wish to lend a hand to his fellows, for the most part lost and blindly groping in a labyrinth of pain and suffering.

But humanistic ethics is no ground for optimism. For the problem of human sin remains forever unsolved, and the essential egoism, or self-centeredness, of the creature precludes any solution of the final problem of human relationships, except for some partial mitigation of the fury of interests in conflict. Religious pessimism does not deny certain real possibilities of the mitigating ethical function, but it admits no ultimate optimism, which can only be based upon a denial or over-dreaming of the essential and ineradicable human nature.

Now what is the relation of humanistic ethics and non-moral re-

ligious mysticism? In a view of religious experience which attempts to bifurcate the realms of morality and religion (which is the view of this paper), we can find no religious sanction of moral conduct. But this, of course, is not to deny the presence of moral sanction; it involves the moral sanction, in the last analysis, within the sphere of what we may call enlightened human interest and the comprehensive objective of social expediency, rather than within the total situation of the religious response. This admittedly implies a lesser conviction of certainty, as Walter Lippmann pointed out in *A Preface to Morals*, and denies any absolutism to ethics. Further, it offers no ground for the moral optimism of the old ancestral order (to use Mr. Lippmann's phrase) but rather stands as evidence in support of a more pessimistic conclusion.

But in the face of all this, we cannot see that our position necessarily justifies immorality nor releases man from his moral obligation. The general character of the moral imperative is inescapable in the nature of those two factors which we have cited—the human desire for self-realization, and the presence of the individual within a community of men.

We observe that the man who has attained a measure of religious orientation—i.e., has achieved in some degree that sensuous, mystical rapport with the cosmic phase of his natural environment,—can claim a certain poise and integration of personal being, or a cosmic disinterestedness (which, perhaps, is a precarious use of terms) that strengthens and supports to some extent his moral will and sensitivity. But this cannot be carried so far as to include any necessary connection between the religious relation and the moral inclination. It might be suggested that the disinterestedness which we have mentioned is itself antithetical to the fully conscious moral interest. Dean Inge has said that disinterestedness in all things is a mountain track which the many are likely in the future as in the past to find cold, bleak, and bare, and he concludes that this is why "the road of ascent is by personal affection for man." Personal affection is a milestone on the road of moral ascent, but it is restricted and limited by man's own egocentricity, the theme which appears throughout Jeffers' works in the intense and tragic portrayals of humanistic introversion.

The traditional moralism, in the light of our view of the non-moral nature of cosmic reality and our view of the essential self-centeredness of man, has pressed the moral will toward an impossible objective. It

has exaggerated the real nature of the moral imperative and has failed to take adequate account of the necessary limitations which preclude an optimistic solution of the moral problem. The final resources of religion lie beyond the pursuit of moral values. To be moral is the least that the human can do; man cannot at once escape the moral obligation and disaster. But for strength and courage to live out this life in the knowledge of his own end and in the awareness of his tragic loneliness, man must reach beyond morality to the religious relation with the non-human realities of his earth-environment.

THE DILEMMA OF THE SOCIAL STRUGGLE

It should be made clear that we are not defending an escape from the pressing and critical necessities involved in the contemporary social struggle. The prevalence of undisguised violence within and between nations, and the imminence of greater and unprecedented catastrophe, plead no alternative to the awakening of a militant and informed social consciousness. In such times men with desperate and uncritical passion seize upon any resource that promises a way out. But an insufficiently relevant and ill-chosen resource, confused and distorted by the hope that is aroused through propaganda and mass-action in a crisis, can only deepen the eventual disillusionment. The cry for action in the service of social redress is vital and inescapable, but if we are to construct a rationale of social action and to rely upon some intelligible philosophy of crisis in the face of catastrophe, we must become realistic about the limitations and the dilemma, as well as the possibilities, of the social situation.

Professor Gregory Vlastos has expressed an objection that is representative of the sociological temper of those moderns who would interpret Christianity naturalistically and in terms of the goal which John Macmurray has defined as the "material achievement of personality-in-community." Vlastos feels that

> our greatest need here is to recover the early discovery of *agape* in terms which are relevant to the life of today. We live in a society torn by conflict. There is a fatal temptation for middle-class people—and the majority of professing Christians are in that category—to seek aloofness from the struggle. Then religious experience strikes a note of nostalgic solitariness, and they reach out in romantic loyalty to the "universe."[9]

9. "Modern Criticisms of the Christian Evangel," in the *Anglican Theological Review* (April, 1938).

And the genius of Christianity, he continues, is not communion with the stars but communion with God-in-man. "It is finding, by losing, oneself not in cosmic reverie, but in material comradeship with the man who fell among thieves." Other than to refer to our earlier criticism of the attempt to interpret Christianity within the framework of naturalism, we shall say nothing of Vlastos' statement of what he believes to be Christian doctrine. But his remark about the note of "nostalgic solitariness" in religious experience, and his indictment of the temptation to remain aloof from the struggle constitute a ready objection to our view.

We cannot remain aloof from implication in the social struggle, whether we choose to or not. The problem is whether participation in social action is going to root its goal, its technique, and its motivation within the religious experience or within resources that are essentially non-religious. Do the fundamental issues of a social ethic rely upon a specifically religious sanction? When the problem is stated thus, what we have already suggested of humanistic ethics and religion makes our answer to this question apparent. Religion is something that man "does with his solitariness" (Whitehead); it is a relation between man and his world that can only be a personal and individual experience.

The content of the specifically religious experience is without moral nature or implication, and its aesthetic character is unrelated in kind to the social vision or to its imperative. But man is not *only* religious, although we may perhaps believe that he is inevitably religious. His personal situation, that is, his presence within a society of persons that is torn by conflict of interests and purposes, compels him to consider this common predicament and, if he would bring any order out of it, to do something about it. The desired end or goal of community, the attempt to realize some measure of adjustment and integration in the conflict, demands action that is not random or chaotic but planned and disciplined by a philosophy of crisis. The formulation of ends to be achieved and values to be conserved, the understanding of the nature of the attempt and its necessary limitations, and the discovery of consonant techniques of action—all of these necessities are within the province of social ethics. The ethical imperative has its origin and its continuance in the nature of the human predicament in which we find ourselves.

Reflection discovers a certain parallel between the religious response and the ethical intention in the primary fact of man's inescapable self-

distinctness and loneliness. The awareness of his own essential loneliness in the world of persons and things usually impels him first to seek the presence and comradeship of other persons, to actualize his dependence upon others of his kind if only he might overcome his loneliness. The goal of this attempt, as we have seen, is the idealized love-experience. But the creature's self-centeredness, with its ineradicable vitality in any actual relation, precludes the achievement of that mutuality which alone is able to satisfy his native longing on the level of personal relationships. But the actual impossibility of achieving this ideal does not prevent the hunger from operating as an ethical incentive.

The distinction between the religious response and the ethical or moral response to this felt human need lies in the limitations and possibilities of these two aspects of experience, that is, in their respective capacities for satisfying or substantially mitigating the individual's awareness of his own isolation. The morality of individual rights and responsibilities in society is concerned with the social relations of persons, and while a "scientific" social ethic is not unmindful of the naturalistic environmental conditions within which such relations are set, its sanctions are after all only human, and the norm implicit throughout its striving is an ideal situation of personal relations which it is common to call mutuality or "personality-in-community." But this ideal cohesive is incapable of constituting a real solution of the creature's essential hunger. Mutuality, whether it is used to mean Macmurray's conception of "the personal life" or Vlastos' idea of cooperative activity and community of interest,[10] denies the necessary and basic egocentricity, the inescapable self-centeredness, of the human individual (which persists even in the most complex social relations of the individual), with its stark implications of conflict and resolute tension in social relations.

The ethical life frequently sets forth its ideal objectives in clear, bold outline, challenging the highest moral aspirations and proceeding from a desperate awareness of the human predicament. It frequently stimulates a response of high fervor and classical devotion to the ideal necessities it envisions. But the enthusiasm too readily infers

10. For Macmurray: a personal relationship, other than functional, "in which we can be our whole selves and have complete freedom to express everything that makes us what we are." *Reason and Emotion*, chapter on "The Personal Life."

For Vlastos: see his discussion, "What Is Love?" in *Christendom* (Autumn, 1935), I, pp. 117-31.

an uncritical moral optimism. Enamored of things as they ought to be, the moralist dreams the nature of things to be such as guarantees the "isness" of his attractive ideals. The strength of his longing to overcome the deranged and tragic relation with his fellows and with his world immediately supports certain "reasonable" pretensions. Possibilities are over-rated and magnified to obscure the reality of persistent and determinative limitations. The egoistic base of all things human —of even the noblest spiritual enterprises, as Reinhold Neibuhr is constantly reminding us—becomes progressively confused. Such confusion is not without considerable strength as a motive of social action, but it should be understood that even this strength does not touch upon a solution of the final difficulty in the human religious situation.

We have said all this to point to that *disinterestedness* which is the mark of the religious life, and which constitutes a type of aloofness and solitariness that is better called religious than nostalgic. Professor Vlastos has defined religion in the primary terms of a social ideal and has subordinated, or rather conformed, the nature of extra-human reality to the demands of this ideal. An extreme sensibility to human social urgencies has vitiated the full significance of the goal of religious disinterestedness.

There is a significant sense in which it may be said that religious disinterestedness is struck on a positive note. It is not an effortless escape nor an unexacting retirement from responsibility. We must look beyond personal exhaustion, for example, to find the motive for Mr. Jeffers' acceptance of the essential evils of human life.

It seems that a distinction has to be made between a negative and a positive disinterestedness. The former is the product of a disillusioned secularism which has lost touch with the resources of reality. It inclines to be bitter, and its childish resentment against life and things is cradled in sullenness or in a false simulation of bravery. A positive disinterestedness may frequently be rooted in disillusionment, but this does not discredit its positive character, for it is sustained by the affirmations of a religious faith. As the cheerful opponents of pessimistic religion have never tired of telling, a pessimistic appraisal of the human moral enterprise is itself grounded in an affirmation of some strength and meaning, in whatever character or to whatever extent and implication such meaning may be conceived.

Personal integrity is the affirmation upon which a religious disinterestedness is built, and upon which the vast complexity of human

pretension and introversion is seen to be ignoble in the greater and more beautiful world with which we are determinately related. A simple and profound religious aesthetic is the rock from which flows the spring of disinterestedness and strength. The core of its reality is appreciably unbiased by human moral presuppositions. The commonplace premise of any attempt to elaborate the social implications of religion is a natural aliency between nature and human nature, that the world is not made for man. This premise is a philosophical paradox in so far as it is possible (and this is the resource of religious experience) for man to have religious relations with his earth environment. Because man as a self-conscious creature stands in this paradox, the meaning of the religious sense of life is ultimately tragic.

The religious trait of disinterestedness is something more than the reasoned objectivity of the sciences. It is a deep affectional quality of experience. Professor Wieman has written of this disinterestedness:

> It is the ability to treat every triumph and every failure, every rapturous joy and every misery, every fulfilment and every disaster, with glowing warmth and appreciation, and yet with all the powers of intelligence, judgment and appraisal freely active and undistorted by fascination or dread. fear or hope.[11]

While the religiously disinterested man, in the sense which we intend, is freed from "mere hysteria, splintered gleams, cracked laughter," he finds in that very disinterestedness a discomfiting awareness of the limitations and impossibilities inherent in the social situation. The quest for the realization of the hope that social justice will soon prevail is in essential measure exposed rather than aided by the religious resource. A large number of our socially minded contemporaries speak easily and repetitiously of religion as belonging to the infancy and immaturity of the race, and a most ready prey to superstition and naïve wishful thinking. But the religious disinterestedness of which we speak would seem to lay bare a more perilous credulity and wishful temperament among the secular prophets of social reform whose extreme faith in the possibilities of man and of human control over nature has no more formidable support or sanction than the mere pretensions of the human spirit. Upon them is placed the impossible task of redeeming the egocentric personalities of men by strength of the human will or by the might of humanly directed coercion. Of

11. *American Philosophies of Religion* (Chicago, 1936), p. 91.

course, this same criticism is also relevant to the liberal pretensions of much of contemporary religious thought which has confused religious disinterestedness with a desirable technique of social action.

The service of religious disinterestedness to the social problem not only lies in the poise and objectivity from which the real nature of man may be seen in his tragic predicament in nature (which includes man's relation with other men); it also provides, or rather is itself the product, of, an actual relation with man's earth-environment, a source of strength and courage by which to endure the inevitable frustration and disillusionment attending the moral consciousness in the social situation. The religious experience effects a reconciliation with the tragic sense of life, the vital awareness of the organic "wholeness of life and things" which saves man from drowning in despair when his days darken.[12] Religious disinterestedness is strength. Rather than solving the dilemma of the social struggle, disinterestedness affords strength to live in the face of the dilemma.

This is religious realism, we believe, and not what the social activist implies by the term *escape*. The limitations of the inescapable human conditions of life bring humanistic social ethics to a final impasse. The actualization of dreamed social possibilities rests ultimately upon a solution of the problem of human self-centeredness, the difficulty which the historic insight of Christianity knows as the fact of sin. Humanism is without the resources of redemption. Salvation must lie beyond our tragic humanity. But our metaphysics, short of affirming the eternal transcendence of a good God whose gracious purpose is to redeem man from his sinful finitude, finds no assurance of redemption. Thus, the human situation is ultimately and finally tragic.

Much remains to be said about tragedy and its religious significance. At present it must suffice to say that our view of the demands of the religious consciousness, while it fails to affirm the ultimate triumph of traditional Christianity and religions of optimism, does not leave man in a suicidal state of detachment from life and nature. The profound experience of *sensuous mysticism*, which must be seen to underlie all that we have said, affirms the creature's attachment to the life of earth, and testifies to a wealth of resources in man's peculiarly religious relation with natural realities.

12. From Jeffers' poem, "The Answer," in *Such Counsels You Gave To Me.*

ON TYPICAL MISINTERPRETATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EXPERIENCE

By Maximilian Beck
Formerly Editor of Philosophische Hefte, *Berlin and Prague*

I

METHOD OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EMPIRICISM

There is a very significant method followed by people who call themselves Empiricists and Realists in discussing religion and morality. They completely disregard the experience of religious and moral men, and substitute for it what they consider as religion and morality from their own areligious and amoral point of view. The results of such discussion are, of course, radical mistakes. A supposition for this behavior, particularly astonishing when practiced by serious scientists, is the conviction that what religious and moral people assert that they have really experienced must be only imagined. *Why* should it be only imagined? Because the experiences of religious and moral people concern supernatural things. Empiricists, however, cannot realize them even through the most exact and profound inquiry.

To be sure, the Empiricist's method of inquiry is a special one, namely, the experimental method. He uses it in the belief that all that really and objectively exists may be ascertained by the experimental method. The organs of perception and material instruments are the means for all experimental methods. The Empiricist himself knows that only material things are accessible by those means. Therefore, his denial of the objective validity of religious and moral experience is based upon a very rude and false conclusion. He already supposes what he wants to prove by the experimental method, namely, that immaterial things cannot be demonstrated by the experimental method, and that nothing really exists which, on principle, resists being ascertained by this method.

In other words, religious and moral men assert an experience of immaterial things. The so-called Empiricists deny the objective reality of those things, *because* such an experience cannot be proved by the experience of material things! It is as if somebody should deny that colors really exist because they cannot be heard.

II

PRAYER AND SACRIFICE

After having denied the experience of religious and moral men themselves, the Empiricist tries to explain the phenomena of religion and morality by means of motives from his own experience and naturalistic viewpoint. He believes that the phenomena are based solely upon inventions without any real vision. Therefore, he himself invents chains of pure reasoning, beyond all experience, and attributes them to the religious and moral man as reasons for his behavior.

There are the phenomena of prayer and sacrifice. This is a very simple matter, the Empiricist holds. Man fears disaster or desires good fortune. He himself, however, being weak, invents an omnipotent god and imagines that he is able to influence this powerful being by prayer and sacrifice to comply with his wishes. No one can deny that the prayers and sacrifices of many people originate in such a belief, but this is very different from a true religious attitude. The first sacrifices in the Bible are thank-offerings, and the fundamental prayers are prayers of thanksgiving. (The words "pray" and "praise" have, perhaps, the same root.)

The Empiricist, however, is not embarrassed. He explains these facts as phenomena of fear, maintaining that man, in fear of a powerful god, tries to propitiate him. Arguing thus, the Empiricist evidently forgets that, according to his own thesis, man had invented God to get rid of his fear. And now man is to fear this creation of his own imagination. But what is more astonishing is the fact that all attempts to explain prayer and sacrifice as motivated by fear contradict the most evident features of the religious attitude, which already manifests itself in the external gesture of adoration. It is an attitude of ecstatic admiration and trust. The religious man thanks God for values which he is experiencing and enjoying with a holy rapture. And, far from fearing God, he is full of love and trustful surrender to him.

It is impossible to call an attitude religious which lacks these essential moments. In even most primitive religions this attitude of ecstatic thanksgiving and joyful admiration prevails over the attitude of fear, especially in the celebration of festival occasions. Many manifestations of human cheerfulness, notably, the dance, music, poetry, and drama, are believed to have originated in prayer and sacrifice. Even the cruel

sacrifice of human beings does not present an insuperable objection, for, incredible as it may seem, these sacrifices are often voluntary, motivated by a vehement impulse to self-immolation. And even Abraham's readiness to sacrifice his son has been taken as a model of trust and devotion, rather than as mere blind obedience, or fear. The orgiastic element in human sacrifice has too often been overlooked, but it is exemplified by the thousands who have hurled themselves ecstatically beneath the wheels of a Juggernaut. Here the phenomenon obviously does not originate in fear.

III

AESTHETIC HEROISM AND RELIGIOUS OPTIMISM

There are many who consider the joyful aspects of religious feeling as manifestations of an optimism in which man takes refuge, being himself neither strong nor courageous enough to face the terribleness of reality. Belief in an all-kind, all-powerful, and all-wise God, and the doctrine of divine providence and justice, are only inventions, they say, for the purpose of balancing the cruelty and decrepitude of the life of man. Without such a religious belief, many could not bear sickness and suffering, need and injustice, and the certainty of death. They maintain that the irreligious man, being bold and strong, resists these illusions, and faces the entire tragedy of human existence, proof against his own desires and fears. His attitude is that of a pessimistic "heroism."

Nevertheless, the "heroic" man, when describing this attitude, comes to a positive and joyful evaluation of that tragedy. This is the more surprising since he uses the word tragedy as a synonym for disaster and sorrow. A joyful sorrow, however, is obviously a contradiction in itself. Thus embarrassed, the heroic man declares his heroism to be an aesthetic phenomenon. He explains the astonishing fact of his enjoyment of disaster as the pleasure of a disinterested contemplation, or as the satisfaction of the desire to see and to know.

The problem is not solved so simply. To be sure, there are theories which explain all the esthetic values as satisfaction of inclinations to play, to imitate, to be impressed, to link one's own feelings with external events,[1] or even merely as reaction to certain nerve stimuli. But

1. Cf. my lecture on "Die Methode der objectivistischen Aesthetik," *Deuxième Congrès International d'Esthetique et de Science de l'Art* (Paris, 1937) I.

such theories too evidently contradict the dignity, austerity, and spiritual depth of the aesthetic phenomenon. And we are all convinced that the beauty of deep sadness of a Beethoven adagio is not adequately explained as the satisfaction of subjective inclinations merely, or as a reaction to an irritation of the sensory nerves. Such theories degrade the greatest intellects to the level of fools, and debase the most serious and chaste endeavors of mankind. They presuppose the despairing pessimism which they are attempting to justify.

Thus rejecting the common subjectivistic theories of aesthetics, we are again confronted with the problem of how it is possible to find pleasure in disaster. What is the meaning of the tragic phenomenon? The paradox of enjoyment by the audience of the calamities which befall the hero of a Greek tragedy is the problem of Aristotle. The joy, some say, is the satisfaction of seeing the guilty punished, but this does not correspond to the facts. The heroes of great tragedy frequently become guilty unwittingly, or against their own will. The tragedy is imposed upon them by fate, or destiny. The hero may even suffer wholly innocently, but this, paradoxically, may even intensify the experience of tragic joy.

Tragedy, in its original meaning, has its origin in the orgiastic cult of Dionysos. Such cults are characterized by the paradox that suffering, mutilation, and even human sacrifice, are enjoyed and celebrated by ecstatic music and dancing. The cruel dismemberment of Dionysos is the subject of commemoration. Such phenomena are not explained merely by classifying them as pathological. They are bound up with the ambivalence of the gods of life and death, and the daemons of desire and cruelty. What is their real meaning? No "heroic" attitude can be claimed here—neither disinterested contemplation, nor bravery of action or resistance. The participants are flung out of balance, and stirred deeply by the intuition of an overpowering value, in the light of which the normal differences of pleasure and pain no longer count. What kind of value it is, is hinted at in the history of art and poetry, in which the development is from harmonic forms to dissonant, from pleasing contents to hideous ones. What seems to be dissonant and ugly at a certain time may be experienced later as harmonic and beautiful, when people have been educated to perceive it more adequately. A former dissonance may reveal itself as a more intricate harmony—a former ugliness, as a more intricate beauty. Thus harmony and beauty

are found to be based, not upon fixed form and content, but upon something quite different.

What this basis is becomes clearer when we compare the beauty and harmony of a former period with those of recent times. Modern harmony and beauty present themselves as stronger, more substantial, more *really* existing. The possession of these qualities (not a closer resemblance of artificial copies to natural originals) is the decisive characteristic of so-called naturalistic and realistic art. (It must be remarked here that the excitingly realistic forms and contents of today will, of course, be the stale and boring forms and contents of tomorrow, too poor to continue to be "realistic.") In other words, it is the degree of *reality* that increases with the advance of art and poetry—the degree of fulness and concentrated abundance of reality as such, beyond all special forms and contents.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that there are moments of extreme desperation and disaster when we discover the value of common and even ugly things. In such moments the mind penetrates beneath the accustomed character of reality, with its distinctions of beauty and ugliness, and suddenly reality in itself reveals itself as a value. Life, real life, just life itself is recognized as happiness precisely at times when life is endangered. In such a moment of despair, even a naked brick may be perceived as beautiful. The worth of reality is, then, not seen in special forms and contents, but in the fact of reality itself. This experience of reality as basic value, which we were trying to reach through the phenomena of the tragic, the Dionysiac, and the aesthetic, is the basis of religious optimism. It is not true that the religious man speculatively invents an all-kind God to balance the real experience of this terrible world. It is not true that, too weak to endure the world, he flees from it to an all-powerful God. On the contrary, theological thinking is based upon an immediate, concrete experience of the perfection and abundance of being. Theological thinking always endeavors to justify this deep and basic intuition against the shallower experience of every day. This intuition of a basic value must necessarily remain hidden to those who look for it only among special contents and forms, instead of beyond them, in the fact of pure reality.

The vision of the religious man is not flight from the terribleness of this world; it perceives majesty and kindness (N.B., kindness!)

not only in birth and life, but also in the formidableness of destruction and death. I cite the Psalms and the Book of Job. I cite also the canticle of Francis of Assisi, who praises God for "Brother Death." Mysticism is based entirely upon this intuition of God as fulness and power beyond all special forms and contents. And this intuition is experienced by the mystic as the fulness of pure happiness. In theology, the value of pure reality is identified with God himself, or with his constantly active creative power and the manifestation of his infinite kindness and grace.

In short, religious optimism is not a flight into an imagined heaven of happiness and security. Neither is it aesthetic play. It is depth and strength of vision, practised in the midst of despair, because despair bursts those categories by means of which men conceal from themselves the abyss of reality in order to live more easily and comfortably. The human organism is not adjusted to the concentrated fulness of reality. Religious belief, based upon such an intuition of God, is needed to strengthen and reassure the quiet existence of man.

IV

NATURALISTIC VERSUS DUALISTIC MORALITY

Religious optimism, with its heroic attitude towards the pain and misery of the world, is said to be the enemy of morality. Many who fight religion for moral reasons maintain that it is a soothing "opium," mere quietism, a frivolous justification of every wrong. And there does seem obviously to be a contradiction between religious optimism, which holds that everything is already complete, and the moral duty to change and improve the world. Hence the conviction that morality cannot be based upon religion. Is this true?

In any case, it must be stated first that all theories of ethics which try to base morality on other foundations fail completely. Moreover, they substitute, unconsciously of course, amoral for moral phenomena. A typical error of this sort is the identification of the moral attitude with social and collective behavior. Many of these social and collective standards of conduct, however, are amoral, and are most perfectly represented, not by men, but by bees or ants. Very social people are often quite amoral, while very solitary men, such as the great, creative geniuses, are often of high morality.

Some theories identify the sin of selfishness with the fact that "I

am only I," and with the essential isolation and inexorable loneliness lying in this self-identity. In the light of these theories, charity and moral conduct in general would consist of a dissolution or suspension of the ego,—a melting of the self into another. However, these theories radically contradict actual moral experience. A free, self-responsible personality is the first prerequisite of all morality, without which it is senseless to talk about morality at all. The moral person educates himself, through the important steps of his development, by the very fact of his self-determination. The value of every human being as a value in himself is estimated by the moral consciousness as immeasurable and irreplaceable. It is the aim of all moral asceticism to train man to resist every temptation to lose himself. It is essential to vice (and not to virtue) to lose oneself. And perhaps it is essential to the sexual act that one lose oneself to the impersonal force (cf. Freud's "Es") of the genus Man. This may be the deeper reason for considering the sexual act as man's first sin,—an intuition based upon experience and expressed in the story of the Fall of Man.

But, on the other hand, in spite of the essential meaning of the individual person for morality, social conduct is essential, too. It is moral to renounce one's own advantage for that of the neighbor. It is moral to combat one's egoistic impulses in favor of the realization of one's moral self. How is it possible, then, that self-maintenance is moral on the one hand, and immoral on the other? What is the meaning of that contradiction? Real morality will find no contradiction here. It speaks of a better self which must be realized through moral conduct, and of a worse self which must be conquered and controlled in favor of morality.

A dualistic theory of man is not pure speculation, but is based on experience. And again, it is experience and not theory which identifies the better self with the spiritual self, and the worse self with the ego, subject to animal impulses. It is the same experience which maintains the mind, spirit, or intellect to be essentially objective and disinterested, and the animal ego to be essentially "will to power,"—will to dominate and possess the whole world for itself alone. But this is not all. Man has experienced inner satisfaction and happiness when he acts against his own interest in favor of his neighbor. He has experienced moral kindness as a reality of inner warmth, inner plenitude, inner growth. Great painters, such as Rembrandt, are able to represent

externally the manifestation of this reality. In other words, the paradox of an inner happiness based upon the renunciation of external happiness is experienced as a reality of moral value. In this way, it is a matter of experience that virtue is its own reward. Thus, it is a misinterpretation to separate moral activity from moral satisfaction, and to argue that the reason for moral behavior is the hope of reward in heaven. "Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, Lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you." (Luke 17:21.) And the state of possessing this kingdom is described as the happiness of a spiritual love, the happiness of apprehending the absolute value by means of a completely disinterested mind.

The best judges of human nature, the great poets, the most subtle psychologists and moralists, all concur in describing morality in this way, as a reality in experience, and not an abstract invention. Moral reality is expressed in external attitudes and gestures. One speaks of kind or cruel features. But there are many who forget the well-known experiences of daily life when they are thinking theoretically. The true art of philosophizing consists in the ability not to overlook what everyone knows in the world of practical affairs.

There are many scientists who admit the existence of such phenomena of morality, but they do not believe that these phenomena prove anything. Instead of drawing conclusions from their own experience, they trace all phenomena back to a homogeneous animal nature in man. They claim that their naturalistic, positivistic, and monistic theories concerning this homogeneous man are based upon experience. They can not see that this thesis is only a hypothetical invention which contradicts all experience of the nature of man. They do not even see that all endeavors to explain moral phenomena naturalistically contradict radically the very principle of these phenomena. It is the principle of fighting the nature of man in order to overcome it. It is absurd to attempt to explain a phenomenon while denying its existence.

We have waited long enough to see the success of these endeavors to trace the phenomena of dualism and morality back to the supposed animal nature of man. The time of waiting has now passed. In many different ways the attempt has been made to reduce these phenomena, namely, by psychological, biological, ethnological, economic, sociological, and psychoanalytical methods, but all these endeavors have failed. Today an impudent immoralism is the only legitimate heir and

usufruct of all these naturalistic theories. It has become clear that moral ideals, the demands of justice, freedom, humanity, and democracy can not be justified on the presumption that man is only an animal. All talk about human welfare and the greatest happiness to the greatest number, all talk of the higher value of collectivity, of the utility of a community, and the like, has grown stale, and lacks the power of convincing. Empty talk does not stand firm in days of distress. It is therefore easy today to find reasons for deriding the highest ideals of mankind, and to justify the most horrible bestiality. It suffices to point out the facts of zoology. It even suffices to show man as he really is, in his merely natural impulses and aptitudes.

From the naturalistic point of view, it is impossible to refute the advocates of the "Darwinian Code," and the glorifiers of the "will to power," since both of them rely upon the facts of nature and history. From the naturalistic point of view, it is right to oppose "realistic" reliance on natural egoism to a "Utopian idealism" of moral demands. How are we to appeal to the human in man if he is entirely an animal? Why should we be excited when he does what he is compelled to do by his animal nature—supposing that he is only an animal? There is no essential difference whether man materializes his animal aims through reason or through instinct,—whether regulated by social laws, or in conditions of anarchy. Neither the means nor the forms, nor the success are decisive for the moral value of human endeavors. The motives and the aims are alone important. If civilization is merely a more refined form of satisfaction of animal needs, there is no reason for moral revolt against the destroyer of civilization. On the contrary, he would be in the right, since refinements may have to be paid for with the sacrifice of health and strength. A barbarous state of society is not essentially worse than an *animal* state of comfort and pleasure.

If, however, we are firmly convinced of the righteousness of our moral revolt against all the consequences involved in the thesis that man is only an animal, then this thesis itself must be wrong. And, as we have already pointed out, it is proved by experience that this thesis is wrong. The same conclusion is also strikingly indicated by the dualism on which is based the conflict of the animal and spiritual natures within man himself.

There are other reflections, too, which give evidence of a super-

natural spiritual being of man. They are as old as moral consciousness. They tell me that I *am* not my body, but *possess* it merely. I *am* not my animal impulses, but am only affected by them. In the writings of Brahmanism and Buddhism, we find manifestations of the most exact inner experience. Here we find enumerated all the subjects with which man ordinarily identifies himself. A deeper self-contemplation and analysis, however, has forced the conclusion that "all this is not I." This is expressed in the most classic form by the Indian masters of introspection, and it is, in a less perfect and more obscure form, and often hidden or even displaced completely, the deepest conviction of every spiritual man since the most ancient times. This conviction enables us to resist the thought of death. This conviction, and not the fear of ghosts or hope of reward in the after-life, is the basis for belief in an immortal soul.

The impossibility of the destruction of Myself as I essentially am, is not an invention of the mind, but a fact of experience. It is absurd to say that this "Myself," which has been experienced as absolutely different from everything which can be destroyed by death, is itself destructible. It is important to remark here that the idea of personal immorality has, since earliest times, been connected with the moral and religious consciousness. Such a conviction has been present in many of the oldest and most primitive religions. And it still persists in the sophisticated position of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and Kierkegaard's interpretation of Christianity.

V

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN RELIGION AND MORALITY

The experience of a supernatural and spiritual being in man has ever represented the point of coincidence of religion and morality. Many theories try to explain this fact in the usual manner. They emphasize the naïve talk of "heaven and hell," and the childish descriptions of the other world in various religions. They stress the exploitation of superstition and fear of the dead by clever castes of priests, for the purpose of keeping the uneducated in subjection. They emphasize the fact that the feeling of resentment for injuries suffered in this life is assuaged by the invention of another world in which the malefactor is punished, and the sufferer recompensed by a divine judge.

Theories which stress these phenomena endeavor to ridicule and

refute the coincidence of the religious and moral reality in the spiritual being of man. They overlook the fact that the difficulty of expressing spiritual experience in intelligible language must necessarily create a delusion. People are inclined to take literally what is meant figuratively. Spiritual matters, however, can hardly be expressed otherwise than figuratively. We cannot deny, however, that such phenomena of crude belief really exist. But we do deny that the religious and moral conviction of a supernatural being in man is based upon them. It is no fault of this conviction that it has been abused by ignorance and deceit. On the contrary, such abuse presupposes the existence of such a conviction, based not upon invention, but upon experience.

The dignity of man, which lies in his spirituality, is a matter of experience. It is in experience that man realizes the plenitude of his spiritual power and beatitude by means of a disinterested love. Mysticism implies this when speaking of becoming God by losing oneself,—an expression which is misleading, however. Can it be denied that thought and will are stronger powers than the bodily forces and material instruments which merely carry out what the mind wills to do? Is it possible to deny the creative and strengthening power of love, and the destructive power of hate? If the power of "mere consciousness" is beyond question, may one not also trust the creative power of the pure mind? There is no difference in principle between the possibility of moving the arms merely by willing, and the possibility of influencing the world solely by means of thinking.

A subtle analysis of the religious consciousness might justify the statement that the religious man never feels himself alone in a lonely world, but on the contrary, as over-arched by a divine consciousness preserving all things in their real existence, and apprehending their existence as a manner of continuous response to that consciousness. The Psalmist thinks of sky and stars, mountains and sea, trees and animals as jubilantly glorifying and praising God. It is an error to interpret this merely figuratively. To be sure, sky, stars, and mountains are not speaking in human language; they are speaking in their own mute language. But, "there is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard" (Psalm 19). It seems to me, also, that the deification of nature in paganism is a naïve attempt to represent nature as hearing and seeing man. In all these attempts, pure consciousness is

understood as divine power, the presence of which alone is the basis and preservation of beings in their real existence.

Man is made "in the image of God" in so far as he is mind or spirit. But his spirit is incarnate in the individual being in his limited body, and, as an embodied spirit, he is compelled to perceive everything subject to limitations. Even when disinterested in regard to his egoistic advantage, he still apprehends the world only from particular points of view. Being placed at a certain point in time and space, and not omnipresent like the spirit of God, he perceives the world as determined by the categories of the limited being that he is. The whole world is seen by him in a perspective, the center and viewpoint of which is himself. To see the world in itself, as it is without any perspective, man would have to be pure, naked, discarnate mind.

Now it must be considered that the realization of every being is necessarily paid for by the destruction of other beings. If, however, as above mentioned, value lies in this realization as such, then it becomes clear that real value always exists only with regard to beings which realize themselves, and not with regard to those which pay for that realization with their own destruction. If I want to help a certain being, I must consider the world from the viewpoint of its environment. If I want a cow to be comfortable, I must consider the flowers of the meadow as food only, and not as beings having their value in themselves. If, therefore, God is held to be a spiritual power, creating through love the realization of every being, he must be able to do it only through the fact of being a limited and incarnate God. For love is essentially bound to the limited viewpoint of the beloved. Thus the creative God is necessarily an incarnate God of love,—not a God of justice. It is impossible to bring about the realization of a certain being except by effectuating its materialization through the destruction of other things. And thus should be understood the profound idea that God needs man for the purpose of creating and preserving the world. Man's finiteness seems at first to be but a lack, but on closer examination, it proves to be an infinite positive value.

The moral existence of man is based upon the infinite significance of his moral decisions. Time is not reversible. What has once happened, has happened forever. The irrevocableness of human decisions, even in the case of insignificant and temporal matters, gives an eternal

moral value to the momentary existence of man. Precisely the short duration of man's temporal existence provides it with a value which eternity could not give. Kierkegaard is right in placing the positive moral significance of human finiteness within the center of Christian consciousness. He is even more right in opposing Hegel's tendency to "mediate" human decisions to world history and the "absolute idea."

Now, I think we are prepared to understand where to seek the solution of the above mentioned contradiction between the religious and the moral consciousness. We have stated that antinomy thus: For the religious consciousness, reality is perfect as it is; moral consciousness, on the contrary, finds the real world imperfect, and demands its improvement through human agency. Religious consciousness is based on the intuition of pure reality as principle of value. It recognizes the joy of realization, even in pain and disaster. Such an attitude is possible only to the completely disinterested vision, which perceives the joy of realization as such, without considering what is at stake. Moral consciousness also is disinterested, but as to the subject only, not the object. The moral man is not interested in himself, but in others. He is interested in the happiness of others, even at the expense of other beings such as plants and animals.

The purpose of morality is to help realize the spiritual being of man, above all and against all that is lower than the spiritual being. Spontaneity, or what is the same thing, moral freedom and responsibility, belongs essentially to the mind. Respect for the spontaneity of the spiritual being may forbid me to do for my neighbor what I am obliged to do for myself. Asceticism has proved to be a means for the realization of the spiritual being. Its literal meaning is "exercise," namely, of spiritual control over selfish and animal impulses. Such an exercise is practiced by renouncing pleasures, and the enjoyment of material goods. But the *voluntary* character of this renunciation is presupposed. It is, therefore, impossible to *force* one's neighbor to a morally relevant asceticism by means of external misery and need. Not only is it impossible, but the attempt would mean an injury to his dignity as a free and responsible spiritual being. Moreover, the oppressed person is distorted and destroyed by envy, hate, and despair, unless he has decided spontaneously upon spiritual behavior in the face of disaster. If the misery and need which oppress my neighbor

are directly or indirectly effected by me, then I am also responsible for the moral decay resulting from that misery and need.

On the other hand, I must love my neighbor as he really is, with all his weakness and suffering. I must do all in my power to free him from his earthly miseries. I may not judge his suffering, as he himself should do, that is, as a moral person able and obliged to overcome suffering in a spiritual way. That is his own moral task, which I can not take from him. My own moral task is only to overcome *my* selfish point of view sufficiently to be able to see the world from *his* selfishly interested viewpoint. Only in this way can I help him satisfy his earthly needs. It should be remembered that this point of view also offers a possibility of recognizing an objective value through pleasure and enjoyment. Here we can only suggest that it is completely areligious to declare that pleasure and enjoyment are merely satisfaction of subjective impulses. Such a devaluation is based upon sceptical and sensualistic theories. The religious man experiences through pleasure and enjoyment of earthly goods objective values manifesting God's plenitude, kindness, and grace. Thus, enjoyment and pleasure, also, may realize the spiritual being of man by enabling him to apprehend an objective value.

Here we should mention the thesis of realistic perspectivism, which asserts the objective reality of perspectives corresponding only to certain points of view.[2] The beauty of a certain landscape is real and objective, although given only as corresponding to one certain point of view in the whole of the world. Spirit placed in a certain point of view does not create or subjectively feel beauty, but discovers and perceives it because it is objectively given in that point of view. This having been acknowledged, the perspectives of the human individual also may bring an infinite enrichment in the possibilities of apprehending values, and manifestations of God's kindness and power. Consequently, he who helps to realize the pleasure and enjoyment of men helps to realize the religious attitude of loving God in his creatures.

Finally, love affirms the realization of a loved being as a value. If love is a spiritual power helping to strengthen the beloved's impulse

2. Cf. my lecture, "Der Unterschied von Seele und Geist," *Travaux du IX^e Congrès International de Philosophie* (Paris, 1937) IX, pp. 3-9; also, *Psychologie* (Leiden, 1938), pp. 53, 60, 106; and "Ideelle Existenz" in *Philosophische Hefte* (1929) I, pp. 183 ff.

to realize itself and to grow, then the religious attitude of enjoying the world from certain points of view, is a creative power. Charity, however, helps man to realize this attitude. It frees him from the misery and need which threaten to suffocate his spirit. The battle against human misery and need is a battle for God and Spirit. Thus the antinomy is solved, for the religious man, in accepting the moral obligation of ameliorating the sufferings of his neighbor, is not simply ministering to secondary, subjective needs, but is truly giving further substantiation to the religious attitude that sees the perfection of reality. Therefore, the alleged contradiction between the religious and the moral consciousness is not justified by human experience.

COMMUNICATIONS

A SURVEY OF STUDIES IN CORNISH HAGIOGRAPHY AND CHURCH HISTORY

By Louis H. Gray
Professor of Comparative Linguistics, Columbia University

Knowledge of the Celtic Christianity of Cornwall is wrapped in obscurity because of the paucity of material. Contemporary documents are lacking; those given by Haddan and Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents Relating to Great Britain and Ireland* (Oxford, 1869, I, pp. 673-695), deal only with the Saxon period (681-1072); and the only fairly certain liturgical fragment is a Proper for St. Germanus of Auxerre (*ibid.*, pp. 696-697; also edited by F. Warren, *Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church* [Oxford, 1881], pp. 159-161), which is of Anglo-Saxon date. The most of our information either comes from sources hostile to Celtic Christianity or is to be derived from late lives of Cornish saints, together with such inferences as may be drawn from Cornish place-names. These lives, none of which can be considered *acta sincera*, were written centuries after the holy men whom they commemorated (cf. Haddan and Stubbs, I, 700); but may sometimes well contain authentic traditions. To make matters worse, the robbery and destruction practised by Henry VIII and the Protestant "Reformers" caused the loss of many records which had previously been cherished.

Of these, we have some excerpts and other information preserved by William of Worcester (1415-1482?) and John Leland (*c.* 1506-1552); and Nicholas Roscarrock (1549?-1634?) wrote a collection of lives of saints which still exists only in a manuscript of 401 folios, running from Aa to Si, in the Library of Cambridge University (Add. MS. 3041; his life of the English St. Christina is printed in C. Horstmann's edition of the *Nova Legenda Anglie* [Oxford, 1901], II, 532-537; and his lives of Saints Nectan, Endelient, Minver, and Maben are excerpted in *Cornish Saints Series* XXV [1930], 22, 25-32; and of St. Carantoc in Stevens's *Material for a History of the Church and Parish of S Carantoc* [inaccessible to the writer]; this manuscript was analysed by the late Charles Henderson, whose premature death was an irreparable loss to all students of Cornwall, and his analysis is now

presumably in the Museum at Truro; but since the rich collection of his documents there is not yet catalogued, it is at present unavailable to investigators).

A manuscript of 889 pages in the Bibliothèque Nationale (Mss. lat., fonds français, 22321), also still unedited, was prepared by Benedictines aiding G.-A. Lobineau for his *Vies des saints de Bretagne* (Rennes, 1725; revised edition of Abbé Tresvaux, five volumes, Paris, 1836-39) and includes *Vitae* of Saints Budocus, Corentinus, Maudetus, Meriadocus, Mevennus, Petrocus, and Winwaloeus (cf. J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne en Armorique* [Paris, 1883], pp. 242-256), of which the lives of Saints Meriadocus and Petrocus are edited in *Cornish Saints Series* XXXIV (1934), 44-51, and XI[8] (1938), 8-22. The *Nova Legenda Anglie* has lives of Saints Cadocus, Carantocus, Decumanus, Gudwalus, Ivo, Kebius [Cuby, Cybi], Melorus, Neotus, Petrocus, and Winwaloeus (I, 167-173, 177-179, 263-265, 501-504; II, 86-90, 100-102, 183-185, 213-218, 317-320, 460-465); and in his *Lives of the Cambro-British Saints* (Llandovery, 1852; to be corrected by the formidable collation with the manuscripts by K. Meyer, originally made by Whitley Stokes, in *Y Cymmrodor* XIII [1900], 76-96), W. J. Rees edited *vitae* of Saints Carantocus and Kebius (pp. 97-101, 183-187).

In 1937, a discovery of much importance for Cornish and English hagiography was made: the fourteenth-century manuscript M. n. 57 in the Ducal Library at Gotha was found by Mr. Francis Wormald, of the British Museum, to contain forty-five lives of Cornish and British saints, including Saints Rumon and Nectan (of whom no *vitae* had previously been known), Petroc, Cadoc, Neot, and Sativola. This collection is declared by the foremost living Cornish hagiologist, Canon G. H. Doble, in a letter to the writer of August 28, 1939, to be "beyond doubt the most valuable English Mediaeval collection of Lives of saints in existence. Those in *Nova Legenda Anglie* are merely pale copies, only of value where their originals are lost." There is reason to hope that in their *Subsidia Hagiographica* the Bollandists will publish the portions of this manuscript which are now under the editorship of Canon Doble, Mr. Wormald, and Fr. P. Grosjean (translation of St. Rumon in *Cornish Saints Series* XLII [1939], 9-14; a translation of the life of St. Nectan by Canon Doble may soon be hoped for, as well as a study of St. Patern, a complete revision of his life of

St. Winwaloe, and a brochure on "The Relics of St. Petroc" from the *Vita Petroci* in the Gotha manuscript).

To Canon Doble we are indebted for the *Cornish Saints Series*, of which forty-two numbers have thus far appeared, and which may most conveniently be obtained from him directly at Wendron Vicarage, Helston (Cornwall). These are as follows (those marked * are out of print at present): *Saint Mawes* (second edition); *Saint Euny* (second edition); *Saint Budoc*; **Saint Winwaloe*; **Saint Corentin*; *Saint German of Auxerre*; *Saint Melaine* (third edition); **Saint Mewan and Saint Austol*;[1] **Saint Gwinear*; *Saint Feock* (second edition); *Saint Petrock* (third edition); *Saint Docco and Saint Kew*; *Saint Melor*; *Saint Carantoc* (second edition); **Saint Senan*; *Saint Nonna*; *Saint Brioc* (only in French translation, Saint-Brieuc, 1930); *Saint Sezni*; *Saint Selevan* (second edition); *Four Saints of the Fal* (SS. Gluvias, Kea, Fili, and Rumon); *Saint Neot*; *Saint Cuby (Cybi)*; *Saint Tudy*; *Saint Clether*; *Saint Nectan, Saint Keyne, and the Children of Brychan in Cornwall*; *Saint Constantine and Saint Merryn*; *Saint Symphorian*; *Saint Decuman*; *Saint Perran, Saint Keverne, and Saint Kerrian*; *Saint Gudwal or Gurval*; *Cornish Church Kalendar*; *Saint Day*; *Saint Yvo*; *Saint Meriadoc*; *Saint Hermes*; *Saint Samson in Cornwall*; *Saint Sulian and Saint Tysilio*; *Saint Gennys*; *Saint Mawgan*; *Saint Cadoc in Cornwall and Brittany*; *Saint Gerent*; and *Saint Rumon and Saint Ronan*.

In these, we have all data thus far known regarding the life of the saint in question, including such evidence as may be gained from a study of place-names in Cornwall, Devon, Wales, and Brittany, and from his cult in Brittany, since its hagiology is so closely connected with that of Cornwall that the two must be studied together (in addition to the well-known collections of lives of Breton saints by Lobineau and Albert Le Grand [most recent edition of the latter, Quimper, 1901], see especially Loth, *Les Noms des saints bretons* [Paris, 1910] and *Émigration*; R. Largillière, *Les Saints et l'organisation primitive chrétienne dans l'Armorique bretonne* [Rennes, 1925]; and Abbé F. Duine, *Bréviaires et missels des églises et abbayes bretonnes de France antérieurs au XVII^e siècle* [reprinted from *Bulletin et mémoires de la société archéologique du Département d'Ille-et-Vilaine* XXXV,

[1] Since sending in the slip-proof of this "Communication," the writer has received from Canon Doble the second edition of *Saint Mewan and Saint Austol* and "The Relics of Saint Petroc," the latter reprinted from *Antiquity*, 1939, pp. 403-415.

1906]; *Memento des sources hagiographiques de l'histoire de Bretagne* [Rennes, 1918]; *Inventaire liturgique de l'hagiographie bretonne* [Paris, 1922]; and *Catalogue des sources hagiographiques pour l'histoire de Bretagne jusqu'à la fin du XII^e siècle* [Paris, 1922]). This material is supplemented by historical notes on the parishes, based in great part on the notes of Henderson, and Canon Doble is also publishing a series of *Cornish Parish Histories*, of which six numbers have thus far appeared.

Henderson, who planned a very elaborate history of Cornwall (cf. the preface to his posthumous *Essays in Cornish History* [Oxford, 1935], pp. xvii-xviii, xxi-xxii), gave a summary of its parochial history in the *Cornish Church Guide* ([Truro, 1925]; this also contains articles on "History of the Ancient Bishopric in Cornwall" by W. Stubbs, supplemented by Henderson, pp. 17-29; "The Architecture of the Cornish Parish Church," by R. F. Wheatly, pp. 225-234; "Cornish Church Plate," by Canon Mills, pp. 235-240; "The Celtic Crosses of Cornwall," by Henderson, pp. 241-248; and "The Holy Wells of Cornwall," by H. Jenner, pp. 249-257). Of this history, parts have appeared, notably the posthumous *History of the Parish of Constantine in Cornwall* (Long Compton, 1937), especially pp. 20-70.

The one comprehensive study of the subject is the late Canon T. Taylor's *The Celtic Christianity of Cornwall: Divers Sketches and Studies* (London, 1916), of which one may hope that a revised edition may some day appear; and he also recorded the religious history of St. Michael's Mount in his book bearing that title (Cambridge, 1932, pp. 21-90, 100-111, 172-176).

A REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR NIEBUHR'S REPLY

By Douglas Clyde Macintosh
Dwight Professor of Theology and Philosophy of Religion, Yale University

In Professor Niebuhr's reply to my critical article on his reduction of theology to mythology he complains, as controversialists so commonly do, of having been misunderstood. Now I freely confess that I may not have discounted sufficiently some of Dr. Niebuhr's strongly worded expressions, and I may in consequence have failed to appreciate fully the positive core of his religious conviction. But I think almost any open-minded reader of his recent "Reply" would take as

in itself a sufficient *reductio ad absurdum* of his position as a Christian minister his closing statement that "in the field of religion any statement which is literally true has no particular significance." I am now inclined to think, however, that in this characteristically accentuated declaration, my critic is hardly fair to his own position. Has he not, in this very same "Reply" undertaken to state more fully than I did in my minimal statement just what the myths of the Fall and Original Sin on the one hand, and of the Incarnation and the Atonement on the other, *literally* mean? Furthermore, I am tempted to be slightly captious and inquire of my critic whether his unqualified declaration that "no finite creature can possess universal truth" be not more than he intended to say. To make a universal statement to the effect that no statement can be universally true is obviously to refute oneself.

But not only does any misunderstanding of Mr. Niebuhr's statements seem to be largely due to over-statement on his part; he also frequently ignores the careful qualifications of my language and overstates *my* position. I certainly did not "quote with approval" Charles Bennett's assertion, that "to take religious knowledge as literally true is impossible." (I can only understand Dr. Niebuhr's impression that I did so as being due in part to an unfortunate but obvious misprinting of "prefer" for "refer.") And I did not assert even as "probably" true a "*full* realization of spiritual values in Jesus of Nazareth," but a "*fuller* realization" of such values in him than in anyone else. (The word "probably" was inserted in order carefully to recognize the fact that one-hundred-percent demonstration is not attainable in value-judgments concerning matters so deeply involved in the uncertainties of ancient history.) Furthermore, I did not claim to find in Jesus "*only* the incarnation of spiritual *values*." I was not concerned to give the *whole* literal meaning of the Incarnation, but rather to call attention to a *minimum* of literal truth with regard to which, as I thought, there could be little or no difference of opinion between us. Nor can I admit that the minimum of literal truth to which I called attention was "too minimal to have any real significance."

In my article I undertook to warn Mr. Niebuhr against the controversialist's besetting "fallacy of excluded middle" (in one place inadvertently miswritten "undistributed middle"), the fallacy, namely, of treating contraries (opposite extremes) as if they were contradictories, with no intermediate position left as logically possible. But now I have to complain of the opposite fallacy, that of treating con-

tradictories as contraries. What seems to be, in Professor Niebuhr's thinking, a clear case of the fallacy of *not* excluding any middle term between contradictories is indicated by his unqualified assertion that in religion there is no literal truth which has any particular significance. Now I fail to see how any believer in God can deny that there is a very significant difference between affirming and denying that God is aware of something, that he knows what he is about, for instance. And nothing in our thought can be more literal, more completely free from myth, poetry, and metaphor, than the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness, between knowledge and ignorance. If then God knows what he is about, there is in religion significant literal truth. That God knows what he is about contradicts the proposition that there is in religion no significant literal truth. But it is a commonplace of elementary logic that of two mutually contradictory propositions one must be true and the other false. Dr. Niebuhr affirms the proposition that there is in religion no significant literal truth. Logically, therefore, he must deny the proposition that God knows what he is about. For practical religious purposes he might about as well deny that God exists.

Professor Niebuhr says that I am "unable to distinguish between truth and literal truth"; yet he himself offers no definite criterion of the difference. Definitions are not always easy, but I will hazard the attempt. Ordinarily in using the predicate "true" we do not mean to make any distinction between truth and literal truth. We mean by truth representation of reality by idea, of subject-matter by a predicate, such as is adequate for all proper practical purposes in deciding between the judgment and its contradictory. From this point of view even a very abstract symbol may be true, and literally true without giving the whole truth. But we may enlarge the concept of truth so as to include, along with literal truth, such truth as there may be in poetry, myth, and metaphor. Such poetical or non-literal truth we may define as such representation of reality by idea, of subject-matter by predicates, as serves to *suggest* rather than to state explicitly some literal truth about the subject-matter judged about. As an example of such truth in myth, or poetry, we may cite the story of the Virgin Birth. The Fundamentalist takes it as literally true. The Modernist takes it, or might very well take it, as mythical, but as containing in poetic form a very significant literal truth, namely, that apart from

divine creative causality we cannot adequately account for the historic Jesus.

As a final word, I must register my objection to Professor Niebuhr's assumption that my theological position is simply that of the typical nineteenth-century religious liberal. If one may take as the distinctive criteria of religious liberalism a belief in the "essential goodness of man," with a practical ignoring of the desperate plight he is in by reason of his individual and social sins and sinfulness, and confidence in human progress as either inevitable or actually steady, especially without a thoroughgoing repentance and turning to God, then I have no hesitation in declaring my unwillingness to be classed as a religious liberal. For many years I have been critical of ordinary liberal theology. What I am interested in might be more appropriately designated *modern evangelicalism* than liberalism.

BOOK REVIEWS

Pueblo Indian Religion. By Elsie Clews Parsons. Chicago University Press, 1939. 2 vols., xviii + 1273 pp. $7.00.

For twenty-five years Dr. Parsons' intensive work in the field and in the library has led up to this long-awaited detailed discussion of religion in the Indian Southwest. It is an encyclopedic work. An introductory chapter of over 100 pages sketches in the pertinent social background and discusses serially certain selected "habits of mind" characteristic of Pueblo culture. This is followed by a summary by towns of the structure and functions of groups charged with ceremonial business; by comparative enumeration of supernatural beings, cosmology, seriatim elements of ritual, and of the ceremonial calendar. The first three hundred pages of the second volume are devoted to descriptions of selected ceremonies summarized from already published literature, and this is followed by a town by town sketch particularizing the ceremonial characteristics of each pueblo. The concluding chapters bring together evidences of diffusion between the pueblo area and southern California, Yuman tribes of the Colorado, Pima-Papago, northern Mexican tribes, ancient Aztec, Plains tribes, the Great Basin, Navaho and Apache, and White cultures. This material on diffusion is discussed not only as evidence of borrowing, but of resistance to introduced traits, disintegration, substitution, and invention of new traits. Finally the hundreds of page references to the quoted literature are brought together at the end of this volume along with an admirable bibliography, and there is an appendix listing problems for future research in the field, and a full index which greatly increases the usefulness of the volumes.

Dr. Parsons writes from complete detailed knowledge of specific conditions in each Southwest pueblo, and she has a good eye, therefore, for significant material in the published literature. From this she has gathered a 300-page section on pueblo ceremonies which will be a boon to those to whom the existing bibliography on the Southwest is understandably forbidding. Readers who find the complex details difficult to carry in the mind from page to page must remember that in this area any "labor of description," as Dr. Parsons calls her work, must impose this burden on the reader. The Pueblos have that sort of a religion.

A short but most valuable discussion (pp. 941-945) concerns an important psychological situation which influences interpueblo borrowing of ritual details: the genuine pueblo ignorance of the set-up of other pueblos and the part this plays in skewing borrowed traits. She documents this with many acute personal observations. As she says, Pueblo Indians "do not learn by question and answer." A pueblo Indian, observing that priests are in retreat in another village, believes they are "Corn Group" priests because his pueblo has a priestly group of this type, and he equates "caciques" and ceremonies similarly. When bits of ritual are introduced from other pueblos, the borrowing pueblo is quite unaware of the anomalies the anthropologist sees. The situation is quite different, for instance, on the Northwest Coast, where, though adaptation also occurs, it occurs in the face of intensive curiosity about other tribal rituals, buttressed by belief in the extreme danger of faulty reproduction of details; or in certain tribes of New Guinea which keep scouts out in other tribes to acquaint themselves with valuable innovations which may be adopted.

Theoretical contributions in these volumes are not argued, but are generally appended to the concrete material as interrogations. Some of them are acute and valuable, as, for instance, the question with which she closes her discussion of Athabascan-Pueblo parallels: does not the simplicity of Eastern Apache culture, she asks, reflect the simplicity of Tanoan pueblos with whom their contacts are closest, while the elaboration of Navaho culture reflects the complexity of *their* neighbors, Hopi and Keres.

Other theoretical suggestions made in the course of the book would hardly survive marshalled argumentation. She suggests, for instance, that the kiva groups originated as organizations of war comrades (p. 1120). A similar origin of Northwest Coast secret societies has been argued by Professor Boas, but there the value of the demonstration is that historical continuity can be established in detail, and that the process of development the societies underwent with the cessation of warfare is therefore illuminated. All this is lacking in the Pueblo case, and Dr. Parsons' only argument for it is that if kiva initiations were based on initiation of the youth as warrior it would explain whipping in a culture very tenderhearted toward children, and that secretiveness and tabus, both characteristic of kiva groups, are also characteristic of warrior groups. Neither of these remarks have anything to do with

deriving kiva groups from warrior groups, nor are they the sort that can be argued for or against. If, on the contrary, she had followed her own clue, that circle dances in the pueblos are war dances, she would have posed a good continuity problem as between war practices and kiva practices. Only in that case her suggestion is negated, for kiva dances are line dances and in so far belong to a different complex from war dances.

The boldest theoretical point in the book has, I think, the least to be said for it. She suggests the origin of the Southwest matrilineal clan *in Hopi* "as a by-product of their Shoshonean housing complex" (p. 1088). Clan organization in the Southwest would then be an independent invention based on Hopi's non-pueblo past. There are two points to be raised against this reconstruction. One is that contained in the whole voluminous literature on single and multiple clan origin in America; one does not at this date select lightly one point of origin at the expense of an other, and, especially, one does not overlook possibilities of diffusion of clanship over areas much more inclusive than the Southwest. The other argument against her proposal is that linguistic evidence aligns Hopi with the Northern Paiute and Paviotso of Nevada who had no "housing complex." By "their (i.e., Hopi's) Shoshonean housing complex" Dr. Parsons means, as she indicates by cross reference, that of the Southern California Shoshoneans, who by linguistic evidence are a long-separated branch of this linguistic stock whose cultural forms would not indicate the nature of Hopi's ancestral traits. In such a case as this, historical reconstructions cannot afford to overlook the evidence available from linguistic study.

The volumes are a useful compendium of the culture traits of the Southwest and surrounding areas and will be of service to students of the Southwest and of the American Indian.

RUTH BENEDICT

Columbia University

The Bible of Mankind. Compiled and edited by MIRZA AHMAD SOHRAB. New York: Universal Publishing Co. 1939. xxx + 743 pp. $5.00.

The boundaries of the field traversed by this bulky volume are marked quite clearly, namely, nine living systems of religion, which originated in five different countries. And those nine living religions

are presented in a system of groupings which is logical as regards their larger relationships, as well as chronological as regards the sequence of their origins within their respective groups (even though such arrangement is not indicated in the Table of Contents, but is indicated at the beginning of the sections on pages 27, 181, 349 and 589). Thus the reader is led to traverse the "Aryan Heritage" through Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism; then the "Mongolian Heritage" through Confucianism and Taoism; then the "Semitic Heritage" through Judaism, Christianity and Islam; and finally the "Synthetic Approach" through The Bahai Cause.

The general scope of the volume seems to cover those historic systems of religion which have managed to keep alive, in contrast to the historic religions, like those of Greece and Rome and Egypt and Babylonia, which have, indeed, left a certain goodly heritage, but which have died as active, organized cults.

If so, there is, in this survey, a noteworthy omission, namely, Jainism, "The Religion of the Victorious," in India. Yet that religion, which started with an avowed universal aim over against the caste-ridden system of Hinduism, holds the unquestioned honor of priority in having established through its "Sangha," or "Congregation," the oldest voluntarily entered religious organization now surviving anywhere in the world. And, considered numerically at the present time, the professing adherents of Jainism are a dozen times as numerous as those of Zoroastrianism. The primary documents of Jainism, available in English translation, are more extensive than is the case with Taoism. Yet, perhaps, the omission of Jainism may be justified by our compiler because of its being one of the less important living religions, even in spite of its historical importance, and its scriptural importance for English readers.

There are two other notable omissions in the volume under review which prevent its being a complete survey of the systems of religion which are both historic and now functioning. Sikhism, "The Religion of Disciples of the One True God," is the latest still independent religious reform in India. Starting as a "protestant religion" in India contemporaneously with Martin Luther in Europe, Sikhism has managed to enroll the third largest religious community in India. Its central shrine, The Golden Temple in the Pool of Immortality at Amritsar, is perhaps, next to the Taj Mahal, the most beautiful and

impressive indigenous religious building in all India. Furthermore the *Granth*, which is the Sacred Scripture of Sikhism, is available in two partial English translations, namely, by Ernest Trumpp, *The Adi Granth, or The Holy Scriptures of the Sikhs, Translated from the Original* with 716 large pages, and by Max Arthur Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion, Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors*, with 2403 pages, in six volumes. Those literary sources would have supplied a large number of choice passages of religious devotion. The present reviewer has culled 265 such passages for his *Treasure-House of the Living Religions*.

And then there is the Shinto religion of Japan, a cult of long antiquity as well as of powerful current influence, which might well have been included. The very earliest extant specimens, as well as very influential documents, of twelve-hundred years of book-making in Japan are the *Kojiki, Records of Ancient Matters*, and the *Nihongi, Chronicles of Japan*. Even more quotable would be the *Manyoshiu, Collection of Ten-Thousand Leaves*, forty-four selections from which are included in two valuable anthologies, namely, in *The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East* (edited by Charles F. Horne), Vol. 13, *Japan*, and in *The World's Great Classics*, Vol. 2, *Oriental Literature* (Colonial Press, New York).

If there are these three outstanding living systems of religion conspicuously omitted from what otherwise might have been a comprehensive conspectus of the Sacred Scriptures of contemporary humanity, there is to be found in this recent anthology a certain noteworthy addition to the list of independent living religions. Bahaism is truly universal in its professed outlook, and also is actually international in its propaganda. Yet Bahaism is younger than some living men; it has not yet reached the historical span of a hundred years, having been first proclaimed in Persia by the Bab in 1844. The reason for the inclusion of Bahaism is undoubtedly that the compiler of the volume is himself an ardent proponent of "The Bahai Cause." Indeed, to his closing section on "The Synthetic Approach" to religion he has devoted a block of 142 pages,—an assignment almost as great as those allotted to three other religions, namely, Buddhism (36 pages), Zoroastrianism (51 pages), and Taoism (61 pages). Also, there is another noteworthy advantage in the relatively large amount of space allocated to the young nineteenth century religion; in the section "Who

Is Who among Authors of Prefaces" (pp. 735-36), the biographical information appears that this author had served as interpreter to the last deceased leader of The Bahai Cause when visiting the United States and Europe during the years 1912-1914, subsequently becoming a member of the household of Abdul Baha in Acca, Palestine, till the latter's death in 1918. Accordingly, it is with considerable initimate knowledge and warm personal loyalty that the reporter's own *Diary* is adduced (pp. 590, 672) among the "Sources" for the teachings of The Bahai Cause, along with excerpts from the Epistles of Abdul Baha to the Shah of Persia (p. 714), to the Pope (p. 627), to the Sultan of Turkey (pp. 653, 684), to Queen Victoria (pp. 639, 645), to America (p. 639), to the Jews (p. 699), to Napoleon the Third (pp. 624, 636, 639, 644, 680, 684, 699, 714).

In any large undertaking, particularly where separate assignments are made to different contributors presenting their own respective religions, there must be granted considerable latitude, and also limitations concerning the sources of information, the amount of material, and the special range of interest. Nevertheless, in any work which purports to be scholarly, there must be followed a consistent and thorough scientific procedure of precise and complete citing of sources. The name of the author and the title of the book is always given, and sometimes, also, the volume-number of the English translation, and some subordinate division-number of the document cited. Yet never once, in the more than seven hundred pages of material presented, is there a complete source-reference given. Ofttimes there are groups of quotations, extending even to two and three pages, quoted from a work of more than one volume, yet without indicating from what particular translation-volume, or from what particular page, or from what chapter and verse of the document quoted. An enormous amount of work has been expended upon this compilation; and it is, indeed, a valuable piece of popularizing. But any careful student will need more help, particularly for authenticating the material.

As a matter of fact, no small amount of work in research and publication has already been done along this very line of gathering common elements from different religions of the world. More than a dozen such compilations may be cited.[1]

1. M. D. Conway, *The Sacred Anthology* (London, 1875); W. N. Guthrie, *Leaves of the Greater Bible* (New York, 1917-18); R. E. Hume, *Treasure-House of the*

To many readers, this *Bible of Mankind* will open up an amazing and inspiring wealth of material showing the elements of consensus among the historic living religions of the world. But it does not indicate the radical *dissensus* of religious and ethical teachings among those same religions. The material has been organized under important topics, and from this great mass of selections an inquirer will be able to construct some gratifying answers to the question, "How similar are the different religions of the world?" But he will need to go much further for answers to the question, "How different are the different religions?"

Nevertheless, there will doubtless be fulfilled the specific purpose which is avowed by the enthusiastic compiler in his Introduction (p. xx):

> . . . the task of bringing into the light of the World of Today, as a guide for the World of Tomorrow, only those teachings, only those ethical and spiritual principles of the nine Faiths, which deal solely with the inner and esoteric side of religions.

ROBERT E. HUME

Union Theological Seminary

The Bible of the World. Edited by ROBERT O. BALLOU in collaboration with FRIEDERICH SPIEGELBERG, and with the assistance and advice of HORACE L. FRIESS. New York: The Viking Press, 1939. xxi + 1415 pp. $5.00.

Western students of the world's religions, as well as their teachers who have long looked in vain for a satisfactory textbook, will welcome the publication at last of a single volume containing a relatively complete selection from the essential scriptures of eight living religions. In arrangement as well as in completeness, this volume stands far above

---

Living Religions (New York, 1932); A. W. Martin, *The Fellowship of Faiths* (New York, 1925), *Ideals of Life* (Tacoma, Wash., 1897), *Seven Great Bibles* (New York, 1930); A. Mee, J. A. Hammerton, and S. S. McClure, *The World's Greatest Books*, XIII, *Religion and Philosophy* (New York, 1910); R. H. Newton, G. Gottheil, and T. R. Slicer, *A Book of Common Worship* (New York, 1915); J. A. Richards, *The Outline of Knowledge*, IX, *Sacred Writings* (New York, 1924); F. L. Riley, *The Bible of Bibles* (Los Angeles, 1928); G. B. Stebbings, *Chapters from the Bible of the Ages* (Detroit, 1872); G. H. Turnbull, *Tongues of Fire: A Bible of Sacred Scriptures of the Pagan World* (New York, 1929); Charles W. Eliot, Ed., *Harvard Classics* (New York, 1910) Vols. 44, 45, *Sacred Writings;* Also the two foregoing volumes bound together with the title, *Selections from Six Great Religions* (New York, 1926).

comparison with any earlier collection. Each religion can here be studied as a unit, inasmuch as all the passages from a given religion are grouped together, largely in chronological order, an arrangement which lends itself to historical study much more readily than the topical division of previous anthologies. At the same time the editor has encouraged comparative study by suggesting comparisons and cross-references in the notes and index.

Students will be grateful for the notes, especially the concise historical summary introducing each religion, and the scholarly glossary of technical terms. The omission of numbered verses is likely to be a serious inconvenience to the teacher in making assignments or in class-discussion, and to the student in writing papers or referring to complete editions. In some cases, even chapter references have been omitted in the notes, as in the quotations from *The Lotus of the True Law*.

The inclusiveness within each section is hard to believe possible in a single volume (until one feels its weight!). The section on Hinduism, for example, includes selections not only from the standard *Vedas*, *Upanishads* and *Gītā*, but also from scriptures less known in the west but basic for popular Hinduism: the *Atharva-Veda*, the *Laws of Manu*, the *Puranas*, and the *Sayings of Ramakrishna*. The excerpts from the *Laws of Manu* would be still more valuable if some passages dealing with the aims and ethics of the ascetic were included.

The section devoted to China includes comprehensive selections from all the basic classics—from the *Book of Odes* down to Mencius and Chuang-tsu—except the *Book of History*. In view of the special influence which that classic has exerted on political ethics throughout Chinese history, some recognition of its ideal picture of the ancient Sage-Emperors would seem indispensable. Would this not be more significant, from a world point of view, than the excessive fulness of detail accorded to Hebrew history? In a Bible of the *world* it seems out of balance to devote almost half (645 pages out of a total of 1342) to the "Judaeo-Christian" scriptures. And for a rounded idea of Judaism, some material from the *Talmud* would be more valuable than certain of the Old Testament passages.

The Buddhist section is noteworthy for the rich Zen literature, particularly the delightful Ox-herding pictures. There are, however, serious omissions in the selections from the Pali scriptures. No place has

been given, for example, to the practice of radiating love, sympathy, and equanimity, which the Buddha taught his followers to practice even when injured or attacked. In the *Dialogues,* these "divine dwellings" form the conclusion to the famous *Tevijja Sutta* ("On Union with God") which has here been entitled "On Theology" and bereft of its essential end. The editors seem to have ignored entirely the *Further Dialogues of the Buddha* (translated from the *Majjhima Nikaya*), and so have missed several gems in which Gotama sets forth the duty of returning good for evil, and how to apply the law of cause-and-effect to mastery of one's own mind. In the absence of key-passages explaining the identity of Dharma with understanding of causation, the reader can scarcely grasp the *content* of the Buddha's discovery, since the editors have used a rather late version of the Enlightenment story which does not make this explicit. The excerpts from the *Lotus* happily include the story of the Prodigal Son, but leave out the key-parable of the Father-Physician, which is equally vital to an understanding of the development of Mahayana doctrine.

The absence of any Shinto sacred literature, although defended by the editor, constitutes a handicap from the point of view of a course in world religions, especially if the emphasis is on living religions. Since Shinto is the religion of a whole civilization of seventy million people, it seems somewhat arbitrary to omit it entirely, in favor of Jainism and Zoroastrianism which are today largely of historical interest.

The translations used are, on the whole, satisfactory, particularly the interesting new translation of the *Tao Te Ching* by a Chinese. The Hindu poetic scriptures have not fared so well: scholarly as well as lay readers would probably find much more inspiration in the *Vedas* and the *Gītā* if a less pedestrian English version could be used.

In a comprehensive and monumental work, it is inevitable that specialists will disagree with details of selection, but such criticisms should not detract from the jubilation of both teachers and laymen over the appearance of this long-needed volume. Teachers will rejoice to have a source-book which can be used as a text for History of Religion courses, but the influence of this "Bible" can scarcely be confined to the academic world. Now for the first time, ordinary men and women who run across Confucius and Buddha—even in popular magazines and popular songs!—can own a single volume wherein they may

find for themselves what the sages really taught. And as these sayings become familiar, it will be less and less possible to condemn two-thirds of the world as "heathen." For this reason alone, the publication of *The Bible of the World* may prove to be epochal.

TERESINA ROWELL

Smith College

The Original Gītā: The Song of the Supreme Exalted One. By RUDOLF OTTO. Translated and edited by J. E. TURNER. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939. 309 pp. 15*s.*

No one doubts that the *Bhagavad Gītā* is "India's favorite Bible," the most powerful single literary source of religious influence in that vast country. Naturally, therefore, it has probably been more studied, translated, and discussed by westerners than any other Hindu work, while many Hindu scholars also devote themselves to it. Those who undertake to analyze and codify its ideas very soon discover that many of them are logically inconsistent with each other. What attitude should we take towards this? There are two main types of answer. One, to which probably all Hindus and the majority of western Sanskritists adhere, assumes the essential unity of the text. Not denying the possibility of an occasional intrusion, this school questions whether any such intrusion in a specific instance can be proved by purely subjective arguments. What might prove such an intrusion would be text-critical evidence. This can not become available until we have a critical edition, based on scholarly study of manuscripts. Such an edition (of the entire sixth book of the *Mahābhārata*, which contains the *Gītā*) is now being prepared by Professor S. K. Belvalkar of Poona. A preliminary report on the text of the *Gītā* has been published by him, in the *New Indian Antiquary* for July, 1939. It shows that, in his opinion, the manuscripts reveal virtually no evidence, certainly no conclusive evidence, for any omission from the standard text. I believe that this excellent scholar is right, at least in his general position. (Of course he does not mean, nor do I, that this proves the unity of the *Gītā*.)

How then account for the "inconsistencies"? Various ways have been suggested. My own starts from this, that the *Gītā* is not a philosophical treatise but a religious, devotional poem. It seeks to inspire and exalt, not to instruct or train the intellect. I believe also that rival schools

of metaphysical thought did not exist in India in the *Gītā's* day. Rival methods of gaining religious salvation existed, and a number of them are recorded in the *Gītā*, which as a rule admits optional validity to all, though it has its favorites. But they did not differ on objective "truth," and so did not force people to an either-or choice. The same man, at different times and in different moods, might feel drawn to different ones. Recognition of this is one of the reasons why the *Gītā* comes so near to being all things to all men, in India at least. The few philosophic (metaphysical) assumptions which it consistently makes are such as practically all Hindus have always accepted.

Some western Sanskritists, including one or two very great ones, have taken the opposite attitude. They have felt that the *Gītā* was too "inconsistent" to be the work of any one man, and have tried to divide it into layers. Until recently, the best-known of these attempts was Richard Garbe's (1905). He distinguished two layers, an older which he called "Sāṃkhya" in its metaphysics, and a younger which he called "Vedānta." Very few Sanskritists thought he succeeded in this dissection. But he was an excellent and very dependable philologist. He never distorted the text to suit his doctrines; his translation is still one of the most reliable aids to understanding the individual verses.

Garbe was also very moderate as a text-surgeon, compared to his pupil, the author of the work under review. Instead of two layers, Otto distinguishes at least nine (really an indefinitely larger number): the "original," to which are admitted only a few fragments of the text; then eight separate and distinct "treatises" supposedly added *en bloc* in various places and at various times; and finally, a considerable number of individual "interpolations" here and there.

Certainly dissection could not go much farther! It might be called the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Garbe school. Yet, I repeat, it is unfair to Garbe to attach that label. Garbe was philologically competent and sound. Otto constantly, though no doubt unconsciously, distorts the text to make it seem favorable to his theories. I do not, of course, accuse him of intentional dishonesty. He lacked Garbe's profound knowledge of Sanskrit, and probably did not realize how he manhandled the language. No really good philologist, no one who knew Sanskrit well, and whose first interest was an unprejudiced interpretation of the text, could, I think, have been guilty of so many distortions,

suppressions of the true, and suggestions of the false, as abound in his pages. To establish this would require a long monograph, such as has actually been written by the above-mentioned S. K. Belvalkar, "Miscarriage of Attempted Stratification of the Bhagavadgītā," a critique of Otto (*Journal of the University of Bombay*, 1937, pp. 63-133). I think much more could be said even than is there said; but in this review I must content myself with a sample.

Otto thinks that in the original *Gītā*, 11.51 was immediately followed by 18.58, all the intervening parts being interpolated. In support of this theory, he relies heavily, in the German original, on what he claims is a clear reference from the latter verse to the former. In 18.58 the Lord says: "With thy thoughts on Me (*mac-cittaḥ*), by My grace shalt thou cross over all difficulties." Otto renders, "So (the Sanskrit has no *"so"!*) richte denn (the Sanskrit has no *"denn"!*) dein *Sinnen* auf mich. . . ." In 11.51 Arjuna says: "I have now become restored to my senses (*sa-cetāḥ*), and attained to my normal state"; that is, after the overwhelming experience of the mystic vision, which had left him stupefied (cf. 11.14, 23-25, etc.); now that the Lord has resumed his human shape, he recovers his senses. Otto renders this by "bin wieder zu *Sinnen* gekommen," and sees in (*mac-*) *cittaḥ* of 18.58 a "clear reference" to (*sa-*) *cetāḥ* of 11.51. But it seems obvious that the Sanskrit words *cetas* and *citta* are not synonyms. The one means "senses, wits" in the sense of English "I lost (or, recovered) my *senses* (consciousness, or capacity for thought and action)." The other means simply "thoughts," which Arjuna is commanded to fix on God. In German it is possible to render both by "Sinnen"; but this is hardly more than a pun, and a German pun, which would be as impossible in Sanskrit as it is in English. Otto's English translator, presumably for this reason, renders 11.51 "come to my *senses* again," but 18.58 "direct thy *thoughts* to Me." He silently omits Otto's note, which of course would be quite meaningless when attached to these English renderings. But he apparently fails to notice that with it falls one of Otto's chief arguments for this important feature of his reconstruction!

It is hard for me to see how any one can doubt that *mac-cittaḥ* of 18.58 repeats *mac-cittaḥ* of 18.57, the verse which in the actual *Gītā* text immediately precedes it. This verse ends with "Be thou always *mac-cittaḥ*, with thoughts on Me!" Then follows immediately (18.58) the reason for the command: "Thy thoughts being on Me (*mac-*

cittaḥ), thou shalt cross over all difficulties by My grace." Otto's whole house of cards collapses at once; instead of supporting his reference to 11.51, this word establishes connection of 18.58 with the (to Otto "interpolated") verse 18.57.

In fairness to Otto, it must be said that the English translation is very bad. Obviously the translator knows no Sanskrit, and he has often made sad hash of Otto's German, especially in his translations from the text and elucidations of Sanskrit words. E. g., p. 253, the paragraph after "(4) Vāsudeva" is reduced to utter nonsense; p. 28, translation of *Gītā* 11.2, "so verily has it been in my own experience," whereas both the Sanskrit and Otto's German mean "I have learned at great length from Thee (Thy words)." One who cares to find out what Otto really wrote should never rely on this translation.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

Yale University

Gorakhnāth and the Kānphaṭa Yogīs. By GEORGE WESTON BRIGGS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938. xiv + 380 pp. xiv plates. $3.25.

The Kānphaṭa ("Split-Ear") yogīs give Professor Briggs an opportunity not only to describe them, but also to study the special background of their beliefs and practices. These yogīs are loosely organized with a varying number of subdivisions, although the number is ideally and traditionally stated as twelve, having a central association with no marked jurisdiction. Members of one subdivision have greater or less rights and privileges in respect to the others. All claim spiritual descent from common holy teachers, and there is fairly close conformity in matters of dress, vows, cult performances, holy places, and dogma. All seek a specialized goal through the application of yoga toward waking the sleeping *kundalini* that lies eight times coiled in man just between the anus and the base of the penis, and when aroused will ascend through six *cakras* (centers) to the top of the head, whereupon perfection of the individual is the result. With these practices are associated beliefs and rites of "left-hand" Tāntric Hinduism, especially those that equate human sex activity with the cosmic functions of creation and seek to put the individual in perfect relationship to the universe through sexual rites, often of a promiscuous and sensational character.

The chief centers of the Kānphaṭa yogīs are in northern and northwestern India, and it is a point to cause comment that one of the most sacred shrines is in Baluchistan, quite to the west of areas where Hinduism has had any footing for many centuries. The first and rather facile thought that comes to one is that yoga practices were known in high antiquity in all those regions, and with those practices the sex cults that make Tantrism notorious, and that all of these are pre-Aryan. It is unwise to yield to the temptation and advance such a theory, and Professor Briggs keeps conservatively away from it. But the question is prominent now since the Indus Valley discoveries, with their representations of iconographic types that resemble yogīs, and some one must consider it thoroughly and report on it as accurately as possible.

The greatest success of Professor Briggs' book lies in its account of current Kānphaṭa practices. This is based upon a wide, and I believe thorough, search through all available ethnographic and religious reportorial literature, and in addition upon the author's own firsthand inquiries. For some twenty years he has been collecting material, and the result is a work which has no parallel on any other Indian sect.

In describing the system of human physiology and spiritual psychology which the Tantras and the Goarakhnāthī literature employ, Professor Briggs has justifiably not endeavored to present a survey of all yoga belief, but only of the part that will explain the practices of the Gorakhnāthīs themselves. He points his study here to the elucidation of their most authoritative text, the *Gorakṣaśataka* ("Century [of stanzas] by Gorakṣa"). He prints the Sanskrit text with an English translation, accompanied by several chapters of commentary. The date of Gorakṣa, reputed founder of the sect, and even his historicity, are puzzling problems, which Professor Briggs seems to answer safely by putting Gorakṣa in the twelfth century.

The book unfortunately contains an appalling amount of bad orthography, not merely misprints. Certain Sanskrit terms are almost regularly misspelled (*darṣanī* for *darśanī*, *gṛhasta* for *gṛhastha*, and a number of others) and the Sanskrit text of the *Gorakṣaśataka* contains somewhere around forty clear errors in the hundred stanzas—and I am not referring to the failure to separate words in the Roman transliteration. But the translation is almost always correct, in spite of the errors of the printed text. Hence non-Sanskritists are not likely to be led astray, and Sanskritists can very easily make the necessary corrections.

A subject of much interest, on which we have little available information, is that of the real physiological effects of yoga. Professor Briggs cautiously does not try to go beyond his available evidence, but it is clear from his work that considerable scientific investigation, such as was started a few years ago by Dr. Behanan, is is order.

W. Norman Brown

University of Pennsylvania

La Religion d'Israël. By Adolphe Lods. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1939. 256 pp. Fr. 20.

This volume belongs to a collection of handbooks on the History of Religions, for each one of which the collaboration of competent specialists was assured. In what concerns the religion of Israel, a better authority cannot be found in France than the Sorbonne professor who for almost half a century has initiated generations of enthusiastic students into the ruggedness of the Hebraic tongue and the arcana of Old Testament exegesis. Adolphe Lods is, moreover, well known to English-speaking scholars for numerous monographs on particular points, and chiefly for two works which have been translated into English: *Israel from Its Beginnings to the Middle of the Eighth Century* (London, 1932), and a later book, *The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism* (New York, 1937), which has been presented to the readers of the *Review of Religion* (1939, III, pp. 181-183).

The new volume is not addressed to the same public as those preceding, and does not treat exactly the same subject. Whereas the former books dealt with the civilization of Israel in general from the origins to the third century B.C., this work exposes, in a synthesis reduced to the essentials, the religious evolution of Israel from the origins to the first century of the Christian era. One might regret, here and there, the absence of discussion concerning the use of sources, but it must not be forgotten that the author has avoided, as far as possible, a consideration of them, in order not to burden the development of his exposition, and in order to keep within the limits which had been assigned to him. Such a book is as captivating as the best of novels—unhampered as it is by technical material, which may always be found in the other works already mentioned, whenever it is deemed necessary.

The work falls naturally into six main parts:

1. The first part (pp. 7-45), dealing with the origins, shows the survivals of the practices and beliefs of primitive Semitism in the religion of Israel, and succinctly presents the religious state of the Hebrew tribes at the time of Moses' appearance. Lods has formulated more precisely the views which he had exposed in his *Israel*, taking into account the most recent scientific works and archeological discoveries; but he did not deviate from his habitual circumspection. For example, apropos of the gods of the Hebrews in the nomad pre-Mosaic period, he limits himself to presenting the principal hypotheses, such as those of Dussaud, Oesterley, Dhorme, Alt, etc. (pp. 43-45). It appears, indeed, that certain of these hypotheses are not irreducible one to another. One may admit with Dussaud that the Hebrews, as the ancient Canaanites (at least such as the latter are reflected in certain poems of Ras Shamra), worshipped principally the god El. The possibility of a lunar cult cannot, however, be excluded, since on these points as on several others, the patriarchal traditions of the Abrahamic cycle are in a sense confirmed by the data of the legend of Keret. The author points out that some historians, such as Dhorme, Dennefeld, and Zolli, are inclined to combine several of these hypotheses, but one regrets that Lods has not indicated his own preferences. In any case, it must be noted that he accords today much more value to the evidence drawn from the tablets of Ras Shamra than he did not long ago. Perhaps it is possible to go a step further and, while trying to improve with precautions the first attempts of the interpretations which have been proposed to date for the Ugaritic tablets, to admit that the difference between the religion of the nomad pre-Mosaic tribes and the religion of the ancient Canaanites was not as considerable as it has been generally accepted. This conclusion would undoubtedly show more clearly the originality of the work of Moses and also explain more easily the so-called "corruption" of Israel by contact with the Canaanites in Palestine.

2. The second part deals with the settlement of Israel in Palestine (pp. 46-66). The author here shows the complexity of certain problems as yet insoluble, such as the date of the Mosaic activity (it is to be noted that Lods favors the thirteenth century, recognizing none the less the difficulties encountered by the tenants of this opinion), the site of the "mountain of God," the pronunciation, the origins and the meaning of the name Jahweh, the foreign influences exerted on

Moses, and, finally, the delicate question of the rites and institutions properly Mosaic.

3. The third part (pp. 67-112) resumes, first, the subject of the religious state of the Canaanites at the time of the settlement of the Israelites in Palestine, then retraces the religious evolution of the people of Israel as far as the middle of the eighth century, and ends with a tableau of the prominent features of the national religion at this period. It seems that the author does not give a sufficient place to the movements of social and, especially, religious reactions against the Canaanite influence. There is in the royal epoch, before the appearance of the greater prophets, an almost uninterrupted current of zealots of Jahweh. Although the accounts relative to the personalities of Elijah, Micaiah the son of Imlah, and Elisha are adorned with legendary elements, it is probable that the influence of such champions of Jahwism on the masses and on the elite was considerable, not merely from a social and political standpoint. The recognition of this fact would not in any way lessen the originality of the greater prophets, but would make more evident the historical connection which must have existed between the work of Moses and the preachings of men like Amos and Isaiah. It should not necessarily be inferred from the paragraph entitled "Jahweh is the god of Israel" (pp. 102-3) that there was no personal religion before Jeremiah. Finally, apropos of the inexplicable sympathies and antipathies of Jahweh (p. 106), the popular story utilized later by the poet of the book of Job might have been mentioned, as it reflects a state of mind in accord with the ideas of that period (if indeed this story be of pre-exilic origin).

4. The fourth part (pp. 113-161) constructs a remarkable picture of the greater prophets up to the Babylonian exile. The personalities of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah are drawn up in a powerful *raccourci*. It is undoubtedly permitted to hold views slightly different from those of the author concerning the prophecies of hope: what criterion of literary order allows for considering them as genuine elements in Hosea (p. 129) and later additions in Amos (pp. 122-123)? One might also express doubts concerning the interpretation of Hosea's sentimental adventures (p. 130). It seems as if the prophet found in his private life a simple illustration, rather than an actual prediction, of the relations between Jahweh and the people of Israel. Lastly, one has the right to regret that, in this astounding gallery

of portraits of the greater prophets, Jeremiah does not stand out with all the amplitude and color one might expect. The fact that he is one of the major religious geniuses deserves more than a rapid mention (pp. 160-161).

5. The fifth part (pp. 162-209) is perhaps the most satisfactory, since the author has succeeded in retracing within a few pages a period probably the richest and the most varied in the religious evolution of Israel, that of early Judaism. Lods justly gives to Ezekiel a considerable importance. The interpretation of Deutero-Isaiah, and particularly the identification of the "Servant of Jahweh" with the people of Israel, will not be accepted by all the critics. The complexity of some significant problems might have been exposed—namely, the question of the relationship between the two ideas of expiation found respectively in Deutero-Isaiah and in the torah of Ezekiel. However, the contrasting currents of thought in early Judaism are admirably delineated; monotheism and traces of syncretism, universalism and particularism, ritualism and spirituality, eschatology and the doctrine of individual remuneration. The view of the ensemble once again gives credit to the science and tact of the historian.

6. The last part (pp. 210-245) presents the conflict between the Greco-Roman civilization and Judaism in Palestine and in the Diaspora, with a picture of the sacerdotal and legal evolution, the increasing authority of the scribes, the revival of the Messianic expectation, the attitudes of the sects, and the infiltration of foreign ideas into Judaism, both within and outside of orthodoxy. Particularly well described is the Jewish propaganda in the ancient world, its methods, its successes and its ultimate failure.

To the volume is added a selected bibliography which skilfully shows the critical sense and the impartial stand of the author.[1] It is to be hoped that this manual will soon be translated into English in order that it may be accessible to all students of the Bible in this country.

Samuel L. Terrien

The College of Wooster

1. An index would not be superfluous; the system for the transcription of proper names might be more consistent: for example, "ch" is used for *Châphân* (p. 147) and *Batchèba* (p. 99) as well as for *Achab* (p. 100) and *Achaz* (p. 147); yet one reads also *Aḥiya* (p. 99), *Pèqah* and *Pèqaḥya* (p. 132); "c" and "q" are used for *Ascalon* (p. 146) and *Ǫohèlèt* (p. 208), etc.

Jewish Magic and Superstition: A Study in Folk Religion. By Joshua Trachtenberg. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1939. xii + 356 pp. $3.50.

Several years ago, I was haggling with a bookseller on New York's East Side over the purchase of a copy of a common edition of *Sefer Raziel,* that little handbook of Jewish magical practice from which so much of Rabbi Trachtenberg's material was drawn. After much discussion, occasioned by the fact that there were two prices written in the book, the bookseller finally clinched his argument by saying, "What difference do a few cents make? Think of what you'll save! With this book in your home, you'll never need any fire insurance."

I was much taken by this instance of indigenously Jewish superstition, and investigated further. I discovered that, in sober truth, many Jews living today believe firmly that mere possession of this book—not, it is to be noted, of a particular edition, but just of any copy of this book, is a sure protection against fire. This superstition is of sufficient antiquity, and is sufficiently widespread to be mentioned by Trachtenberg (p. 315).

This single case of irrational faith in the direct intervention of supernatural powers in human affairs is interesting. More than that, it is symptomatic. Rabbi Trachtenberg shows that the Jews, although not among the most superstitious of peoples, have their share of beliefs justifiable neither by reason nor by experiment by the multiplicity of superstitious beliefs and magical practices which he brings to light in his excellent "study of folk religion." So great a profusion of specific illustrations has he amassed, that his work may well stand as a case-book of "reflections of the infinite variety and ingenuity of the human mind" (Foreword, p. x).

If so exhaustive and painstaking a survey can be said to have a fault, it is implied here. Trachtenberg, in his atomic study of reflections *of* the variety and ingenuity of the human mind, spends little time in reflecting *on* these reflections. Surely, the itemizing and cataloging of beliefs does not preclude an author's thinking about their general nature. I do not mean to suggest a total absence of generalizations, but merely that the book is weakest in this direction. For example, the author never does discuss fully why the work is subtitled "a study in folk religion," nor does he concern himself with the implications

of the popular character of superstitious beliefs. Jewish magic and superstition, he says, are distinctively Jewish; he might have gone further and said that within any religion a characteristic magical cult tends to develop. This cult is, at best, tolerated by the religious authorities; at times, it is proscribed. The biblical accounts of the death penalty for the raising of spirits, and of the visit of King Saul to the Witch of Endor are evidence that, within the Jewish community, the appeal to sorcery had a long and varied history.

Essentially, the appeal of magic is to the masses, whose minds require concrete evidence of divinity. If there are Powers, one might say, the popular belief is that They should use their power. Divinity, to be generally acceptable, must be able to prove a value in use. To prove its claim to be supported by the people, the ecclesiastical authority should be able to control the activities of Divinity. One should be able to put the gods to a practical use. Religious leaders, however, engaged in the elaboration and development of theology and canon law, or in the theoretical justification of ritual or belief, do not need this concreteness. A purely spiritual Value is their familiar; they have become accustomed to Divinity in the abstract.

Within the Christian fold, as Trachtenberg points out, magic, popular religion, was heretical; its practitioners often de-frocked priests; its ceremonies mummeries of orthodox ceremonial; its rites perversions of orthodox ritual. It is probable that the existence of an official magic of the Church, involving the accepted miracles and the sacraments, made it necessary for the hierarchy to place other, non-official magic under the ban, and thus heightened its heretical character. Furthermore, though the syncretism of the early Christian Church had involved the development of a highly organized system of angels and demons, the emphasis of the later Church fell on the side of the angels; the Church, as befitted its position, concerned itself with the powers of Good. Christian magic, on the other hand, found its sphere in a concern with the powers of Evil and thereby intensified its separatist, heretical character. It became, to a large extent, a cult of Satan.

Within Judaism, however, this process of separation was not carried out. One reason for this was that, save for a brief period of Parsi influence, the demonic powers never gained much prominence in Jewish thought. Jewish magic, then, had perforce to concern itself

chiefly with the development of additional techniques for the control of those same powers of Good to which the official religion was devoted.

> The primary principle of medieval Jewish magic was an implicit reliance upon the Powers of Good, which were invoked by calling upon their names, the holy Names of God and his angels (p. 15).

This is not to suggest that the demons were completely eliminated from popular belief. The existence of powers of Evil was, on the contrary, widely recognized. But while Christian magic was a reliance on these powers, Jewish magic, far from using the powers of Evil, was devoted in part to the development of formulas compelling these spirits to abstain from interference in human affairs.

It was, therefore, possible for magic to be tolerated by the Jewish authorities as it could not be by the Christian. It was even possible for a rabbi or scholar to engage in magical practices without loss of standing. Faust is an essentially Christian character; his explorations in the magic arts involved the sacrifice of his orthodoxy; he had to sell his soul to the devil. This would not have been necessary had he been a Jew, for "Jewish magic . . . functioned within the framework of the Jewish religion" (p. 15).

A further distinction between Jewish and Christian magic is made by Trachtenberg in terms of practice. Christian magic involves the exact performance of certain precisely defined actions. It is highly ritualized. As Eliphas Levi indicated in his recently reprinted *Doctrine and Ritual of Transcendental Magic,* the actions were supposed to be effective independently of the belief in their efficacy. "Do and you shall believe" was Levi's advice to the aspiring magician. This type of performance magic is precisely that which was forbidden among the medieval Jews.

> Two main types of forbidden magic were distinguished: that which produces a discernible, material effect, by means of "the performance of an act," and that which only creates the illusion of such an act or its effect. . . . The practitioner of the first type merits the Biblical penalty of death; the second is forbidden but not so punishable (p. 19).

That is to say, broadly, the authorities prohibited sympathetic magic, magic which depends upon the imitation of actions to stimulate powers inherent in things rather than upon invocation.

Permitted (i.e., tolerated) magic involved calling upon God and the angels by their names. This was permitted, in the first place, because

> The use of angels, names, and even demons, involving an appeal to the supernatural and a recognition of the supremacy of God, was admitted past the barrier on sufferance (pp. 21-22).

and, in the second place, because the miracle of language had profoundly impressed the Jewish mind. Words, names, had in themselves a compulsive force, which was, of course, particularly strong in the names of God and His angels. Thus, while the prohibited forms of magic were frowned upon because of their kinship to idolatry, the permitted forms were tolerated because the Jew did not recognize his own logolatry.

Jewish magic and, particularly, Jewish superstition remained essentially the preoccupation of the common people, in spite of the fact that they were tolerated by the authorities. Among the intellectuals, magical practices were more widely accepted than were the concomitant superstitious beliefs. In fact, the extent to which this movement from below pervaded Jewish life may be considered as an index of the degree of democratic control of the Jewish religion, of the absence of hierarchical direction in Jewish affairs. Unless hierarchical domination of a religion is so strong that the will of the communicant is overwhelmed by the consensus of the theologians, the popular beliefs, the folk religion, will, in some way, become a part of the orthodox tradition. A man's religion is not so much that into which he was born; it is, rather, that into which he grows up. It is the nexus of beliefs and their attendant practices to which, in the process of time, he becomes emotionally conditioned. For the medieval Jew, much of the belief was superstition, much of the practice, magic. It speaks well for the sanity and liberalism of official Judaism that it accepted this, and did not create a situation of double allegiance. Rather than allow the Jew to be drawn outside the orbit of his official religion, the leaders drew certain types of magic and superstition into the orbit of the religion.

The details of this process are available in Trachtenberg's book, which should be read in the light of these generalizations. It is an exhaustive compendium, and yet it is as hard to put down as a compelling work of fiction. Much of the material is thought-provoking, and will lead the reader to the formulation of ideas on popular beliefs

and practices in other cultures. The work may profitably be regarded as living anthropology.

Trachtenberg starts by presenting the myth of the Jew as magician extraordinary, and describes his material as an effort to get at the truth behind the legend. If any conclusion can be drawn, it is that there is very little connection between the myth and the facts. The popular portrait of the Jewish sorcerer was based on ignorance of the nature of the Jew rather than on knowledge. The strange language and strange appearance of the Jew, as well as his eternal strangerhood, bred the legend. The Jew was called magician because of his foreignness rather than because of his magic.

Pierre van Paassen, in describing his Dutch childhood, in *Days of Our Years*, wrote:

> There was current among our people a vague belief which was always mentioned in mysterious tones. It attributed to the Jews some secret magic power which enabled them to suspend, or at least effectively intervene in, the normal processes of nature (p. 29).

Van Paassen, whose appreciation of Trachtenberg's book was quoted on the dust jacket, would, I feel, be the first to admit that there was no relation between the vague beliefs of his people about Jewish magic and the actual facts which Trachtenberg has studied so carefully and presented so fully.

Joseph L. Blau

New York City

The Message of Jesus Christ. By Martin Dibelius. Translated by F. C. Grant. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. xx + 192 pp. $2.00.

It was Dr. Dibelius who, back in 1919, spoke the first word that started an avalanche of books and articles on form-criticism of the Gospels. And now, just twenty years later, we have his "last word": he believes the results have reached such security that they may be presented to the general public for appropriation. He therefore prints in full his reconstruction of the original material out of which our Gospels grew; it was in these forms that the earliest Christians told what Jesus said and did.

They are five-fold. First the "old stories," which tell of events that led Jesus to make a declaration or of the circumstances of his

death. The other forms are "parables," a self-explanatory term, "sayings," in which Jesus' words are given without supplement, "miracles" accenting Jesus' power, and "legends," secondary matter, usually elaborating the marvellous elements. As regards the origin of these forms, old stories, parables and miracles were framed primarily for the use of preachers; the old stories particularly. So convinced is Dr. Dibelius that this was their function that his scientific name for them is "paradigms," models to be copied by all missionaries in their addresses to the unconverted. In comparison the sayings were of minor significance, being used chiefly in directing life within the church, while the legends do not belong to the earliest period. So the key to the process is "In the beginning was the preaching!"

This classification has, on the whole, stood the test of two decades of intensive study; an appalling number of other schemes have been advocated—some of them impossibly elaborate and artificial—but for practical utility they reduce to just about what Dr. Dibelius proposes. Most other scholars, to be sure, prefer to disassociate the account of Jesus' death from the old stories and to make a separate class of them ("Passion narrative"), but to this Dr. Dibelius offers no objection in principle. Considerable protest has been aroused, on the other hand, by his titles for the rest of the material in this class, because neither of them is descriptive of the form as such. "Old stories" is either too vague or—if "old" means "older than the other material"—contains an historical judgment instead of a form designation, while "paradigms" describes, not the form, but the use to which it is supposed to be put. The best alternative is that advocated by Dr. Vincent Taylor, "pronouncement stories," which is precise: these are stories in which Jesus makes a pronouncement. If then we use six classes—"pronouncement stories," "Passion narrative," "parables," "sayings," "miracles," and "legends"—we are on safe ground.

More serious, however, is the historical assumption that Dr. Dibelius assumes as fundamental. In many quarters, indeed, the dictum "In the beginning was the preaching" has been acclaimed as an inspired utterance—and has been used as the starting point for theories that may conservatively be described as "imaginative." But the dictum tells only part of the truth. Equally significant is, "In the beginning was the Way"; and more important than either, "Before the beginning was the Rabbi."

That is, before we can speak of Christianity at all, Jesus taught as a Rabbi, comparable to other Rabbis, and, like other Rabbis, had about him a group of specially selected "disciples" (roughly corresponding to the Twelve). Such disciples were attached to every Rabbi. They lived with him, ate with him, "followed" him (literally) wherever he went, paid the strictest attention to his every word and—this is the important point—memorized mechanically all his significant sayings. Here to Jewish ears "significant" means every saying that gives a new ruling on a disputed problem of legal observance (Halakah), or that phrases strikingly a moral or religious truth (Hagadah); where a Rabbi was in agreement with general opinion or practice no effort was made to perpetuate his words. The Talmud contains myriads of Rabbinic citations, and they are all of the types just described—and all classifiable also under the six Gospel "forms" of pronouncement stories, Passion narrative (usually told as deathbed scenes), parables, sayings, miracles and legends.

In other words, the tradition of Jesus' sayings and (to a lesser degree) of his acts began in his lifetime and under his own direction; it began with a group of disciples who were required to memorize his significant utterances *verbatim;* and not only to memorize but to accept and act on what he said, whether in the realm of belief (Hagadah) or of practice (Halakah). The Halakah was crucial; for it is in the matter of practice rather than of belief that Jews form parties, and it is about practice that the hottest disputes rage. For Jesus' disciples their Master's Halakah was vital to the last degree, especially after his death when they proclaimed him as Messiah. As such he would (soon!) come to judge the world, and from all who contradicted his teaching he would demand a terrible accounting; so to know and follow his Halakah would mean just the difference between heaven and hell. So his followers called themselves simply "The Halakah" (in English, "The Way") and their first problem was to teach this "Way" to the flood of converts. The missionary preaching, important though it was, was in comparison secondary, for there was no use bringing outsiders into a community that itself had gone wrong.

These considerations Dr. Dibelius does not raise, and his neglect to do so detracts from the high value of his careful and important work. Undoubtedly a story could serve as a "paradigm" for a preacher; but was it not even more useful to instruct those already converted?

The "form" of the story does not help us decide between these alternatives. The decision must be made by considerations which lie outside the form, so that "form-criticism" breaks down where we most need help.

If this important limitation be borne in mind, the volume will be of the highest value to students, especially as Dr. Grant's translation does complete justice to the original.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

General Theological Seminary

Religion on the American Frontier, 1783-1850. Vol. III: *The Congregationalists. A Collection of Source Materials.* By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939. xi + 435 pp. Maps and Bibliography. $3.00.

American historiography has long needed a fuller and more adequate treatment of the religious aspects of our history, but the diversity of institutional forms in American religion has immensely increased the labors of the historian. The Congregationalists, for example, are not numerous, yet only one accumulation of documents upon their history, the correspondence of the American Home Missionary Society, contains some 100,000 letters of missionaries and 150 volumes of "press" copies of letters by Society officials. This is a daunting mass of paper.

In this splendidly edited little book Professor Sweet has given us not only a sample of the riches in this collection and in others, and a guide to their further utilization, but also a valuable contribution to the history of a denomination and of a region. This is the third volume in a series which is planned to "make available source materials for an understanding of all the religious forces which made any impact upon the frontier." The earlier volumes dealt with the Baptists (New York, 1931) and the Presbyterians (New York, 1936). Because of the co-operation between Presbyterians and Congregationalists on the mid-western mission field, this volume is in many ways a complement to Volume Two, although it can stand firmly in its own right as an independent work.

In his General Introduction the editor points out that the Congregationalists were in 1783 "the most numerous as well as the most influential religious body in America," but that they failed to hold

that rank, or even to maintain a position among the religious forces of the nation commensurate with the New England contribution to the national order. So far as the frontier is concerned the reason for this relative decline Professor Sweet sees in the Plan of Union. This was the celebrated working agreement entered into in 1801 between the Presbyterian General Assembly and the Congregational General Association of Connecticut. The text of the agreement is reproduced on page 15, note 5; its practical effect was to lead to the creation of what was virtually a new denomination in those parts of the west to which New England emigration went. In Ohio at any rate, this composite church order was nicknamed the "Presbygational"; wherever it functioned, the distinction between Presbyterian and Congregational was one very difficult to establish. Indeed, the terms were largely meaningless. The agreement, to which the other Congregational state associations of New England adhered in spirit, if not in form, was implemented by the development of the two great interdenominational missionary agencies, the American Home Missionary Society and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

The functioning and failure of this early attempt at church union is the central theme of Professor Sweet's collection, a theme which invests it with a lively if melancholy interest for the present. Historically, the Plan of Union broke down under the weight of persistent traditions, the passions of the anti-slavery controversy, and the doctrinal quarrel which rent the Presbyterian church in 1837 into New School and Old School factions. Preference in some congregations for the looser and more democratic Congregational procedures may also have been a factor. Churches which are the result of mergers apparently may find it dangerous to their continuance to take a positive stand on anything either in morals or doctrine.

In his volume upon the Presbyterians, Professor Sweet has documented the Presbyterian schism; in this volume he shows with moving clarity the operation of the other factors making for the collapse of the Plan of Union, and the emergence of the Congregational churches as a separate, self-conscious denomination in the Middle West. He begins with selections from the documents of the Missionary Society of Connecticut which illustrate the work of the Society and of its missionaries in the first days of the Plan of Union. In the

next two chapters, the editor has reproduced the records of early Congregational churches in Ohio and Illinois, and the first general Congregational organizations in Illinois. Of especial moment are the "Minutes" of the Congregational Association of Illinois from its founding in 1835 to 1841. This Association included most of the early Congregational churches in the lower Illinois Valley and in the "Military District" between the Illinois and the Mississippi. Thus it lay upon the debatable frontier between the incoming anti-slavery "Puritans" from New England and New York and the established "Hoosiers" and "Suckers." Few single documents can be found which show better than this the processes of cultural conflict and institutional development. The Congregational churches and their Association championed temperance, doctrinal freedom, and anti-slavery. The Association endorsed Elijah Lovejoy and his Alton *Observer*, and endured in its annual meeting at Warsaw the threats of a pro-slavery mob. Out of conflict came institutional self-consciousness, and the extract from the "Minutes" closes fittingly with a vigorous, clearly worded statement of the Congregational polity and the resolution, "That some minister be appointed to preach a discourse on Congregationalism at our next stated meeting: To present its origin, History and general features."

Other documents reproduced include a long extract from the autobiography of Flavel Bascom, one of the "Yale Band" and a pioneer minister in Illinois; letters illustrating the early history of Congregationalism in Michigan; documents concerning the Indian missions of the A.B.C.F.M.; and others upon the history of the Congregational and Presbyterian Convention of Wisconsin. The Convention was a means for preserving unity in co-operation between Presbyterians and Congregationalists after the collapse of the organic unity of the Plan of Union. Documents from Iowa or Minnesota would have furnished a desirable complement to the collection, for which the Indian mission papers could easily have been omitted, so that we might have the complete cycle before us from strictly Congregational activities through the co-operation of the Plan of Union to the new era of renewed denominational activity.

Professor Sweet's editorial skill and his firm adherence to a definite criterion of selection have given to his collection a remarkable consistency and coherence. This adds to the value of the work but should

warn its users to an enhanced caution, for life, even in Congregational churches, is neither consistent nor coherent. "Religion" is treated almost wholly in its churchly aspects: personal experience, doctrine, and ethical practice—apart from temperance and slavery—are not touched upon. The "Frontier" is not realized at all, except as blank space. Neither the incidents of life in a raw country nor the "frontier" as Turner conceived it appear here, except occasionally or between the lines. From the standpoint provided by the Turner hypothesis, indeed, the book offers a powerful negative, for it presents, not the process of change and adaptation, but that of persistence. One of the most vivid impressions gained from a close reading is that of the projection into the turmoil of the West of the stiff, unflinching, determined Puritanism of the East. A missionary in Wisconsin wrote in 1845, "N. England Theology has emigrated with its ministers & I see not but it has stood as erect in this pleasant valley as among the granate (*sic*) hills" (p. 394). But this is not the whole story, and no one should believe that it is: Professor Sweet would be the last person to advise students to stop with his book. He has continually allowed hints to escape of the wealth and variety of his sources. The very missionary quoted above went on in his next sentence to give away a sizable cat, with the declaration that, "Nothing like Oberlinism has been indorsed or to any extent found sympathy among us." May we not hope that Professor Sweet will find a place in his developing series for a volume or volumes upon the clash of cultures on the frontier?

The publishers have given the book a format worthy of its contents; three maps offer useful supplements to the text; and there is an excellent bibliography.

Maurice C. Latta

Iowa Wesleyan College

The Privilege of Age: Essays Secular and Spiritual. By Vida Dutton Scudder. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1939. 319 pp. $3.50.

From a much larger number of essays and articles which she has published between 1913 and 1939, Miss Scudder has selected twenty pleasantly characteristic items, ranging from topics so secular as "The College Girl's Mind" to topics so spiritual as "The Cross in Utopia." To this reviewer the volume is chiefly valuable as the revelation of a

strong and endearing personality—learned, humorous, zestful, candid, brave, devout. Whatever the tale of her years, such a woman is not to be regarded as an intellectual noncombatant.

For Vida Scudder, apparently, one of the privileges of age is that of retaining all the venturesomeness traditionally associated with youth. Her book, as she says, "reflects at times values persistent throughout the ages, and again, more often, sometimes prophetically, the ferment of expanding perplexities in an exciting and difficult period" (p. 11). While one recognizes her desire to view the modern ferment in the light of abiding realities, one feels that flux in itself has strong attractions for her. That which is "difficult" is inherently "exciting." To get into intellectual or spiritual tangles constitutes "adventure"—a word of frequent recurrence. The bewildering complexity of modern life leaves her undaunted: "All this confusion is a hopeful sign in one way. It means life, not decay. . . . Spring winds are blowing" (p. 131). These cheerful words were written in 1929, but the temper of her book indicates that she would not now retract them. Even in her Anglo-Catholicism she remains the disciple of Heraclitus. "The first social lesson of the Church Year is that of a perpetual flux. Movement, not stability, is the law of the Christian life" (p. 285). "Turmoil and upheaval, war and revolution, distress of nations with perplexity, are an essential part of the Divine Order" (p. 287). It is certainly true that "disturbing as well as conserving forces are essential to the great catholic synthesis" (p. 198), but in these papers the predominance of the former over the latter is so heavy that the synthesis seems to be imperilled. "Should there be," she twinkles, "a change in religious institutions corresponding to a change in dress?" (p. 99). The implication is that such changes might be stimulating "adventures." I must confess that at the age of forty-five I am not youthful enough to keep up with this veteran's passion for movement. It leaves me with a senile longing for permanence and simplicity and peace.

For readers of the *Review of Religion*, the most interesting essays in this volume will be those which combine Miss Scudder's Catholicism and her ideals of social justice. "Only from the roots of a Catholic and Christian civilization," she insists, "could bloom the fair flower of a co-operative commonwealth, for whose unfolding we watch and wait" (p. 282). Many Christians would subscribe to that statement without agreeing with all of Miss Scudder's suggestions

for encouraging the growth of the flower. Although she asserts the existence of an "impassable gulf" between Christianity and communism (p. 77), she cannot quite abandon the hope of reconciling the two. "Some of us," she hints, "feel the trinitarian faith with its sacramental implications to be extraordinarily consonant with much in Marxism" (p. 271). Now if one interprets both the trinitarian faith and Marxism in the light of an immanentist mysticism in which St. Francis, Blake, and Shelley are about equally blended, undoubtedly a kind of harmony is achieved, but only at the cost of distorting the lineaments of real Catholicism and of real modern radicalism.

The difficulty of being both a loyal Catholic and a "radical" in the usual present-day sense is recognized by the author with a noble candor. The problem comes to a head in a remarkable passage (pp. 138-141) in "Conflicting Loyalties." Believing that the time has come when the Church must suffer in body for the sake of her soul, Miss Scudder sometimes feels willing to join those who seem to be the foes of Christianity. "There is such a thing as purification by fire. I dare to go very far; I think it may be the duty of devoted Church members not only to acquiesce but to assist in smashing the Altar, in demolishing the Cathedral, before the multitudes without can be nourished by the Bread of Life." But in the act of uttering these words she shrinks from some of their implications. She gives the foes of the Church no "blanket approval." Loyalty to the Church must be placed above loyalty to any secular cause. "Also, I naturally regard the ends which limit the vision of some secular radicals as simply important means preliminary to the liberation of the soul. . . . So I maintain a rather dizzy equilibrium; and I am very well aware of its perils. I should be sorry to play the role of Judas, who was perhaps merely trying to force Christ's hand. But I find the Adventure stimulating."

Such an Adventure well deserves the dignity of a capital letter. Our comprehension of it is aided by the statement that the religion denounced by "the forces that may involve secular revolution . . . is not the authentic faith which claims my unwavering allegiance, but rather a travesty of that faith" (p. 141). For so ardent a mystic as Miss Scudder, there is not merely a distinction but an opposition between the Visible and the Invisible Church. Smash the former, and the latter will probably thrive all the more.

No one will question the validity and the beauty of Vida Scudder's

personal religion or the sincerity with which she identifies that religion with the Catholic faith. It is fair to suggest, however, that her mysticism of the Inner Light, combined as usual with a certain grudge against the objective and institutional aspects of Christianity, is precisely that element in religion which leads from Catholicism to Protestantism, thence to sentimental naturalism and humanitarianism, and finally to that contemporary muddle which Catholic theories of social order are struggling to transcend. It is symptomatic that her warm approval of Joachim of Flores' ideas on the dispensation of the Holy Spirit should be supported by a quotation from *Prometheus Unbound* (p. 797). Once let the Inner Light shine so brightly as to dim the Outer Light, and we are bound to arrive at the position of Shelley—and of Blake:

> Thou art a Man; God is no more:
> Thine own humanity learn to adore.

This couplet is admiringly quoted (p. 62) by Miss Scudder in an essay which places that rather shopworn seer, Rabindranath Tagore, side by side with St. John of the Cross and St. Bonaventura. But we have increasingly been adoring our own humanity for the last four centuries, with results which some of us would now be glad to escape.

In short it seems to me that Miss Scudder is a highly romantic radical and a highly romantic Catholic. But many readers will value her book for those very qualities, and will regard me as temperamentally disqualified from sharing its insight. Let me add that I should consider myself extremely fortunate were I able to set forth my own view of life with anything like the courage and beauty of spirit which Vida Scudder has displayed in these essays.

Hoxie N. Fairchild

Columbia University

Spirit and Reality. By Nicolas Berdyaev. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 204 pp. $3.00.

There is today, in many quarters, a true cult of Berdyaev, and for all his admirers this volume will be a revelation. It is not for nothing, however, that on the cover of the book is a sentence by Dr. W. R. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's, "Nicolas Berdyaev is one of the most interesting and stimulating thinkers of the present day." This is true to a large extent, and in the present work, Berdyaev touches some of

the most vital and crucial problems that beset modern religious thought.

To understand his position we must remember that he belonged to the first generation of Russian Marxists. He worked his intellectual way from this group to Christianity. He was one of the moving spirits of the Religio-Philosophical Society of St. Petersburg, which flourished in the early years of the present century, and, since the Russian Revolution, he has been in Paris and has been one of the chief contributors of the journal *Put'* (The Way), the leading organ of Russian Orthodox thought. This group is trying to find a basis for religion and civilization, although not on the basis of Capitalism, and a reading of many of their articles will convince the student as nothing else will that perhaps there is no such animal as Capitalism. Not that these men are superficial or insincere, but they raise problems which fit in very strangely with the world as the rest of humanity understands it.

In this volume, which is in the true religio-philosophical tradition, Berdyaev seeks an understanding of the problem of freedom, but it is not freedom in the ordinary political or intellectual sense. It is freedom in general, and the role of the spirit in particular, but the spirit is broader and more fundamental than the Holy Spirit. What is the relation of the spirit or spirit and God?

Spirit, then, is something that cannot be defined rationally. It is something that cannot be brought under the usual framework of logic and of reason, because it is free, and if it is free, it must be as free from logic as from any other quality or measure. We have, therefore, at the outset the most complicated task of expressing in human language something which is not only of a higher type of being, but is also outside of anything that we can consider a type of being and yet it is, perhaps, the real being. This is a poor and inadequate rendering of the pages of Berdyaev, but it is a sincere attempt to secure a fair summary of a large part of the volume. Like all the authors of this school, Berdyaev is trying to express in words something for which words are inadequate, and yet humanity almost instinctively realizes that it cannot be satisfied with the usual terminology. The human mind can conceive of the difference between freedom and determinism, but how can it express that feeling?

In his efforts to do so, Berdyaev quotes the Fathers of the Church and many of the German mystical philosophers, such as Jakob Boehme,

Tauler, and others. He follows the leaders of his group in viewing Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and the other German philosophers as guides to mystical thought, and he seeks a religio-philosophical aspect where others have seen only the philosophical. In addition to this he uses a heavy language filled with unusual terms and terms used in an abnormal sense, for in Russian it is very easy to create abstract nouns out of the more usual concrete nouns, and to play with them in a rarefied atmophere of thought. No scholastic philosopher, with his divisions between substance and accidents, has been able to go as far as Berdyaev in piling concept upon concept until the reader is almost buried beneath a mass of abstracts.

This is not said in condemnation. Berdyaev realizes that the picture of the spirit as given in the New Testament is extremely simple and far-reaching. Given a few phrases in the Gospels or the Epistles, the commentator is compelled to expend pages and still cannot exhaust the entire content. The same is even more true in dealing with Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists, and some of the early Byzantine theologians.

It is easy to realize the central theme of our author. Once having stated his concept of freedom and of the spirit, he analyzes asceticism and mysticism. He shows how the former has been too often perverted into a desire for personal salvation and a dislike for humanity, and his judgment is that of the Blessed Nil Sorsky, "It is better to drink wine with love than water with passion." With mysticism he does show how the apophatic theology of the mystics has led them to be accused of pantheism, and almost of atheism, in their use of extreme formulas to denote their relation to God and the world. Among the best pages are those where he contrasts Eastern and Western mystics (pp. 156 ff.) and proves that Byzantine Christianity was nowhere near as sterile as is often thought.

He pleads for a new spirituality which will emphasize more clearly the social obligations of mankind, and which will be free from the vices of the present. It is here that Berdyaev is most difficult, for his thought is based on the Russian Orthodox idea of *sobornost,* that consent of the faithful which expresses itself by various indefinite means, and which demonstrably has guided the Orthodox Church, and in fact all of Christianity, in selecting the Books of the Bible, the authenticity of the General Councils, and, last but not least, has checked the extremes of the Living Church and similar groups in the Soviet Union

since the Revolution. The more definite Western thought has tried to find some external guide, where the East has employed a vague but definite tendency to achieve the same results.

All this is on an extremely high plane, and we are startled when the author at times drops down in his dislike for rigid systems, rigid hierarchical and governmental rule, to talk of Capitalism, "which is the death of the spirit" (p. 37). He shows, too, traces of his old Marxism in his feeling that the Church has always been too friendly to property and money, and that it has always dealt with offenses against property liberally, while it has been too strict in matters of sex (p. 931), and here there is perhaps a trace of the influence of Rozanov. Yet he unhesitatingly feels that Communism and Socialism also are yielding, and must yield to the same temptations as did Capitalism (pp. 171, 178).

The truth is that Berdyaev is an aristocrat of thought, and he conceives of the new spirituality as the work of a group of spiritual aristocrats. It may be asked if such a group will be any more consonant with the traditions of the Gospel than are any other aristocrats that the world has seen. The whole thesis of the new spirituality is to be found in Berdyaev's belief that spirit is objectified, and that this means death and destruction. In other words, the maintaining of the business of life has led to the development of institutions, religious, political, economic, which do not express the entire truth, which do not represent absolute justice, and which have in the past maintained themselves after the need which created them has passed away. Can we be sure that the new system of the new spirituality will do better? If not, we are thrown back on the idea of Dostoyevsky, in *Crime and Punishment*, "Vive la guerre éternelle—until the new Jerusalem." Perhaps that is the only answer to the problems of the world.

However that may be, Berdyaev has given a penetrating study of the problems of organization, of asceticism, and of mysticism. He has set forth many facts that are often overlooked or explained away. The book deserves careful study, but it is very unlikely that its author has reached a definite and final solution, especially in those points where he leaves the philosophic field to apply his results to human life as it is lived upon this planet.

Clarence A. Manning

Columbia University

God of the Living, or Human Destiny. By R. H. L. Slater. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. (International Library of Christian Knowledge) 325 pp. $2.50.

Written from the standpoint of the new orthodoxy, this volume takes its title from the last of fourteen chapters which cover many topics of interest for a philosophy of religion. It is based on three convictions which are so well stated in the first chapter that the remainder of the book almost inevitably suggests declining power, even though effective writing continues to the end.

God of the Living, by a former lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Rangoon, and now examining chaplain to the Bishop of Burma, comes from a clergyman spurred to his work by a state of affairs where "Even among professing Christians there are those to whom the final clause of the creed, 'and the life everlasting' means next to nothing" (p. 25). The volume is the fruit of a recognition that the Christian movement has been singularly hesitant in attempting any detailed presentation of its ultimate ideal; or, as Felix Adler used to say, has never seriously undertaken to portray its heaven.

Although numerous topics are illuminated by the introduction of relevant Hindu and Buddhist views, the author's own positions are practically all taken with reference to current English literature. The signal omission of references to American philosophical and theological work (except that of two Englishmen teaching in America) is ground for some disappointment in a work whose publishers have stressed the international character of the series.

This study of human destiny is full of evidence of the new independence of religion. There is vigorous reaction against outside efforts at domination, whether these are made by a secular state, by a patronizing philosophy, or by a dogmatic science. The author clearly recognizes the important contemporary fact that many leaders of our intellectual world are so afraid of being self-deceived that they have been actually inhibited in the search for truth, and have preferred poverty and thinness to any intense quest of fuller truth which involves risk. The book is notable, likewise, for its recognition of the dangers in its own position, as well as for the extended argument that other positions entail greater hazards.

It seems to the present reviewer that Mr. Slater's book is strongest

where he takes the prophet's role, rather than in "the slow achievements of discursive reasoning" which seems to him the philosopher's work. But his contention that "the pioneers of truth have been the prophets rather than the philosophers" (p. 29) is typical of the author's tendency toward somewhat easy generalizations laudatory of religion. Careful reading of such a philosophic classic as Spinoza's treatise *On the Improvement of the Understanding* will certainly give grounds for challenge to the author's generalization. Or would Mr. Slater simply include Spinoza among the prophets, and not among the philosophers? And what about Huxley's putting Marx among the prophets?

In a striking chapter on "The Eternal Harmony," both Monism and Pluralism are rejected in favor of a Harmonism which the author presents as the cornerstone of a distinctive Christian philosophy. Thus the doctrine of the Holy Trinity provides him with a means of rounding off our modern scientific interpretations of nature (p. 218). Mr. Slater contends that the central Christian doctrine of the Trinity "was not asserted on any ground derived from speculation," but "was prior to any Christian speculation." After stating (p. 224) that the Christians, prior to the formulation of that doctrine, had learned to worship the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the author adds "They had no other worships. Three only."

Confronted with this rather blunt statement as to historic fact, it is interesting for us to note the frequency with which Origen somewhat emphatically states the duality, rather than the tri-unity, of the God of Christian worship—"the most High, and His Only Begotten" (*Contra Celsum*, Bk. 8, ch. 67). It is quite within the facts, I believe, to say that in this great work where Christian worship is discussed so fully, it is much easier to find repeated expressions of the dual nature of Christian worship than to find the "Three Worships" which our author gives as the general or constant rule. (See Bk. 8, Ch. 12, 13, and many other places.)

Further, the most apparent meaning of Justin Martyr's much discussed passage (1 *Apol.* Ch. 6) is that the "host of good angels" are included with the most true God, the Son, and the prophetic Spirit, under his statement of what "we (Christians) worship and adore," as Roman Catholic writers have commonly maintained. That interpretation is supported by Origen's admission that angels are sometimes

termed *God* in the Scriptures (*Contra Celsum*, Bk. 5. Ch. 4) and by his admission that "we praise and bless" the angels (Bk. 8, Ch. 57) although he carefully insists that we are not to give them the honor due to God, nor worship them in place of God. In the light of such passages, Mr. Slater's attempt to derive the Doctrine of the Trinity directly from Christian worship can hardly be accepted in the bold form in which it is stated. It might, however, be combined with Gilbert Murray's suggestion that the thought-forms of the Greek world were such as to assure that Christ or some other Son of God would become the second Person of the Trinity.

At another point it may again be an apologetic interest which leads to perhaps too vigorous a statement of the distinctions between Christ and all other religious personalities. On page 186, Mr. Slater says, "If Western students are interested in Buddhism, it is the philosophy, rather than the personality, of the founder which attracts them." It is rather difficult to accept that statement after reading the great treatment of Buddhism by Professor Pratt, and especially after lingering long over his impressively reverent treatment of the blessed founder, given in his statement of what Christianity can learn from Buddhism.

The important chapter on "Religion and Philosophy" best presents the new declaration of religion's independence. "Religious belief has too often suffered mutilation at the hands of philosophic interpreters. Distinctive affirmations have been ignored, or moulded beyond recognition. Religion, constrained to alliance with philosophic systems based on premises essentially alien, appears in a dress which hides the true form" (p. 280). But many readers who are grateful for this very valuable chapter will again find an apologetic interest leading to an undue sharpening of the contrast between the Hebrew's warm and joyful communion with the living God, and the "remote, distant One of Greek Philosophy." There is much, indeed, in Greek philosophy not at all accurately represented by this description, which is hardly applicable, in full fairness, even to Aristotle's God, eternally thinking on thought. And it is quite insufficient, or even misleading, to suggest that a "paralyzing thought of vain recurrence" (p. 278) justly summarizes the Greek view of history.

God of the Living is not a mere homiletical effort to reduce philosophy and science to the status of hand-maidens of religion. A review giving that impression would falsify the facts. Far more typical of the

work are the valuable and striking passages easy to find throughout the book. A wide range of theological, philosophic, and scientific thinking is marshalled with insight and skill, and made to focus in an illuminating treatment of what might fairly be called religion's greatest theme. The book will aid many readers toward a new sense of the possible intellectual integrity of religious belief.

MARION J. BRADSHAW

Bangor Theological Seminary

Science and Psychical Phenomena. By G. N. M. TYRRELL. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939. xx + 379 pp. $3.75.

During the period of the first serious attack upon the age-old question of supernormal psychical phenomena, a British group of scholars, notably several at Cambridge, offered closely knit and very readable accounts of their new experiments. As soon as the Society for Psychical Research, founded in 1882, reported upon the results of investigation of spontaneous cases of apparitions, dream coincidences, or hauntings, the ready hand of Frank Podmore, or Frederic Myers, or Sir William Barrett made accessible to the general reader the main outlines of the newly explored territory. The first great phase, during the 1880's, was the experimental study of alleged telepathic phenomena. The second great phase was the study of mediumship, especially the work of Richard Hodgson on supernormal elements in Mrs. Piper's phenomena. Then came, in the first two decades of the present century, the very complicated work on "cross-correspondences" in which several automatists, separated widely in space, appeared to receive organically related aspects of the same message. Finally, the period roughly from 1920 to the present has seen, on the psychological side, much more intensive study of "the *modus operandi* of the mediumistic trance," and, on the mathematical side, an enormous improvement of the statistical controls against the old bugbear of chance-coincidence. In 1930 began J. B. Rhine's experiments in telepathy and clairvoyance which have seemed to many American readers a rebirth of the old experimental and statistical efforts made in 1882; to the European reader familiar with the history of the subject, this recent work is indeed a promontory reaching into unknown waters, but one which can be seen in perspective only when the whole coast of psychic research is well explored.

We have attempted, in our first paragraph, to indicate what psychical research looks like to a well-read student of the English work. Mr. Tyrrell's book is an Englishman's view of psychical research, based upon the more systematic and well controlled researches, and with the very natural and acceptable insular biases apparent for years in the British contribution to the subject. Mr. Tyrrell is by profession a physicist; by avocation, apparently, a very competent psychologist and philosopher, as far as the reviewers can formulate a judgment on the matter. To the few scholars who have read extensively in the technical literature of the subject, the book will appear for the most part elementary, but well planned and competently executed. To those unfamiliar with the more serious literature in the field, it will seem at times rather bold, the author having space only for a few examples of each type of phenomenon and very little space for the details concerning experimental and statistical controls which the source materials themselves contain.

The object of Mr. Tyrrell's book, as stated in the preface, is to correct widespread misunderstantding of the field of psychical research. This the author hopes to accomplish by presenting for the reader's inspection a comprehensive outline of what has been accomplished in the field. But his account is not restricted to sheer presentation of evidence. The general plan of the book is to present evidence on each problem, then to discuss the significance of the phenomena and to formulate tentative theories.

The first part of the book is concerned with spontaneous extrasensory perception. Here the author draws chiefly upon the publications of the Society for Psychical Research, culling from this vast amount of material numerous cases of telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and related phenomena. The cases are selected in a conservative spirit, constituting not the most spectacular, but a fair general sample of material currently published in reputable sources.

The author is well aware that no handful of spontaneous cases of dream coincidence or of precognition can or should carry conviction. He briefly cites cases of sudden and horrified awareness, in great detail, of accidents happening to distant loved ones; then turns immediately to the psychology of the process, attempting to ascertain the relation of the physiological and psychological condition of the percipient to the capacity for such supernormal perception. This is suffi-

cient for the beginner, yet the treatment is sketchy and inadequate for the expert reader. The author has done as well as he could within space limits, but still, in terms of the problem, not well enough.

Part II presents a brief account of the experimental evidence on telepathy and clairvoyance. In 1881 an experiment which could properly be labelled "scientific" was undertaken, the results of which yielded odds of several billions to one against an explanation in terms of chance. Mr. Tyrrell traces the history of such experimental research from this beginning down to the recent work performed in university laboratories and elsewhere. It is surprising to find so much emphasis upon the experiments of pioneering days and such lack of interest in the great classical experiment, in 1921, by three members of the Psychology Department at the University of Groningen, in the Netherlands (in which very elaborate controls were used in transmitting numbers in silence from one room to another) and the same neglect of the still unexplained but spectacular high scores in card guessing obtained by Estabrooks at Harvard in 1925. The work of Rhine and his associates at Duke University is given only eleven pages.

Mr. Tyrrell's account of his own experiments in telepathy and clairvoyance is both brief and modest, but is of exceptional interest. His procedure was to have his subject point with a pointer at one or another of five boxes, guessing which was the "right" one. In one of these five light-proof boxes there was a lighted bulb, visible only after the lid was opened. In some cases, no bulb was lighted at the time the guess was made, but a later opening of the boxes threw the light on in one of them by means of a complicated commutator arrangement which prevented the experimenter himself from having any normal knowledge as to the box chosen. Many subjects took part, several doing quite well, and one doing amazingly well over a long period. Mr. Tyrrell has constantly worked on his problem, improving his technique as criticisms have come in, and he gives us a clear and valuable account of the psychology of his major subject, who appears to vary in scoring level as her health, interest, and morale vary. Especially striking is the study of the bunching of hits, long strings of right choices being out of the category of ordinary chance explanations. In an analysis of the relation of conscious processes to a deeper level of activity, in connection with his best subject's performance, he writes: "In order that the deep mental stratum which has the supernormal knowledge may use the normal motor mechanisms to get this knowledge external-

ized, there must be some very delicate liaison work between the two types of consciousness involved, which is hard to establish and easy to derange" (p. 109).

At this point the author embarks upon an extensive discussion of the theory of extra-sensory perception. On such disputable ground it would be easy to fall into the pitfalls of emotionalism and autistic thinking, but the discussion is scholarly, cautious and dispassionate. The various possibilities are discussed, and it is made clear that the problems are not yet solved. There are, for example, the questions of physical versus non-physical theories, and of the empirical versus the rational approach. Such considerations lead to difficulties which are, as the author says, "very real." Regarding the field of precognition, especially, the facts are at variance with our present schematization of the universe.

The writer draws constantly and effectively upon modern philosophy, especially the work of C. D. Broad and A. N. Whitehead, with re-echoes from James and Bergson. He is aware, as few psychologists are, that extremely little is known about the psychology of perception, even less about the relation of perception to the brain, and almost nothing whatever as to the necessary limitations on perception imposed by temporal and spatial relations of organism to environment. Mr. Tyrrell's attack on classical mechanism is in the vein of Whitehead and Broad, with effective reference to the contribution of Eddington. He has, moreover, a gift for clear demarcation of the point where empirical data stop and speculation begins. He offers his facts with modesty, and his speculations with an apology much more characteristic of a modern physicist than of those who, in such an infant science as Psychology, feel the need to plant their feet upon a rigid certainty as to the nature of cosmic structure.

The insularity mentioned above unfortunately makes it necessary to note that there is little or no attention paid to the psychological analysis of extra-sensory phenomena as carried out in Continental and American investigations. In particular, the work of the Warcollier group in France is neglected, and the very real contribution of French psychology (Grasset, Janet, Bergson and others) is passed over, except for an occasional reference.

Perhaps the opening paragraph of our review will have made plain to the reader why Mr. Tyrrell feels it wise to give nearly half his book to the phenomena of the mediumistic trance. There is good his-

torical justification for this emphasis, but it is clear, as Mr. Tyrrell himself abundantly recognizes, that we understand at present neither the psychology of the trance states nor the reason why, in these states, a somewhat more striking quality of telepathic and clairvoyant phenomena is evident than can ordinarily be obtained under routine laboratory conditions. The pressure of the membership of psychic research organizations is inevitably for material bearing on survival of death, and the great merit that such work has, despite this limitation, is that the hopes, fears, and ingrained habits of everyday persons in their relation to a source from which they expect information and comfort is a matter of detailed record. Whatever the reasons may be for the extraordinary histrionic skill of the entranced personality in conveying to sitters the sense of the real presence of the deceased, the actual content of those communications which go beyond information conceivably available to the medium constitutes a problem for the student of telepathy and clairvoyance.

The experimenter goes to the medium as he goes to his laboratory, not because he wishes the dead to take precedence over the living, but because, as a scientist, he goes wherever his phenomena can be studied. For this reason, Mr. Tyrrell's discussion of mediumship is of extraordinary importance. There is, as far as we know, no other general textbook on this subject in which the problem of mediumship is presented not simply through evaluating evidence on the survival question, but through careful study of the contribution of the peculiar state of the entranced medium to the special problems of supernormal perception. Here the author is at home in the vast material of the Piper, Leonard, and Willett mediumships, and shows an extraordinary capacity to select material from those communications which show what the consciousness of the purporting communicator is like at the time of the communication.

Analysis of *modus operandi*, as it has been called, and critical consideration of the exact psychology of the trance personalities, find Mr. Tyrrell at his best. In these last twenty years of intensive psychology of mediumship initiated by Mrs. Sidgwick's classical papers on Mrs. Piper's psychology, there has been no time for the taking stock of this whole labor. If Mr. Tyrrell had done only this, the book would have been abundantly worth while. The relation of personality traits shown in the trance to those shown by the same individual when

awake; the relation of the several personalities in a communicating team to one another; the relation of the trance personalities to the personalities of the sitters; the way in which the communicators look upon themselves; and the way in which they find images and words for purposes of explaining how things look to them in the world of sitters "out there"; all these things are handled with adroitness and in good perspective.

Two quotations from page 255 may perhaps convey some sense of the kind of material that comes through and the kind of psychological analysis that has to be made:

Script of April 16, 1911. "Myers Let me again emphasize the difference that exists between Piper and Willett phenomena the former is possession the complete all but complete withdrawal of the spirit the other is the blending of incarnate and excarnate spirits there is nothing telergic it is a form of telepathy the point we have to study is to find the line where the incarnate spirit is sufficiently over the border to be in a state to receive and yet sufficiently controlling by its own power its own supraliminal and therefore able to transmit. . . ."

Mrs. Willett remarks on the process as seen from her end in a little aside passage in the Ear of Dionysius. In the script of March 2, 1914, she says: "Do you know, it's an odd thing, I can see Edmund as if he were working something; and the thing he is working is me. It isn't really me, you know; it's only a sort of asleep me that I can look at."

There is a whole chapter on sense imagery as related to the trance, culminating in a clear recognition that the trance state is merely a wide *variety of states* melting into one another and into certain types of "normal consciousness"; in other words the problem is a broad psychological one, not a problem to be turned over to a psychical researcher alone.

Since Mr. Tyrrell is interested in evidence as well as theory it is not entirely clear why he says so little about the classical cross-correspondences, and most of the other types of evidence for survival collected by the British S.P.R. Again we presume that space limitations were fatal to any such effort. It is, however, especially regrettable that he omits systematic discussion of the so-called "proxy sittings" in which, by careful prearrangement, a medium holds a sitting for a distant person through a proxy who could not, even if he would, inform the medium as to the central source materials that the distant sitter would wish to discuss. Since he slights the evidence from the

proxy sittings, he naturally omits also the mathematical devices devices developed, both in England and the United States, for the evaluation of large masses of material in terms of their goodness of fit in relation to a distant sitter with whom there is no normal communication. This is one of the big milestones of recent psychical research which is unfortunately neglected.

There is an interesting chapter touching on certain points of contact between psychical phenomena and religion, the chief contactual point being that both deal with "an influx of experience beyond the sensible world." It must be noted that by religion the author does not refer to belief in a set of intellectual propositions, but response to a universal supra-intellectual and supra-sensuous experience. Apparently in the realization that psychical research is often vaguely confused with the quasi-religion of spiritualism, the author makes the important point that whatever psychical research may *discover* does not properly belong to the realm of such religion, but to the "department of empirical fact."

In concluding, Mr. Tyrrell notes that through the years psychical research has not succeeded in bringing general conviction regarding a single supernormal fact. What, then, is the importance of such research? The answer to this lies in the fact that "humanity, in the modern world, is outgrowing its knowledge"—at least, its knowledge with respect to what manner of being man is, what kind of a world he lives in, and how far the discoveries of science are to be accepted as final truth. And such knowledge, it is the author's conviction, can come from no other source than psychical research. At the beginning of the book is found a quotation from Goethe: "Man is not born to solve the problem of the universe, but to find out where the problem begins." Mr. Tyrrell has shown quite clearly, and in a scholarly fashion, where he, at least, believes the problem to begin.

As one puts down the book, one is filled with three convictions. First, that a competent and honest man has worked through a mass of difficult psychological material, and has handled it with both courage and subtlety. Second, that he has neglected those aspects of the problem which are closest to the laboratory sciences of today, slighting, strangely enough, not only the work of other British, American, and Continental laboratory investigators, but even his own valuable experimental studies. Third, that the effort to which his book is

directed is inevitably doomed to very limited fruitfulness, in view of the atmosphere in which any such seed must struggle to flourish, or even to keep alive.

It is customary in all such books to say that the atmosphere now is not quite as frigid as when the S.P.R. was founded in 1882. Mr. Tyrrell does not work in an American psychological laboratory, nor, indeed, in any psychological laboratory. The reviewers would challenge even the assertion that the general intellectual climate is more favorable, and they would certainly insist that professional psychology is further from taking hold of the problem than it was fifty years ago. The long-distance telepathy and clairvoyance tests currently made under the supervision of two or more experimenters with records in duplicate, independent scoring and checking, etc., still cause no ripple upon the surface of professional indifference. Mr. Tyrrell does not seem to grasp that the tide of anti-mechanist sentiment expressed by Whitehead or Eddington is still a thousand feet below the towers of a psychology laboratory, thrust high on a cliff of splendid isolation; nor that laboratory efforts will impress only those who are already nine-tenths persuaded.

With many phenomena of science, the *first* step is to establish that a given occurrence is a reality; when everybody has finally agreed to this, then one discovers step by step just how it occurs, under just what conditions it can appear. But phenomena such as those with which psychic research deals are subject to no such principle. One must first go through the long grilling toil of decades of thankless research until one can actually master the phenomenon and make it occur *at will*. When this can be done, over and over again, to the satisfaction of all, and the phenomenon made available to anyone at any time who sees fit to question it—when, in other words, it can be demonstrated as cell division or induced currents can be demonstrated —the theoretical analysis and literary organization of the material will reach a wide and alert public, scientific as well as lay. But not till then.

Just the same, this is a fine book for the few who have the time and interest to see what a good mind can make out of our present situation in psychical research.

GARDNER MURPHY and ERNEST TAVES
Columbia University

BOOK NOTES

Buried Empires: The Earliest Civilizations of the Middle East. By PATRICK CARLETON. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1939. 290 pp. $3.00.

Using a combination of archeology and history, the author traces the earliest civilizations of Northwestern India and Mesopotamia up to the time of the rise of Assyria. The area thus covered embraces the modern countries of Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, the shores of the Persian Gulf, Beluchistan, and Sindh in India. The work is systematic and dependable as to facts, but the author sometimes allows his enthusiasm to influence his judgment, as in the case of his estimate of the artistic value of the bronze figure of a dancing girl reproduced on the plate facing page 154—one glance at which should reveal the complete lack of proportion in every part of the statuette. Indeed, the weakness of the book is due to the questionable judgment of its author, for example, two headless skeletons are frail evidence of an invasion (p. 166), the presence of pottery vessels in a grave is no sufficient evidence of the belief that shades eat and drink in the hereafter, and the discovery of a skeleton in a contorted attitude does not demonstrate human sacrifice. In a similar category may be placed some other highly questionable statements, namely, for example, that the Hebrews quite certainly borrowed the Story of the Flood from the Sumerians; that there was one primitive mother goddess; and that the modern Abyssinian dialects are all Semitic. The same poor judgment accounts for such unusual orthography in a "textbook" as, Battle of Créçy, el-'Irâq, Amûnemha't, and Amunhotpe. Surely in a textbook in the ordinarily accepted sense of that term, technical transliterations should be avoided, especially when there are forms generally accepted, such as, Crecy (or Crécy which the French themselves use), Iraq, Amenemhet. But one finds it difficult to imagine in what sense this book can be used as a textbook at all.

No, it is a failure as a textbook, at any rate, from the standpoint of a teacher. Nevertheless, it has its value, and an important one it is. It brings together, and up-to-date, the chief archeological finds made in the Middle East; and it presents them in such a way as to furnish a foundation upon which each student of human civilization may build a structure for himself of the culture of the Western World. A future edition could remedy its defects, and render it useful to many a student who may be without access to well-equipped libraries.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

Mythes et dieux des Germains. By GEORGES DUMÉZIL. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1939. xvi + 159 pp. Fr. 15.

M. Georges Dumézil, instructor in Armenian at the École des Langues Orientales Vivantes and in Comparative Mythology at the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, has published a number of works on the myth-

ologies of Indo-European speaking peoples and of the peoples of the Caucasus.

In the present work describing the salient features of Germanic mythology he wishes to show that this mythology reflects an Indo-European conception of the world and society as divided into three parts with the magic part considered as the most important. The three classes of society in this Indo-European conception were the magicians, the warrors, and the farmers, which represent the three social functions of magical sovereignty, warrior force, and fecundity. This conception is expressed in the social hierarchy of the Indo-Iranians and of the Italo-Celts, and it comes out clearly in Germanic mythology, as M. Dumézil demonstrates. He points to similarities between the Teutonic and the Indian and Roman notions of sovereignty and dynasty and of the magician-king, to similar myths and legends of wildbeast-warrior societies, to similar ceremonial use of fermented drinks for augmenting vitality, and also to similar myths and deities of fecundity.

Many of these rapprochements have been made by others, chiefly in attempts to compare Germanic religious concepts with those of the Hindus and the Romans (cf. Frederik Sander, *Rigveda und Edda*, Stockholm, 1893; and also the bibliography suggested by M. Dumézil). M. Dumézil's approach, however, is new and more fruitful than these others, in that he compares fundamental conceptions of society and of the world rather than the superstructure of religious concepts or theogonies.

M. Dumézil offers his arguments with great clarity, cogency and probability, and in many instances he supplements his evidence from comparative mythology by evidence from comparative linguistics. However, these similarities among Teutonic, Hindu, Roman and Greek myths do not fully prove a common inheritance, since similar explanations of the world might have developed independently among these various peoples, or on the contrary these Indo-European speaking peoples may have these myths in common with peoples of other linguistic groups. If all the Indo-European peoples could be shown to have similar conceptions of society and the world while their neighbors had a quite different conception, then those similarities might be considered as derived from a period of Indo-European community.

The etymologies presented by M. Dumézil do not in themselves form convincing linguistic proof of the descent of the Germanic mythology from a primitive Indo-European mythology, nor are they really sufficient to support such a conclusion as drawn from a comparison of mythologies.

In his conclusion M. Dumézil has indicated certain Germanic developments which he does not consider primitive, and has also pointed out the striking fact that Germanic mythology survived the Christianization of Germany, lived on into the Middle Ages, and has again been revived in all its force in the last few years in Nazi Germany.

From the pen of M. Georges Dumézil we look for other studies which

will continue and amplify the work of this and previously published writings on the comparative study of the mythology of all the Indo-European speaking peoples.

GORDON HARPER MARSH

Indian Philosophy and Modern Culture. By PAUL BRUNTON. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1939. 92 pp. $1.00.

This feverishly written little book consists, to a large degree, of quotations by which the author intends to prove the parallelism of Indian and Western thought. Mr. Brunton is well acquainted with modern India, and his contacts with contemporary Indian scholars (the book is dedicated to one of them) enables him to refer to rather infrequently quoted texts. What a traveller from the Occident finds in India is an "astonishing mélange of lofty ethics and low customs, subtle wisdom and superstitious ideas, profound thought and priestly barbarism" (p. 45), but it is the purpose of this book "to help to show that the human mind has explored the same paths in both Orient and Occident, amid the shadows of antiquity and under the bright glare of modernity" (p. 91).

In his search for parallels, the author focuses attention on what he calls "India's Idealist Metaphysics," quoting a large number of sentences in which the world is called a mere thought-creation. The Western analogies to this doctrine are chosen from European philosophers from Spinoza to Hegel, from Emerson, "the Boston Brahmin," and from a number of modern scientists.

To add a critical note, it could be said that, while Mr. Brunton gives typical quotations from India, the compared passages from Western thinkers are rather carnal than "idealistic."

FRIEDRICH SPIEGELBERG

Einleitung in den Heiligen Koran. By MAULANA SADR-UD-DIN. Berlin-Wilmersdorf: Verlag der Moslemischen Revue, 1939. 48 pp. RM 0.50.

This is a *Separatabdruck* of the Introduction to the German version of the Aḥmadiyya Qur'ān Translation and Commentary. The Dutch version produced by the Batavia branch of the Aḥmadiyya Anjumān appeared two or three years ago, and the long promised German version has now been completed, the work of the Indian Muslim, Sadr-ud-Din, who has long been associated as a "missionary" with the Berlin branch of the Anjumān.

The Introduction is not really an Introduction in our sense of the word. It takes up none of the questions one expects to be treated in such a work, viz., critical questions regarding the text and interpretation, the structure of the Sūras, the chronology of the different parts, the historical development, etc.—matters which are of the utmost importance to a student approaching the Qur'ān. Rather is this a Preface, and even then a Preface of a peculiar kind, for we are told nothing of the origins of the translation, or the sources used in the preparation of the Commentary, or the principles on which the author has worked. These forty-eight introductory pages are a

sort of Apologia for the Qur'ān. M. Sadr-ud-Din is very sensitive to the criticisms levelled against the Qur'ān by European writers, and he sets himself the task of introducing his translation by demonstrating that as a religious book it is superior to the Bible. He is peculiarly distressed by the charge that there is no originality in the Qur'ān, that its teaching is but a rehash of ideas already well known and quite familiar from the teachings of the Bible. He is constrained to admit that many matters dealt with in the Qur'ān had already appeared in earlier Scriptures, but labors to find reasons for considering the Qur'ānic presentation of such matters superior to what had been given in the writings which preceded it. Persian and Indian religion are touched upon in this Apologia, but in the main it is directed at the Bible.

The arguments the author brings in this connection are interesting as exemplifying a new trend in Muslim polemic, but have no other value. The grade of his scholarship is well illustrated by his statement on page 5:

Der älteste bis heute vorhandene Teil der hebräischen Bibel ist ein Abschnitt der Propheten und stammt aus dem Jahre 916 vor Christi Geburt. Die älteste vollständige Handschrift der gesamten Bibel gehört dem 11 Jahrhundert christlicher Zeitrechnung an.

One would have thought that in Berlin M. Sadr-ud-Din would have made some acquaintance with the rich work of German scholarship, but the reading that lies behind his *Einleitung* seems to be almost entirely in English, and there is no trace of any acquaintance with the great body of German work on the Qur'ān which is readily accessible to him there.

The last page of the pamphlet gives a specimen page of the Text, Translation and Commentary of the new German version.

A. J.

Judaism in a Changing World. Edited by Leo Jung. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. x + 294 pp. $3.00.

This collection of essays deals with the relations of contemporary life and thought, and Jewish traditions, as seen from the standpoint of Orthodox Judaism. Dr. Leo Jung is editor of the volume to which he has also contributed the leading article, "Major Aspects of Judaism." The other subjects treated include Jewish education, Jewish law, the challenge of science, Biblical criticism, Zionism, reason and mysticism, Jewish marriage and Jewish-Christian relations. Among the contributors are Rabbis David de Sola Pool, Isaac Unna (Palestine), Bernard Drachman, Oscar Z. Fasman, H. Raphael Gold, Salis Daiches (England), Eli Munk (France), the Rev. A. Cohen (England), Professors Moses L. Isaacs, Willard Lampe, M. H. Farbridge (Oxford, England), Moses Jung, the historian, Paul Goodman, and the leader of the Agudath Yisroel, Isaac Breuer (Palestine).

These essays were apparently not planned to cover specific constituent elements of the larger problem, but taken together they do constitute an interesting survey of orthodox Judaism. The basic assumption which per-

meates them all is that the Jewish people are the recipients of a divinely revealed and eternally unchanging law, the Torah, which it is their destiny to live by and their mission to teach to all mankind. In the nature of things, such essays cannot be uniform in quality. Thus, A. Cohen's critique of the major conclusions of the "higher critics" of the Bible is very splendidly done and is a fine example of rigorous thinking and lucid writing; Oscar Z. Fasman, on the other hand, repeats the myth that Jews never believed in missionizing among their non-Jewish neighbors. Throughout the second commonwealth Judaism was an active missionary religion, as the records in Josephus, Philo, the New Testament, and, indeed, the Rabbinic writings themselves, amply testify.

It is similarly difficult to follow the editor himself in tracing the rise of minorities to ideological deflections from the prevailing social or religious norm. "A minority comes into being out of a consciousness of some immanent difference which distinguishes it from the majority." Ideological deflection is, indeed, an important source for the origin of minorities. A far more usual source, however, has been the fact of migration and social dislocations which have uprooted people from their indigenous territories and thrust them, with their native patterns of life and thought, amidst alien majorities. It is again a case of over-simplification for Dr. Jung to define the Hebrew concept of *Mitzvah* as a religious ceremony. Mitzvah is traditionally applied to all religious imperatives; this includes ceremonial observances and, also, all prescriptions of the Jewish legal and moral code. Dr. Jung's definition becomes manifestly inadequate when he cites the Jewish extension of the beneficences of poor relief to needy pagans as an illustration of religious ceremony.

In spite of the inadequacy in some of the discussions, the book will be welcomed by students of religion as a valuable survey of thought and practice in an important sector of Jewish life in this country.

BEN ZION BOKSER

With the Twelve. By CARL A. GLOVER. Nashville, Tenn.: Cokesbury Press, 1939. 7 + 276 pp. $2.00.

As the title suggests, and as the author states in his preface, "the purpose of this book is to explain, interpret, and portray the disciples in terms of their relationship to Jesus Christ" (p. 7). Using the primary source material found in the Synoptic Gospels, with a selected section from the Fourth Gospel, the author notes that "archeological discoveries and reverent Biblical scholarship of the past forty years have thrown much new light on the Gospel record"; and he adds: "Besides this enlightening information on the Scripture itself, the findings of psychiatrists in the field of mental healing give the modern man a new appreciation and understanding of the matchless personality of the great Healer" (p. 7). An extended bibliography at the end of the book calls attention to the wide range of information obtainable.

The writer makes many illuminating comments on the life and teaching of Christ, and traces the transforming effect of His influence in the careers of those who were intimately associated with Him. While the discussion of incidents which present perplexities shows a readiness to consider various theories offered in explanation of them, the writer seems to hold that the nature of some recorded occurrences is beyond comprehension. Of the story of the stilling of the tempest, he says: "So we leave this incomprehensible miracle as it stands," noting simply the impression upon the minds of the disciples (p. 54). Regarding the story of Jesus' walking on the water, several interpretations which reject the miraculous element are indicated, but it is also said, "The narrative may be accepted as it stands," in which case the unsatisfactory deduction is made, "we must conclude that Jesus possessed power of levitation comparable to those instances which investigators believe to have occurred in modern times" (pp. 68-69).

The Twelve were appointed by Jesus so that they might be trained "through constant companionship to catch his spirit and understand his message" (p. 44). The message of Jesus was the Kingdom of God, its nature and requirements, and how it is to be realized on earth. In places throughout the book, characteristic aspects of the Kingdom are illustrated, but considering the importance of this main message of Jesus, as presenting the work for which His followers were to be trained, the treatment of the Kingdom appears to be scattered and inadequate.

The book as a whole has a fine note of sincerity; the attitude toward scholarly investigation is commendable, though exception may be taken to some of the conclusions drawn; and the purpose for which it was written, as cited above from the preface, is kept before the reader in a sympathetic and helpful manner.

R. C. K.

Psalmboksförslagen av år 1765-67 och 1793. By STURE KRISTOFERSSON. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1939. 413.

The Hymnals of the Church of Sweden reveal much of the history of that communion. The earliest dates back to the Reformation and reflects the spirit of Luther and Olavus Petri. The Hymnal of 1695, in the making of which Bishop Jesper Svedberg played a leading role, had much of the sturdy spirit of the Carolinian period. Greatest of all was the 1819 Psalmbook created by Johan Olof Wallin, called by Tegnér "The David's Harp in the Northland." This Psalmbook was truly a people's book, a great literary product which came to be used regularly in religious instruction, and the companion volume of the Bible in every Swedish home. Not until 1937 was a new Hymnal issued, and in this work the major portion of Wallin's masterpiece is incorporated.

In addition to the regularly adopted Hymnals in Sweden, numerous "förslag" (proposed hymnals) saw the light of day. Sture Kristofersson has in this volume, his doctor of theology dissertation at the University of

Lund, given us an exceedingly thorough discussion of the *Förslag* of 1765-67 and 1793. That of 1765-67 bore the marks of German Pietism and Herrnhutism, which at the time enjoyed some favor among the broad classes in Sweden. Archbishop Uno von Troil led the way in bringing out the 1793 proposal, although it must be said that he lacked creative abilities in psalmody. Pietistic influences continued in this work; however, it should also be noted that there was ample evidence of the popularity of paraphrased psalms from the Psaltery. Although neither of these works were accepted for the nation, they did help prepare the way for Wallin's masterpiece.

Kristofersson's work illustrates further the great current interest among church people of Sweden in the history of their own church. Coming at this time it gains in value inasmuch as it is commonly considered that Sweden is now enjoying a most unique revival in church music. This thesis was sponsored by Yngve Brilioth, formerly Dean of Lund Cathedral and Professor of Practical Theology at the University and now Bishop of Växiö.

EVALD BENJAMIN LAWSON

Religion and the State in Georgia in the Eighteenth Century. By REBA CAROLYN STRICKLAND. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. 211 pp. $2.50.

The story of religion and the State in Georgia is told very vividly by the author. She does not attempt to narrate a story of religion in Georgia, nor a story of the development of the state, but she shows how the colony of Georgia was founded by studying the motives underlying its founding.

The primary motive for the founding of Georgia was humanitarian. Although there are four motives given, namely, imperialistic, mercantile, humanitarian and evangelical, the most clearly defined motive, according to the author, is humanitarian. Oglethorpe himself had been leading a fight in Parliament for the improvement of debtors' prisons. For, as he expressed it, "the miserable wretches" were no longer imprisoned but were "starving about the town for want of employment."

There was another group who were oppressed. "These were Protestants who were being persecuted in Europe for conscience' sake." From many quarters in Europe they came seeking religious freedom. The author points out the circumstances surrounding the groups of Protestants who aided in the colonization of Georgia.

The author gives an account of the political set-up in the colony and portrays the religious conditions of England during the seventeenth century. By the beginning of the eighteenth, religious societies had come into being in England, the outstanding of which was the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. Also, the spirit of humanitarianism had found its place in religion. When George I came to the throne, it was his policy to bring into the church of England all Protestants. This was the hope of the Latitudinarians.

The colonial governments were brought under the control of the crown.

Freedom of worship was granted to all Protestants, however. According to Dr. Strickland, there was religious diversity in the colony of Georgia. Among the groups representing various types of religion are the Anglicans, Lutherans, Moravians, Pietists, Jews, Scotch Presbyterians, French Huguenots, and Swiss Calvinists.

The position of the Church of England in the colony of Georgia, so far as being an establishment is concerned, was "that of a missionary enterprise with missionaries chosen by the Trustees and encouraged financially by the government of the colony." The author points out the fact that "the civil authorities in Georgia had extremely limited power, but they were instructed to encourage religion and co-operate with the ministers; in general these instructions were followed. Attempts to reserve office-holding to Anglicans failed." Up to the time Georgia became a royal colony, the colonists themselves had tended toward moral uprightness. Dr. Strickland explains very clearly the Wesley affair and does justice to Wesley.

The royal government put forth the effort to make Georgia a religious establishment like that of Virginia and South Carolina, but due to the Awakening it could not thrive. It is clearly pointed out that, at no time during the colonial period, was Georgia a theocracy.

The author states that, during the revolution, the ministers molded opinion, and served as chaplains. Throughout the whole study there is evidence of no one point where religion and the state in Georgia were one. But on the other hand, there is separation of church and state. Religious groups struggled to develop their own in their own way. The changes of the Revolution were the changes which made for independent development of the church.

C. A. TALBERT

The German Church on the American Frontier: A Study in the Rise of Religion Among the Germans of the West Based on the History of the Evangelischer Kirchenverein des Westens (Evangelical Church Society of the West), 1840-1866. By CARL E. SCHNEIDER. St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, 1939. xx + 579 pp. $4.50.

The primary title of this book is too pretentious; it is, as its subtitle indicates, a history of the Evangelical Church Society. Only a limited phase of the religious life of the Germans on the American frontier is studied. The author is concerned chiefly with the Germans who settled in Missouri, and who were instrumental in organizing the Evangelical Church. Very little reference is made to the large migration of Germans to Nebraska, Illinois, and Wisconsin, nor to the Missouri Lutheran Church, the German Reformed Synod, and other groups numerically stronger than the Evangelical Society. Limiting the study to the years between 1840 and 1866 is inadequate, except for the founding of this particular denomination. Professor Schneider admits these limitations in the introduction to this volume.

A difficult task confronts the author in recording the history of the Ger-

man church. Perhaps no group in American church life had such a varied educational, religious, and cultural background. The views of the Germans from the Eastern states differed from those directly from Germany. Those who migrated from their homeland came from large cities and rural districts, some were university graduates, others were peasants. Many pioneers were interested in religion, having Lutheran, Reformed, or Prussian Union background, but others were devotees of philosophical rationalism. There were German settlements in America which refused any pastor the permission to preach to them, while in other communities Germans were known to travel fifty to eighty miles to attend a religious service. Though no single picture of the Germans in the West can be painted, the book indicates that the majority of the Germans were very poor and believed their first obligation was economic security, their religious interests being secondary.

Changing circumstances in the West altered many of the convictions of the early German immigrants. This is especially true concerning their prejudices against synods. These pioneers were fearful of the power of large ecclesiastical bodies, but in time they came to see the advantages of parishes joining together for mutual benefit. As a result, synods were organized.

A majority of the pastors who served the Evangelical Church came from Pietist seminaries in Europe and were Pietistic and unionistic in sympathy. It would have been of value had Professor Schneider explained the nature of Pietism more fully, as it colored the entire history of this denomination. The original pastors hoped to build one German church in the West, founded on a broad Pietistic basis. Their plans failed, resulting in an additional organization being established. The unionistic nature of the early founders, however, was expressed through the merging of many independent congregations and groups within its fold. There have been many mergers in its history, but there is a possibility that the merger now being consummated with the Reformed Church may result in the Evangelical Synod losing its identity as a separate entity.

An interesting section of this book describes the hardships of the pioneer pastors and congregations, their efforts to erect church buildings, the picnics introduced in hard times to help finances, their efforts to sing, to form choirs and purchase organs, and the preaching. The sermons were written and memorized and, on the whole, were scholarly. However, it was considered proper in some communities for worshippers to rise and stretch themselves during the services, lest they fall asleep.

The Evangelical Church made several contributions to the religious life of the West. It raised the standards for the clergy, requiring them to be well educated and evangelical. Greater co-operation was secured among widely separated congregations, and greater uniformity of services and teachings were sponsored. Good music was encouraged, of which the Germans were rightly proud. However, the Evangelical Church retained European culture and tradition too long for its own advantage. In the early

years, its loyalty to German tradition aided its growth, but eventually this same factor proved a handicap in its efforts to become acclimated to the America of the West.

Professor Schneider has made a valuable study of American religious life. His greatest contribution rests on his presentation of original documents which depict the struggles of the pioneers. In this vivid picture of the West one sees a devotion not excelled in the history of American Christianity.

ALTMAN K. SWIHART

The Christian Faith in a Day of Crisis. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1939. 226 pp. $1.50.

"I Was in Prison": The Suppressed Letters of German Pastors. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1939. 112 pp. $1.00.

Twice before, in *Contemporary Christian Thought* (1936) and *Trends of Christian Thinking* (1937), Dr. Macfarland has surveyed the field of present day Christian philosophy and theology. Again, in *The Christian Faith in a Day of Crisis,* he has presented a digest of those books which every Christian minister knows that he should have read, although he never seemed to get around to it. So for the parish minister, whose local duties prevent his carrying out the plan of reading which his intellectual development demands, and whose remoteness keeps him from discussing modern thought trends, Dr. Macfarland has performed a valuable service. The book is very like the notes of the author's own reading: the principal arguments of the various books are stated succinctly and illustrated by quotation. A running commentary and a summary of what Dr. Macfarland feels are the substantial contributions of the writers' positions to the whole of Christian doctrine complete the chapters of the book. This reviewer feels sure that he is reflecting Dr. Macfarland's own opinion in saying that even the most careful reading of the book must remain an inadequate means of keeping abreast of contemporary thought, and that in its proper use this volume will serve as a guide, rather than as a substitute for the original works. But even those who have delved into the books which come under discussion may profit from a perusal of Dr. Macfarland's book, for his wide personal acquaintance with the leaders of Christian thinking affords him the opportunity of showing his readers to what extent this thought is the outgrowth of experience. It is this reviewer's personal opinion that the synthesis which Dr. Macfarland attempts to make in the final chapter might better have been left undone, for it is difficult to reconcile such diverse views as this modern age is producing without doing violence to the genius which is inherent in each. The time may come when all of these various approaches may be viewed as leading to one goal, but our very proximity to the scene makes it difficult for us to appraise them accurately.

The second book, containing letters written by those German pastors who,

for the sake of their convictions, are being held in concentration camps, bears the mark of coming out of the white heat of experience. Actually the section of the book which includes these letters is only forty-five pages in length, a bit less than half the book. But that half is precious beyond its mere cost. Out of these letters, often really only excerpts from letters, to loved ones, wives, children, fellow pastors, and congregations, one may derive a true insight into what the testimony of one's faith may really mean. This is not a book for the sentimentalist or the romantic. It deserves to be read soberly and with a clear mind, in a spirit which reflects that of the authors themselves. These letters form the clearest witness of a living faith that can be found anywhere today.

GEORGE E. RATH

Protestantism's Challenge. By CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939. 286 pp. $2.50.

In this learned and often elaborate book, the author challenges Protestantism to return to essential religion as taught by Jesus. The challenge is opened with the proposition that we no longer have a verbally inspired and infallible Bible. Then it is shown that the Apostle's Creed, Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the idea of the Church have passed through many stages of development and have been understood and interpreted variously by Protestants. It seems, therefore, that they are not matters of great importance for the religious life of today. After a discussion of the origin of the Nicene Creed, the author concludes that the ancient creeds were formulated according to ancient needs, and that allegiance to them will "not solve present Christian problems" (p. 95). His discussions of Apostolic Succession and the New Testament Church seem to be directed against Catholics. He refutes Matt. 27:25 and John 19:15, and denounces anti-Semitism. He argues that the Crucifixion stories are *haggada.* He is also convinced that Jesus claimed to be, and was known to his contemporaries as, teacher and prophet.

"What now, Protestantism?" Return to Jesus: to his religion of the fatherhood of God, to his view of the "splendor of man," to his ideal of "the better community," and to his "ethical quadrilateral" of "purity, love, heroism, and humility" (p. 260). The author illustrates these teachings and others with many citations from the Gospels. But his use of many passages seems to us extremely doubtful. The story of the unrighteous steward in Luke 16 is supposed to mean: "It is likewise the duty of man to cultivate perspective in his judgment of his fellows and his outlook upon life." "Man must build his life upon character" (The Widow's Mite, Mark 12:41-44). "Man must respect the personality of others" (Jesus on John the Baptist in Matt. 11). "Man should always use his commonsense" (Matt. 7: 24-27).

It is doubtless always timely to remind people of such simple principles of a good life, Christian or otherwise. But why these principles are Protestantism's challenge at this time is not made clear. One also wonders what has happened to the great Reformation principles of justification by faith and the sovereignty of God. They have evidently ceased to be Protestant. One wishes the author had taken the trouble to explain why he has neglected the Protestant Reformation in a book on "Protestantism's Challenge." If Protestantism means adherence to a few principles of doubtful biblical authority, it is more proper to speak of Protestantism's collapse than of its challenge.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

Religionsphilosophie. By BERNHARD ROSENMÖLLER. Second edition. Münster in Westf.: Verlag Aschendorff, 1939. vii + 168 pp. RM 3.38.

This is not another textbook of the philosophy of religion. In the preface the author indicates that he does not intend to treat the whole subject matter of the philosophy of religion, but to limit his inquiry to the fundamental problems of religious knowledge, in particular, of the knowledge of God. In contrast to recent methods following mathematical or naturalistic (scientific) principles of thinking, he clearly states his own position: "I take my place, with full consciousness, in the philosophical tradition which is under the influence of Plato and which, since the beginning of Christian speculation, unrivalled, has dominated the occident until in the second half of the thirteenth century it was attacked and refuted without a sufficient reason" (p. iv). Thus he delineates the Platonic-Augustinian tradition as it finally was characteristically formulated by Bonaventura. Rosenmöller, however, does not revive medieval trends of thought, but rather proves himself an adept follower of the platonizing phenomenology of the early Max Scheler. By a masterful phenomenological analysis of the essential acts of metaphysical thinking, aesthetic and ethical experience—which constitutes the outstanding part of the book—he proves that every personal attitude and all personal life are directed by the knowledge of the existence of the Unconditioned. With every phenomenological description and emotional experience of ideas, this description of the idea of the Unconditioned shares in the difficulty which arises when the real existence of the being corresponding to the idea is to be proved, a difficulty of which the author seems to be somehow aware (cf. p. 114). Nevertheless, he convincingly demonstrates that any proof of God without recognition of the idea of the Unconditioned is fruitless. Of great value for any philosophy of religion are the methodological principles which the author develops in his introduction and conclusion, where he defines its borderline against philosophical metaphysics and theology.

ECKHARD KOEHLE

Die Polis in Kirche und Welt. Eine Lexicographische und Exegetische Studie. By KARL LUDWIG SCHMIDT. Basel: Reinhardt, 1939. vii + 111 pp.

Readers of the *Review of Religion* will recall that Professor Schmidt was recently deprived of his German citizenship by Nazi decree, and that his further contributions to the *Theologisches Woerterbuch Zum Neuen Testament* were proscribed. But in this twentieth century persecution is usually not entirely successful. This treatise is Schmidt's article on *Polis*, originally intended for the *Woerterbuch*, in greatly expanded form.

An exhaustive word study of *polis* and its derivatives is followed by a critical examination of its New Testament usage. Thereupon special attention is devoted to the earthly and heavenly Jerusalem as the holy city of God. The major emphasis of the investigation centers upon the meaning of *polis* in the *Apostolic Fathers*, the early Christian Apologists and the Alexandrian theologians, with special attention upon late studies of Origen. A score of pages disposes of the usage of Philo, Josephus, the Septuagint and of the Greco-Roman materials. In three pages the findings of the investigation are then summarized.

As far as the New Testament is concerned, its idea of *polis* and citizenship derives from eschatological and Christological considerations. It is merely an extension of the Old Testament prophecies regarding the city of God reaching their fulfilment in Christian reconstruction. This Christological-eschatological content disintegrates in the early Catholic period. The only agreement between Christian and Platonic-Stoic views of the *polis* was in expansion beyond the framework of the local *polis*. Otherwise the Platonic-Stoic concept was pantheistic, non-eschatological and humanistic, whereas the Christian concept was theistic, eschatological, dependent upon God, God-made, God-directed, the heavenly kingdom of God and the church. The heavenly *polis* is essentially the eschatological kingdom of God. As long as Christians, really citizens of heaven, dwell on earth, they collectively form the heavenly *polis* in its earthly expression which is the church. Christians on earth are aliens and pilgrims but also the temple, house, and building of God. Hence primitive Christians transferred the glory of the state to the Christian *polis*, the heavenly Jerusalem. And this Christian revaluation of the existing state made it an angelic or intermediate power, something real and significant, and yet only temporary and transitory. The thirteenth chapter of the Revelation of John is the culmination of this kind of Christian thinking. The kingdom of God will come only when the kingdoms of this earth cease to exist. Therefore, while they exist, the church which will be succeeded by the kingdom of heaven must live in opposition to the state. The church representing the heavenly scheme of things is by nature opposed to the state representing by nature the earthly pattern.

Students of political theory as well as of the New Testament must face the results of Schmidt's analysis.

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church. By CHARLES WILLIAMS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, ix + 245 pp. $2.50.

The purpose, methods, and audience of this volume are accurately set forth in the preface and dedication. It is dedicated to the "Companions of the Co-inherence," those people who care to study "the half-read wisdom of daemoniac images" and to understand the mysteries of the phrase, "This also is thou; neither is this Thou." The author is one of those modern thinkers who endeavor to express in words the truth of the affirmation of the negation which co-exists along with the affirmation of every definition. The result stretches concepts of thought and phrases of speech beyond the intelligence of all who are not initiated into the new truth. Such an attitude renders it impracticable to comment in detail on passages of the book. There are paradoxes in the history of Christianity—there have been changes, and there will be changes—but the indications of the activity of "our Lord the Spirit," as seen by the author, will be confusing for the majority of readers. There are some brilliant ideas in the work, but history and theology are "polarized" for the purposes of the author, and the average student will require a long amount of study before he can utilize the good aspects for serious scientific or religious purposes.

C.A.M.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Ancient Religions

Les traditions suméro-babyloniennes sur la création d'après les découvertes et les études récentes. By Charles-F. Jean. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1940. lxvii, 169-86.

Le gesta di Kārit-Na'man re di Tiro e Sidone. By Emilio Villa. *Studi e materiali storia delle religioni.* 1939. xv, 108-25.

The Origin of Belief Among the Greeks in the Divinity of the Heavenly Bodies. By Martin P. Nilsson. *Harvard Theological Review.* 1940. xxxiii, 1-8.

The Coming of the Pythia. By Kurt Latte. *Harvard Theological Review.* 1940. xxxiii, 9-18.

Religious Cults of the Ancient Finns. By F. Victor Fisher. *Religions.* 1940. No. 30, 38-43.

Oriental Religions

Zur Geschichte der Erforschung Chinesischer Religionen. By R. F. Merkel. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni.* 1939. xv, 90-107.

Greatness of Asoka's Conquest. By Radhakumud Mookerjee. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 583-88.

Polonnaruwa. By S. Paranavitana. *Maha-Bodhi.* 1939. xlvii, 523-34.

The University of Nalanda. By Radhakumud Mookerji. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1940, xv, 12-16.

The Will in Buddhism. By Mrs. Rhys Davids. *Hibbert Journal.* 1940. xxxviii, 251-60.

The Influence of Buddhism on the Greek System of Thought and on Christianity. By T. Vimilananda. *Maha-Bodhi.* 1939. xlvii, 549-55.

Student Life in Pre-Buddhist India. By Taponath Chakravarty. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1940. xlv, 18-22.

Conception of Freedom in the Bhagavad-Gita. By S. K. Maitra. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 430-39.

The Nature of Yoga in the Bhagavad-Gita and Patanjala Yoga-Sutras. By Sheo Narayan Lal Srivastava. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 503-7.

Karmayoga—A Historical Study. By P. M. Modi. *Review of Philosophy and Religion.* 1939. viii, no. 2, 17-24.

The Yoga Number. *Kalyana Kalpataru.* 1940. vii, no. 1.

The Sociological Concept of Dharma. By V. R. Talasikar. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 453-55.

Our Psychic Culture. By B. Bhattacharyya. *Vedanta Kesari.* 1940. xxvi, 334-37.

Knowledge and Reality. By Pandit D. C. Bhattacharya. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 610-15.

Sikh Monotheism and Its Background. By CHARANJIT S. BINDRA. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. XLIV, 450-53.

Guru Nanak and World Peace. By CHARANJIT SINGH BINDRA. *Buddhism in England.* 1940. XIV, 132-33.

Swami Rama Tirtha: An Appreciation. By C. F. ANDREWS. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. XLIV, 424-30.

The Ram Raj of Gandhiji for India. *Muslim Review.* 1940. XXVI, 20-23.

An Appeal to Gandhiji. By S. A. H. *Muslim Review.* 1940. XXVI, 39-44.

Legacy of Swami Vivekananda. By the Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. XLIV, 574-82.

Swami Vivekananda's Economic Ideas. By SHIB CHANDRA DUTT. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. XLIV, 537-44.

Some Vedantic Views on Universal Causation. By ASHOKANATH SHASTRI. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. XLIV, 496-98.

The Progress and Prospects of Vedanta Movement in France. By MARCEL SAUTON. *Vedanta Kesari.* 1940. XXVI, 338-45.

Hell and Heaven. By SAIYID ALI ABBAS KUJHWAI. 1940. XXVI, 11-19.

Sufi-ism. By HIRA LALL CHOPRA. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. XLIV, 553-56.

Islam and Democracy. By IZHAR HUSAIN SAHIB—KUJHWA. *Muslim Review.* 1940. XXVI, 3-10.

JUDAISM

David's War Against the Ammonites. By CHARLES B. CHAVEL. *Jewish Quarterly Review.* 1940. XXX, 257-61.

Jewish Apocalypse in the Time of Christ. By N. H. PARKER. *Crozer Quarterly.* 1940. XVII, 33-46.

Needed: A Spirit of Inquiry in Jewish Religion. By MORDECAI M. KAPLAN. *Reconstructionist.* 1940. V, no. 19, 6-11.

The Meaning of Reconstruction. By MORDECAI KAPLAN. *Reconstructionist.* 1940. VI, no. 1, 8-19.

Recent Trends in Hebrew Literature. By EISIG SILBERSCHLAG. *Jewish Social Studies.* 1940. II, 3-22.

CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL

La Signification des gestes du Christ. By R. THIBAUT, S.I. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1940. LXVII, 14-31.

La Vie dans l'Esprit d'après saint Paul (Romains, ch. 8). By JOSEPH HUBY. *Recherches de science religieuse.* 1940. XXX, 5-39.

Études sur la contemplation dans le Nouveau Testament. By JULES LEBRETON. *Recherches de science religieuse.* 1939. XXIX, 568-93; 1940. XXX, 81-108.

Shubbiha Lahum: A Suggestion from the New Testament. By ERIC F. F. BISHOP. *Moslem World.* 1940. XXX, 67-75.

The Fundamental Motif of Christianity. By Erwin R. Goodenough. *Journal of Religion.* 1940. xx, 1-14.

Christianity and History. By E. R. Hardy, Jr. *Theology.* 1940. xl, 14-25; 104-11.

Faith and Mysticism: Two Studies. By Norbert Drewitt, O.P. *Thomist.* 1940. ii, 59-87.

Angelos. By Margherita Guarducci. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni.* 1939. xv, 79-89.

Early Christianity in Arabia. By Ida Paterson Storm. *Moslem World.* 1940. xxx, 7-13.

Christianity and Catholicism. By F. C. Capozzi. *Chronicle.* 1940. xl, 82-86; 106-10.

Sainte Marie, Mère de Dieu. By E. Mersch, S.I. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1940. lxvii, 129-52.

Vita, Inventio et Miracula S. Enimiae. By C. Brunel. *Analecta Bollandiana.* 1939. lvii, 237-98.

La Passion de S. Pierre de Capitolias († 13 janvier 715). By Paul Peeters. *Analecta Bollandiana.* 1939. lvii, 299-333.

Les Jésuites a Paray-le-Monial (1619-1763). By G. Guitton, S.I. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1940. lxvii, 153-68.

La Vie secrète des Jésuites belges de 1773 à 1830. By E. de Moreau, S.I. *Nouvelle revue théologique.* 1940. lxvii, 32-69.

"The Movement of Sound. . . ." By A. Francis Klarmann. *Liturgical Arts.* 1940. viii, 23-27.

The Modern Relevance of John Donne. By H. Escott. *Congregational Quarterly.* 1940. xviii, 57-64.

The Problem of *The Praise of Folly*. By T. S. K. Scott-Craig. *Theology.* 1940. xl, 121-28.

The Rise of European Pietism in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By Milton C. Westphal. *Crozer Quarterly.* 1940. xvii, 3-24.

Swedenborg's Influence on Swedish Philosophy. By Axel Lundeberg. *New Christianity.* 1940. vi, 7-12.

The Function of Cathedrals. A symposium. *Theology.* 1940. xl, 25-41.

The Six-Principle Baptists in America. By W. T. Whitley. *Chronicle* (Baptist). 1940. iii, 3-9.

The English Deists. By E. S. Waterhouse. *Religions.* 1940. No. 30, 19-25.

John Adams: Puritan, Deist, Humanist. By Howard Ioan Fielding. *Journal of Religion.* 1940. xx, 33-46.

The Permanent Significance of Evangelicanism in the Episcopal Church. By Alexander C. Zabriskie. *Anglican Theological Review.* 1940. xxii, 7-24.

In the Palace of the Czar Sixty Years Ago. By Joseph Novotny. *Crozer Quarterly.* 1940. xvii, 25-32.

The Protestant Churches of the Continent. By A. E. GARVIE. *Congregational Quarterly*. 1940. XVIII, 38-47.

Die Wohlyniendeutschen. *Christliche Welt*. 1940. LIV, 53-56.

Protestantism and the Origins of Modern Science. By A. S. NASH. *Religion in Life*. 1940. IX, 66-78.

CHRISTIANITY: CONTEMPORARY

A Symposium: The Renaissance of Biblical Theology. *Journal of Bible and Religion*. 1940. VIII, 11-39.

More Western Observations. By MAURICE LAVANOUX. *Liturgical Arts*. 1940. VIII, 27-34.

La première encyclique de S.S. Pie XII. By J. LEVIE, S.I. *Nouvelle revue théologique*. 1940. LVI, 6-13.

"The Glory That Excelleth." By "SHAHEEDA." *Moslem World*. 1940. XXX, 46-53.

Die Einheit der Ost-und Westkirche, zur 500. Wiederkehr des Unionskonzils von Florenz, 1439/1939. (Symposium.) *Eine heilige Kirche*. 1939. XXI, 169-313.

The Church as a Fellowship (Church Congress Syllabus IV. 3). By JOHN A. F. MAYNARD. *Anglican Theological Review*. 1940. XXII, 36-46.

The Reunion of the Churches: Some Fundamental Problems. By ALFRED E. GARVIE. *Christendom*. 1940. V, 66-74.

Ecumenical Values of Liturgical Worship. By JOHN CROCKER. *Christendom*. 1940. V, 26-32.

World Christianity: Assumptions and Actuality. By HENRY P. VAN DUSEN. *Religion in Life*. 1940. IX, 41-55.

The Proposed Concordat. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. *Chronicle*. 1940. XL, 129-31.

National Socialism and Christianity: Can They Be Reconciled? By WILHELM PAUCK. *Journal of Religion*. 1940. XX, 15-32.

Christians in Russia Today. From an article in *Antirelioznik*. *Religious Digest*. 1940. No. 54, 17-18.

Vom ibero-amerikanischen Protestantismus. By GEORGE H. NEUENDORFF. *Christliche Welt*. 1940. LIV, 61-63.

American and British Christianity. By M. E. AUBREY. *Christendom*. 1940. V, 47-53.

Urchristliche Enderwartung und urchristliches Ethos. By KURT LEESE. *Christliche Welt*. 1940. LIV, 31-35.

Christian Moralism in America. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. *Radical Religion*. 1940. V, 16-20.

Christian Faith and Natural Law. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. *Theology*. 1940. XL, 86-94.

The Church's Effort on the Brink of War. By IVAN LEE HOLT. *Christendom*. 1940. V, 85-95.

General Theory of Religion

What Is Religion? By D. T. Suzuki. *Buddhism in England.* 1940. xiv, 138-39.

The Nature of Religious Experience. By S. N. L. Shrivastava. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 604-10.

The Spirit of Man and the Spirit of God. By the Bishop of Truro. *Modern Churchman,* 1939. xxix, 473-84; 1940. xxix, 523-37; 569-82.

Place of the Mystic in Society. By S. David Malaiperuman. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1939. xliv, 528-32.

Reason and Revelation. By Mahendranath Sircar. *Prabuddha Bharata.* 1940. xlv, 25-30.

Religion and Economic Change. By Robert Gordis. *Reconstructionist.* 1940. vi, no. 2, 6-13.

Does Macmurray Understand Marx? By Elizabeth P. Lam. *Journal of Religion.* 1940. xx, 47-65.

Chaos and Cosmos. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. *Religion in Life.* 1940. ix, 16-30.

The Contribution of *Existenz-Philosophie.* By Julius Seelye Bixler. *Harvard Theological Review.* 1940. xxxiii, 35-63.

We regret to state that, due to the European war, ten of our foreign periodicals are not being received.

INDEX

Articles and Communications

BECK, MAXIMILIAN, On Typical Misinterpretations of the Religious and Moral Experience 416

DAVIDS, CAROLINE A. F. RHYS, Poems by Monk and Nun 129

FLEMING, E. McCLUNG, Symbol and Myth in Religion 170

GARVIE, ALFRED E., Is God Impersonal, Personal, or Supra-personal? 17

GRAY, LOUIS H., A Survey of Studies in Cornish Hagiography and Church History 431

HEINEMANN, ISAAK, The Attitude of the Ancient World Toward Judaism 385

LEHMANN, PAUL L., The Authority of the Church and Freedom .. 159

MACINTOSH, DOUGLAS CLYDE, Is Theology Reducible to Mythology? 140

———— A Rejoinder to Professor Niebuhr's Reply 434

———— Theology, Valuational or Existential? 23

MANNING, CLARENCE A., The Orthodox Churches of the Balkans in 1939 45

MEEK, THEOPHILE JAMES, Primitive Monotheism and the Religion of Moses 286

MILLER, BENJAMIN, The Demands of the Religious Consciousness 401

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD, A Reply to Professor Macintosh 304

OLMSTEAD, A. T., Zoroaster 3

SIMSON, OTTO GEORG VON, The Bamberg Rider 257

WINNETT, FRED V., Primitive Arabian and Semitic Religion 282

Aini, Mehemed Ali, *Un grand saint de l'Islam: 'Abd al-Kâdir Guilînî*, 192

American sects: Schneider, 491; Sonne, 241; Sweet, 463

Ancient religions: Burrows, 108; Carleton, 484; Dumézil, 484; Jacobsohn, 234; Olmstead, 3; see also Periodical literature

Anderson, Paul R., review of Ortegat, 92

Andrus, Robert G., review of Matthews, 119

Angus, S., *Essential Christianity*, 371

Anselm, St.: Schmitt, 240

Aquinas, Thomas, *Selected Writings*, 354

Arabian religion: Winnett, 282

Archer, John Clark, reviews of Bhattacharya, 183; Wadia, 244

Atiya, Aziz Suryal, *The Crusades in the Later Middle Ages*, 208

Bahaism: Sohrab, 440

Ballou, Robert O., Ed., *The Bible of the World*, 444

Barker, Reginald J., *It Began in Galilee*, 119

Baron, Salo W., review of Finkelstein, 196

Barth, Karl, *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God*, 229

Beck, Maximilian, On Typical Misinterpretations of the Religious and Moral Experience, 416

Bell, Richard, translator, *The Qur'an*, 331

Benedict, Ruth, review of Parsons, 438

Bennett, John C., review of Barker, 119

Bentwich, Norman, *Solomon Schechter*, 61
Berdyaev, Nicolas, *Spirit and Reality*, 469
Bergson: Moore, 230
Bernard, Theos, *Penthouse of the Gods*, 235
Bernard of Clairvaux: Castrén, 68
Bhattacharya, Haridas, *The Foundations of Living Faith*, 183
Bible: Ballou, 444; Campbell, 110; Sohrab, 440
Old Testament: Buttenweiser, 55; Cohon, 339; Feldman, 367; Greenstone, 239; Kraeling, 342; Leslie, 368; Meek, 286; Schmidt, 309
New Testament: Clark, 109; Dibelius, 460; Dodd, 110; Knox, 202; Nock, 202; Percy, 352; Schmidt, 111, 496; Wilson, 369
Black, Marvin M., *The Pendulum Swings Back*, 120
Blake, William: *A Descriptive Catalogue of an Exhibition of the Works of William Blake Selected from Collections in the United States*, 240
Blau, Joseph L., reviews of Feldman, 367; Hopper, 206; Rosenthal, 200; Sjöberg, 334; Trachtenberg, 456
Block, Marguerite, reviews of Black, 120; Blake, 240; Fletcher, 247; Roberts, 247; Wicks, 377; Younghusband, 376
Bokser, Ben Zion, review of Jung, 487
Borton, Hugh, review of Dilts, 106
Bradshaw, Marion J., *Third Class World*, 237; review of Slater, 473
Branscomb, Harvie, review of Lindeskog, 350
Briggs, George Weston, *Gorakhnāth and the Kānphaṭa Yogīs*, 450
Brown, W. Norman, review of Briggs, 450
Brunton, Paul, *Indian Philosophy and Modern Culture*, 486
Buddhism: Ballou, 444; Davids, 129; Gordon, 187; Sohrab, 440; Vasubandhu, 50; see also Periodical literature
Burrows, Millar, *The Basis of Israelite Marriage*, 108
Burtt, Edwin A., *Types of Religious Philosophy*, 244; review of Perry, 249
Buttenwieser, Moses, *The Psalms*, 55
Byrne, Eugene H., reviews of Gragg and Gabel, 113; McNeill and Gamer, 112

Campbell, W. A., *The Cornerstone of Christianity*, 110
Carleton, Patrick, *Buried Empires*, 484
Cassady, Maynard L., review of Stefanesco, 115
Castrén, Olavi, *Bernhard von Clairvaux*, 68
Chapin, Helen B., review of Gordon, 187
Chinese religion: Ballou, 444; Bradshaw, 237; Sohrab, 440; see also Buddhism and Periodical literature
Church and state: Frey, 86; Macfarland, 493; Strickland, 490
Clark, Kenneth W., *A Descriptive Catalogue of Greek New Testament Manuscripts in America*, 109
Cohon, Beryl D., *The Prophets*, 339
Coolidge, Mary L., review of Gilson, 71

Dakin, A. Hazard, review of Emrich, 221
D'Arcy, M. C., see Aquinas, 354
Davids, Caroline A. F. Rhys, Poems by Monk and Nun, 129
Dewey, John, review of Macintosh, 359
Dibelius, Martin, *The Message of Jesus Christ*, 460
Dickie, Edgar P., *Revelation and Response*, 96
Dilts, Marion M. *The Pageant of Japanese History*, 106
Dodd, C. H., *History and the Gospel*, 110
Dostoevsky: Lehmann, 159
Duker, Abraham G., review of Goldberg, 347
Dumézil, Georges, *Mythes et dieux des Germains*, 484

Duyvendak, J. J. L., review of Vasubandhu, 50

Eastern Churches: Berdyaev, 469; Gorodetzky, 116; *Kyrillos Loukaris*, 211; Manning, 45
Easton, Burton Scott, reviews of Dibelius, 460; Knox, Nock, 202; Palmer, 375
Edgerton, Franklin, review of Otto, 447
Egypt: Jacobsohn, 234
Emrich, Richard S., *The Conception of the Church in the Writings of the German-English Philosopher Baron von Hügel*, 221

Fairchild, Hoxie N., review of Scudder, 466
Feldman, A. J., *A Companion to the Bible*, 367
Ferm, Vergilius, review of Barth, 229
Finkelstein, Louis, *The Pharisees*, 196; review of Bentwich, 61
Fleming, E. McClung, Symbol and Myth in Religion, 171
Foster, Frank Hugh, *The Modern Movement in American Theology*, 217
Freud: Rosmarin, 336
Frey, Arthur, *Cross and Swastika*, 86
Friess, Horace L., reviews of Bradshaw, 237; Linfield, 102; Wadia, 366
Fuerth-Sulzbach, Maria, review of Castrén, 68

Gabel, Leona C., *The Commentaries of Aeneas Silvius Picclomini, Pius II*, 113
Gamer, Helena M., *Medieval Handbooks of Penance*, 112
Gandhi: Wadia, 366
Garland, Hamlin, *The Mystery of the Buried Crosses*, 363
Garrett, Christina H., review of Haller, 74
Garvie, Alfred E., Is God Impersonal, Personal, or Supra-personal? 17
Germany: Dumézil, 484; Frey, 86; Hauer, 323; Macfarland, 493
Gilson, Etienne, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*, 71
Glover, Carl A., *With the Twelve*, 488
Goldberg, David, *"Perish the Jew!" A Clinical Treatment of Anti-Semitism*, 347
Gordon, Antoinette K., *The Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism*, 187; review of Bernard, 235
Gorodetzky, Nadejda, *The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought*, 116
Gragg, Florence A., *The Commentaries of Aeneas Silvius Picclomini, Pius II*, 113
Grant, Frederick C., review of Percy, 352
Gray, Louis H., A Survey of Studies in Cornish Hagiography and Church History, 431
Greenstone, Julius H., *The Holy Scriptures: Numbers*, 239
Grensted, L. W., *This Business of Living*, 246

Hailperin, Herman, *A Rabbi Teaches*, 239
Haller, William, *The Rise of Puritanism*, 74
Hamilton, Clarence H., see Vasubandhu, 50
Haroutunian, Joseph, review of Moehlman, 494
Harrison, G. Elsie, *Son to Susanna: The Private Life of John Wesley*, 114
Hartmann, Gerda, review of Régamey, 327
Hauer, J. W., *Glaubensgeschichte der Indogermanen*, 323
Heinemann, Isaak, The Attitude of the Ancient World Toward Judaism, 385
Helsen, Harry, review of Garland, 363
Hinduism: see India
Hoffman, Isidor B., review of Hailperin, 239
Hopper, Vincent Foster, *Medieval Number Symbolism*, 206
Hopwood, P. G. S., *A Testament of Faith*, 361

Hügel, von: Emrich, 221
Hume, Robert E., review of Sohrab, 440

India, religions of: Ballou, 444; Bradshaw, 237; Briggs, 450; Hauer, 323; Jackson, 105; Macnicol, 235; Otto, 447; Régamey, 327; Śāntinātha, 105; Sohrab, 440; Wadia, 366; see also Periodical literature
Islam: Aini, 192; Atiya, 208; Ballou, 444; Bell, 331; Sadr-ud-Din, 486; Sohrab, 440; see also Periodical literature

Jackson, R. J., *India's Quest for Reality*, 105
Jacobsohn, Helmuth, *Die dogmatische Stellung des Königs in der Theologie der alten Aegypter*, 234
James, William: Moore, 230
Japan: Dilts, 106; Kato, 52; see also Periodical literature
Jeffery, Arthur, reviews of Aini, 192; Atiya, 208; Bell, 331; Sadr-ud-Din, 486; Zajaczkowski, 238
Jones, Rufus M., *The Flowering of Mysticism: The Friends of God in the Fourteenth Century*, 372
Judaism: Ballou, 444; Bentwich, 61; Burrows, 108; Finkelstein, 196; Goldberg, 347; Heinemann, 385; Jung, 487; Lindeskog, 350; Lods, 452; Meek, 281; Rosenthal, 200; Rosmarin, 336; Sjöberg, 334; Sohrab, 440; Trachtenberg, 456; Winnett, 282; see also Periodical literature
Jung, Leo, Ed., *Judaism in a Changing World*, 487

Kato, Genchi, *A Bibliography of Shinto*, 52
Kayser, Stephen S., review of Cohon, 339
Kierkegaard, Sören, *Fear and Trembling*, 357
Knox, Raymond C., reviews of Angus, 371; Glover, 488; Wilson, 369
Knox, Wilfred L., *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, 202
Koch, G. Adolf, review of Sonne, 241
Koehle, Eckhard, review of Rosenmöller, 495
Kraeling, Emil G., *The Book of the Ways of God*, 342; review of Greenstone, 239
Kristofersson, Sture, *Psalmboksförslagen av år 1765-67 och 1793*, 489

Lamaism: see Tibet
Latourette, Kenneth S., *The Thousand Years of Uncertainty*, 63
Latta, Maurice C., review of Sweet, 463
Lawson, Evald Benjamin, review of Kristofersson, 489
Lehmann, Paul L., The Authority of the Church and Freedom, 159
Leidecker, Kurt F., reviews of Hauer, 323; Radhakrishnan, 177
Leslie, Elmer A., *The Prophets Tell Their Own Story*, 368
Lieb, Frederick G., *Sight Unseen*, 248
Lindeskog, Gösta, *Die Jesusfrage im neuzeitlichen Judentum*, 350
Linfield, H. S., *State Population Census by Faiths*, 102
Lods, Adolphe, *La Religion d'Israël*, 452
Loukaris, Kyrillos: Volume issued on the three hundredth anniversary of his death, 211

Macfarland, Charles S., *The Christian Faith in a Day of Crisis*, "I Was in Prison," 493; review of Frey, 86
Macintosh, Douglas C., Theology, Valuational or Existential? 23; Is Theology Reducible to Mythology? 140; A Rejoinder to Professor Niebuhr's Reply, 434; *Social Religion*, 359; see also Niebuhr, 304
McKee, Elmore, *What Use Is Religion?* 376

McNeill, John T., *Environmental Factors in Christian History*, 374; *Medieval Handbooks of Penance*, 112
Macnicol, Nicol, *Hindu Scriptures*, 235
Magic: Trachtenberg, 456
Malebranche nel terzo centenario della nascita, 373
Mallett, Marcus B., review of *Malebranche*, 373
Manning, Clarence A., The Orthodox Churches of the Balkans in 1939, 45; reviews of Berdyaev, 469; Gorodetsky, 116; *Kyrillos Loukaris*, 211; Williams, 497
Marsh, Gordon Harper, review of Dumézil, 484
Matthews, W. R., *Signposts to God*, 119
Meek, Theophile James, Primitive Monotheism and the Religion of Moses, 286
Mendelsohn, I., review of Burrows, 108
Mercer, Samuel A. B., reviews of Carleton, 484; Jacobsohn, 234
Middle Ages: Atiya, 208; Castrén, 68; Gilson, 71; Hopper, 206; Latourette, 63; McNeill and Gamer, 112
Miller, Benjamin, The Demands of the Religious Consciousness, 401
Miller, Randolph C., review of McKee, 376
Moehlman, Conrad Henry, *Protestantism's Challenge*, 494; reviews of Schmidt, 111, 496
Mohammedanism: see Islam
Monsma, Peter H., review of Dickie, 96
Moore, John Morrison, *Theories of Religious Experience*, 230
Moravian Brethren: Pleijel, 82
Morlan, George K., *Laymen Speaking*, 118
Morse, James King, *Jedidiah Morse*, 213
Muilenburg, James, reviews of Buttenwieser, 55; Kraeling, 342
Murphy, Gardner, review of Tyrrell, 476
Mysticism: Blake, 240; Castrén, 68; Jones, 372
Mythology: Dumézil, 484; Fleming, 171

National Council on Religion in Higher Education: Fleming, 170
Niebuhr, Reinhold: A Reply to Professor Macintosh, 304; Macintosh, 140; 434
Nock, Arthur Darby, *St. Paul*, 202

O'Connell, Geoffrey, *Naturalism in American Education*, 120
Olivier, A., *La Strophe sacrée en St. Jean*, 370
Olmstead, A. T., Zoroaster, 3
Olson, Alma Luise, review of Kierkegaard, 357
Oriental philosophy: Brunton, 486; Otto, 447; Radhakrishnan, 177; Régamey, 327; Śāntinātha, 105; Vasubandhu, 50; see also Periodical literature
Ortegat, Paul, *Philosophie de la religion*, 92
Orthodox Church, see Eastern Churches
Otto, Rudolf, *The Original Gītā*, 447; see also Moore, 230

Palmer, Albert W., *The Art of Conducting Public Worship*, 375
Parsons, Elsie Clews, *Pueblo Indian Religion*, 438
Paton, William, *World Community*, 243
Paul, St.: Knox, Nock, 202
Percy, Ernst, *Untersuchungen über den Ursprung der johanneischen Theologie*, 352
Periodical literature: 122, 250, 375, 498
Peritz, Ismar J., review of Leslie, 368
Perry, Charles M., *Toward a Dimensional Realism*, 249
Pharisees, see Finkelstein, 196
Pietism: Pleijel, 82; Schneider, 491
Piper, Otto, *God in History*, 242
Pleijel, Hilding, *Das Kirchenproblem der Brüdergemeine in Schweden*, 82
Primitive religions: Meek, 286; Parsons,

438; Schmidt, 309; Winnett, 282; see also Periodical literature
Psychical research, Garland, 363; Lieb, 248; Tyrrell, 476
Psychology: Fletcher, 247; Grensted, 246; Roberts, 247
Puritanism: Haller, 74

Radhakrishnan, S., *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, 177
Randall, H. H., Jr., review of Schmitt, 240
Rath, George E.: reviews of Latourette, 63; Macfarland, 493
Régamey, Konstanty, *The Bhadramāyākāravyākaraṇa, Three Chapters from the Samādhirājasūtra*, 327
Reustle, Frederick, review of Morlan, 118
Richardson, Cyril R., reviews of McNeill, 374; Smith, 113
Roberts, David E., review of Piper, 242
Roberts, Harry, *The Troubled Mind*, 247
Rochedieu, Edmond, *La Personnalité divine: Comment faut-il l'envisager?* 223
Roman Catholicism: Castrén, 68; Emrich, 221; Gilson, 71; Gragg and Gabel, 113; Gray, 431; Latourette, 63; Lehmann, 159; McNeill and Gamer, 112; Ortegat, 92; Schmitt, 240; Smith, 113; see also Periodical literature
Rosenmöller, Bernhard, *Religionsphilosophie*, 495
Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., ed., *Law and Religion*, Vol. III, *Judaism and Christianity*, 200
Rosenthal, Henry M., review of Rosmarin, 336
Rosmarin, Trude Weiss, *The Hebrew Moses: An Answer to Sigmund Freud*, 336
Rowell, Teresina, review of Ballou, 444

Sadr-ud-Din, Maulana, *Einleitung in den Heiligen Koran*, 486
Śāntinātha, Sādhu, *The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion; Māyāvāda, or the Non-dualistic Philosophy*, 105
Schechter, Solomon: Bentwich, 61
Schmidt, Karl L., *Die Polis in Kirche und Welt*, 496; *Le Problème du Christianisme primitif*, 111
Schmidt, Wilhelm, *Primitive Revelation; The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology*, 309
Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, Ed., *S. Anselmi cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia*, 240
Schneider, Carl E., *The German Church on the American Frontier*, 491
Schneider, Herbert W., reviews of O'Connell, 120; Paton, 243
Schwarze, W. N., review of Pleijel, 82
Scott, E. F., reviews of Clark, 109; Dodd, 110
Scudder, Vida Dutton, *The Privilege of Age*, 466
Shinto: see Japan
Simson, Otto von, The Bamberg Rider, 257
Sjöberg, Erik, *Gott und die Sünder im Palästinischen Judentum*, 334
Slater, R. H. L., *God of the Living*, 473
Smith, H. Maynard, *Pre-Reformation England*, 113
Sohrab, Mirza Ahmad, Ed., *The Bible of the World*, 440
Sonne, Niels H., *Liberal Kentucky, 1780-1828*, 241
Spiegelberg, Friedrich, reviews of Brunton, 486; Jackson, 105; Macnicol, 235; Śāntinātha, 105
Spinka, Matthew, *Environmental Factors in Christian History*, 374
Stafford, Geoffrey W., review of Harrison, 114
Stefanesco, Marin, *Le Problème de la méthode*, 115
Stoudt, John J., review of Jones, 372
Strickland, Reba Carolyn, *Religion and the*

State in Georgia in the Eighteenth Century, 490
Styler, G., review of Campbell, 110
Swedish Church: Kristofersson, 489; Pleijel, 82
Sweet, William Warren, *Religion on the American Frontier, 1783-1850*. Vol. III: *The Congregationalists*, 463
Swihart, Altman K., review of Schneider, 491
Symbolism: Fleming, 170; Gordon, 187; Hopper, 206; von Simson, 257

Talbert, C. A., review of Strickland, 490
Taves, Ernest, review of Tyrrell, 476
Terrien, Samuel L., reviews of Lods, 452; Olivier, 370; Rochedieu, 223
Thomas, George F., review of Moore, 230
Tibet: Bernard, 235; Gordon, 187
Trachtenberg, Joshua, *Jewish Magic and Superstition*, 456
Tsunoda, Ryusaku, review of Kato, 52
Tyrell, G. N. M., *Science and Psychical Phenomena*, 476

Vasubandhu, *Wei Shih Er Shih Lun, The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-only*, 50

Wadia, P. A., *Mahatma Gandhi*, 366
Wadia, Sophia, *The Brotherhood of Religions*, 244
Wallis, Wilson, D., review of Schmidt, 309
Walsh, Daniel C., review of D'Arcy, 354
Waterman, W. R., review of Morse, 213
Wegrocki, Henry J., review of Lieb, 248
Wesley, John: Harrison, 114
Wicks, Robert R., *One Generation and Another*, 377
Williams, Charles, *The Descent of the Dove*, 497
Williams, Daniel D., review of Foster, 217
Willoughby, Harold, *Environmental Factors in Christian History*, 374
Wills, J. R., review of Hopwood, 361
Wilson, Dorothy F., *The Gospel Sources*, 369
Winnett, Fred V., Primitive Arabian and Semitic Religion, 282
Wolfe, Paul A., review of Grensted, 246
Wright, William Kelley, review of Burtt, 246

Yogis: Briggs, 450
Younghusband, Sir Francis, *The Sum of Things*, 376

Zajaczkowski, Ananiasz, *Manuel arabe de la langue des Turcs et des Kiptchaks*, 238
Zoroastrianism: Ballou, 444; Olmstead, 3; Sohrab, 440

Review of religion. v.4, 1939-40

RR 20 44

APR 9

AP 7 '44

FE 14 '58

2 4 '44 Thesis

v.4
1939-40

CBPac

v.4

JUN

MAR 1

MAR 2

MY 5 '54

3 2400 00330 8149

GTU Library